State v. Holmes

• Decision Date: 08 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 54965-1-I.,54965-1-I.
• Citation: 117 P.3d 360,129 Wn. App. 24
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Wayne H. HOLMES, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 360

117 P.3d 360

129 Wn. App. 24

STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Wayne H. HOLMES, Respondent.

No. 54965-1-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.

August 8, 2005.

Thomas M. Curtis, Snohomish County Pros. Office, Everett, WA, for Appellant.

Eric Broman, Christopher Gibson, Nielsen Broman & Koch, Seattle, WA, Catherine Glinski, Manchester, WA, for Respondent.

GROSSE, J.

¶ 1 The Washington Supreme Court decision in City of Redmond v. Moore¹ did not invalidate the crime of driving while license suspended in the third degree.² Rather, it invalidated the process by which drivers have their licenses suspended in certain circumstances. Because police are not required to know whether a driver was afforded due process when his or her license was suspended in order to have probable cause to arrest a driver for driving while license suspended in the third degree, and then conduct a search subsequent to the arrest, we reverse.

FACTS

¶ 2 On October 9, 2003, Wayne Holmes was stopped for a traffic infraction. The police officer checked the Department of Licensing (DOL) records which showed that Holmes's license had been suspended in the third degree for failing to pay his tickets.³ The officer arrested Holmes for violating RCW 46.20.342(1)(c). In searching Holmes's person incident to the arrest, the officer found a pipe of the type commonly used to smoke drugs, pills, heroin, and cocaine in Holmes's left front pocket. After being read his Miranda⁴ rights, Holmes told the police that there was cocaine and heroin in the car, along with a black bag by the passenger from seat that had syringes in it. The police then continued searching Holmes's vehicle and found heroin, cocaine and drug paraphernalia. The Snohomish County Prosecutor charged Holmes with possession of a controlled substance.

¶ 3 After Holmes was arrested and charged, in City of Redmond v. Moore,⁵ the Washington Supreme Court held that RCW 46.20.289 and .324(1) did not provide adequate protections for a defendant's due process rights, and that an order suspending a license under those provisions was void.⁶ Holmes moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Moore⁷ and a prior decision in State v. White.⁸ Holmes argued that because his license suspension was unconstitutional, his arrest was therefore invalid, and evidence seized as a result of the unlawful arrest must be suppressed. The superior court agreed, suppressed the evidence, and dismissed the charge against Holmes. The State appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶ 4 The central question in this case is not whether there is a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Instead the appropriate question is whether police officers are required to know for certain that the DOL provided sufficient due process in suspending a driver's license before they can form a reasonable belief that the crime of driving while license suspended in the third degree has been committed and arrest the driver. We conclude that police officers are not required to possess such knowledge to have probable cause to make an arrest in such circumstances.

¶ 5 Holmes argues that because the DOL suspended his license without due process, his subsequent arrest for driving while license suspended in the third degree lacked authority of law. Thus, he argues, the subsequent search of his car was an unconstitutional invasion of his privacy rights under Washington Constitution article I, section 7, triggering the automatic application of the exclusionary rule.

¶ 6 Holmes relies on State v. White⁹ and our recent decision in State v. Wallin¹⁰ in support of his argument. However, both cases are distinguishable. In White, the Washington Supreme Court held that a statute which made it a crime for a person to fail to disclose correct information to a police officer was unconstitutionally vague and could not be the basis of criminal sanctions. White was arrested under suspicion of violating this unconstitutionally vague statute and a subsequent search yielded incriminating goods. When White was arrested, there was no probable cause to believe White had committed any crime other than that defined by the unconstitutional statute.

