State v. Hoot

• Decision Date: 11 April 1903
• Citation: 94 N.W. 564,120 Iowa 238
• Parties: THE STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. JEROME W. HOOT, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

94 N.W. 564

120 Iowa 238

THE STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. JEROME W. HOOT, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

April 11, 1903

Appeal from Blackhawk District Court.--HON. A. S. BLAIR, Judge.

THE indictment charges the defendant with an assault with intent to commit murder. He was tried, convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of ten years. From the judgment he appeals.

Affirmed.

C. E Pickett for appellant.

C. A Van Vleck, Assistant Attorney General, S. B. Reed and Courtright & Arbuckle, for the State.

OPINION

BISHOP, C. J.

Defendant and his wife, Nettie Hoot, were married in January, 1899. After living together about a week, they separated, and Mrs. Hoot returned to her home, at No. 337 Argyle street, in the city of Waterloo, this state. In May following, defendant returned to his wife at Waterloo, and together they started to make a trip down the Mississippi river, but it seems another disagreement arose, and within a few days Mrs. Hoot came back to her home in Waterloo. The defendant visited her there on August 10, remaining about an hour. He then went away, and did not return again. On October 30, 1899, a letter, addressed to the defendant at No. 337 Argyle street, Waterloo, was delivered by letter carrier to Mrs. Hoot, who opened and read the same. She testifies that previous to this she had frequently opened letters addressed to her husband, and which had been delivered at her residence, and had then forwarded the same to him, if important. The address upon the envelope, together with the letter, were apparently written by a woman, and the letter read as follows: "Chicago, Oct. 22, 1899. Jerome, my dear: You will get all your presents to me by express today as I will return them. You know why. Goodby, Tab." The envelope is postmarked "Chicago, October 28, 1899." On the same day the letter was received, an express package was delivered to Mrs. Hoot, the same being addressed to defendant at the street and number mentioned. The handwriting of the address thereon was the same, apparently, as that of the letter previously received. Mrs. Hoot opened the package, and, on taking off the outside paper covering, found a polished box, on each end of which was a handle. Underneath one of such handles there was a drawer, and in it a small hole, evidently intended for use in pulling the drawer out. She put her finger in the hole, and pulled the drawer out a short distance, when there was a a sharp explosion, followed by smoke emerging from the box. Such explosion was not sufficiently severe to do any damage, and immediately Mrs. Hoot called in an officer who took charge of the box. The next day the officer took the box to a safe location, placed it upon a pile of rock and exploded it by pulling the drawer out, a long cord attached thereto being used for the purpose. The explosion was a terrific one. The pile of rock was blown to fragments and scattered in every direction, and the air was filled with debris. No trace of the box could afterwards be found.

I. The box in question was sent by express from Chicago to Waterloo. Appellant complains that the trial court did not fairly and sufficiently instruct the jury upon the subject of the identity of the defendant as the person who sent such box. We have repeatedly held that it is the right of a defendant, charged with the commission of a crime, to have the jury properly instructed, and that every essential part of the case should be covered by the instructions given. State v. Brainard, 25 Iowa 572; State v. O'Hagan, 38 Iowa 504. In the instructions given in this case there is no one that is devoted exclusively to the subject-matter upon which the complaint is based. But even a cursory reading of the instructions discloses that the jury was repeatedly told that a finding that the defendant was in fact the person who sent the box was essential to a conviction. The instructions are framed in clear, simple language, and we think no room was left for speculation or uncertainty. In our view, it was not possible for the jury to go astray upon the proposition of law involved. We do not say it would have been out of place to have devoted a special instruction to the subject indicated, but as defendant did not so request, and as the subject was otherwise fully covered, we do not think any necessity therefor existed. It cannot be said that the question of the identity of the defendant as the person who committed the alleged offense of itself involves such a matter of special defense as to call for special instructions. What we have said above, therefore, in no sense conflicts with any thing that is said in State v. Brainard, supra.

II. A further matter of complaint has relation to the legal status of defendant and his wife as of the time in question, and the failure of the trial court to instruct with reference thereto. It is the contention of counsel for appellant, if we correctly interpret his argument, that the facts presented are not sufficient to justify the indictment or warrant a conviction thereunder, and this for the reason that Mrs. Hoot, in receiving and opening the package, acted without right or authority, and, in consequence, was herself a wrongdoer. It is pointed out that the package was plainly addressed to defendant; that there is no evidence in the record tending to show that Mrs. Hoot had any direct authority to act for or on behalf of her husband in such a matter; and our attention is called to numerous authorities holding that the marital relation, taken by itself, raises no presumption of the relation of principle and agent between husband and wife, and that the wife has absolutely no right to act for the husband, unless authorized so to do, certain matters pertaining to domestic affairs alone excepted. Such is not, in terms, the argument of counsel, but we take it that the conclusion sought to be drawn from the premises stated is that, there being no authority, express or implied, on the part of Mrs. Hoot to open the box in question, and the transmission thereof being in itself a legal act, there is accordingly no basis upon which to predicate criminal intent within the meaning of the law; and this for the reason that it cannot be presumed that defendant contemplated, much less intended, an unauthorized and unlawful interference with the package.

We may concede the premises, but we cannot yield our judgment to the conclusion. No question of abstract right or authority on the part of Mrs. Hoot is involved. The only question necessary or proper for our consideration in this connection is this: Assuming that defendant was the sender of the box in question, does the evidence in the record before us warrant a finding that it was within his contemplation that such box would be delivered to his wife, and that an attempt would be made on her part to open the same? In criminal law it is cardinal doctrine that every man is presumed to intend all the probable consequences of his wilful act. 2 Bishop on Criminal Law, section 665. If, therefore, the act done was followed by a result, probable in itself, and such result was within the contemplation of the defendant at the time the act was done, no other rational conclusion can be reached save that the result contemplated was the result intended. Now, it is manifest to us that the doctrines of the law of agency can have no application to the case before us. This is a criminal proceeding, instituted on behalf of the public. Mrs. Hoot has no connection therewith save that, being the particular individual upon whom the assault is said to have been committed, she is a witness in the case. What were the relation between herself and her husband are material in one sense, and one only; that is, in determining the question of intent. If it was within the expectation of the defendant that his wife would receive and open the box, and that, as a result thereof, her death would probably result, the offense against the public would be complete. An unauthorized opening of the box, if such was intended, would support the indictment to all intents and purposes the same as an authorized opening. We conclude, therefore, that the contention of counsel in the respect indicated is without merit.

III. It is asserted by counsel for appellant that a specific intent alleged and proven, is essential to the crime charged in the indictment, and that the evidence in this case wholly fails to disclose any...