¶ 7 The White court held that even though the police officer was enforcing a presumptively valid statute when he arrested White, the arrest was unlawful and the fruits of the search were subject to the exclusionary rule. In so holding, the Washington Supreme Court went to great lengths to distinguish its case from a nearly identical United States Supreme Court case, Michigan v. DeFillippo,¹¹ in which that Court found the evidence to be admissible.¹² In DeFillippo, the United States Supreme Court determined a similar statute to be unconstitutional and held that the purposes of the exclusionary rule would not have been served by suppressing evidence gained as the result of the police officers' good faith arrests under a presumptively valid statute.¹³

¶ 8 The White court distinguished its case from DeFillippo on three grounds. First, the court determined White's arrest was partially based on a flagrantly unconstitutional statute and thus, the arrest was invalid. The court cited to the following language in DeFillippo:

"The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its unconstitutionality — with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws."¹⁴

The court determined that White's arrest had been at least partially based on a flagrantly unconstitutional statute and thus, even under DeFillippo, his arrest would have been invalid and the evidence inadmissible.

¶ 9 Second, the court determined that the officers' search and seizure of White was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because White's detention was unreasonably long and his refusal to disclose his name, address, and other information could not be the legal basis of an arrest.¹⁵

¶ 10 And finally, the White court determined that Washington Constitution article I, section 7 affords greater protections than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court reasoned:

The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in DeFillippo is justifiable only if one accepts the basic premise that the exclusionary rule is merely a remedial measure for Fourth Amendment violations. As a remedial measure, evidence is excluded only when the purposes of the exclusionary rule can be served. This approach permits the exclusionary remedy to be completely severed from the right to be free from unreasonable government intrusions. Const. art. 1, § 7 differs from this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in that it clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy with no express limitations . . . The important place of the right to privacy in Const. art. 1, § 7 seems to us to require that whenever the right is unreasonably violated, the remedy must follow. . . . Without an immediate application of the exclusionary rule whenever an individual's right to privacy is unreasonably invaded, the protections of the Fourth Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 7 are seriously eroded. . . . Such a rule will add stability to the rights of individual citizens, discourage the legislature from passing provisions akin to RCW 9A.76.020, and will make law enforcement more predictable.¹⁶

The court determined that because White's arrest was without authority of law, the subsequent search was an unreasonable abrogation of his privacy rights under the Washington Constitution, thereby triggering the automatic application of the exclusionary rule.

¶ 11 White is distinguishable from the case at bar. The legal authority for Holmes's arrest flows from RCW 10.31.100(3)(e), which provides that, "Any police officer having probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a violation of any of the following traffic laws shall have the authority to arrest the person: . . . RCW 46.20.342, relating to driving a motor vehicle while operator's license is suspended or revoked." Holmes was arrested for violating RCW 46.20.342(1)(c), which defines the crime of driving while license suspended in the third degree. The Moore court did not find RCW 46.20.342(1)(c) to be unconstitutional. Rather, it found RCW 46.20.289 and .324(1) to be unconstitutional because they allowed for the suspension of licenses without affording due process.

¶ 12 In White, the basis of the search was the officer's reasonable belief that White had committed a constitutionally invalid crime. White's arrest, therefore, was without authority of law because the crime that formed the basis of that arrest was itself invalid. The legal authority for Holmes's arrest and search was a constitutionally valid statute, RCW 10.31.100(3)(e), and the arresting officer's reasonable belief that Holmes had committed the constitutionally valid crime of driving with a suspended license. Because the crime that formed the basis of Holmes's arrest was constitutionally valid, it provided valid authority for his arrest if supported by probable cause. Holmes's right to privacy is thus measured by whether probable cause justified his arrest, as he does not challenge the scope of the subsequent search.¹⁷

¶ 13 In State v. Wallin,¹⁸ Wallin violated the terms of his community placement for the crime of first degree child molestation, committed between 1988 and 1990. As a result, the court extended the period of his community placement to the statutory maximum of 10 years. In 2003, a neighbor reported Wallin was taking pictures of her teenage nieces from his apartment window. The police reported the incident to Wallin's Community Corrections Officer (CCO), who felt this information formed the basis of a "`well-founded suspicion'" or a "`reasonable suspicion'" of a parole violation justifying a search of Wallin's home without a warrant.¹⁹ The subsequent...