State v. Hopper
| Decision Date | 02 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 57493-6,57493-6 |
| Citation | 822 P.2d 775,118 Wn.2d 151 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Steven Mizell HOPPER, Respondent. |
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Peter Goldman, Deputy King County Prosecutor, Seattle, for petitioner.
Lenell Nussbaum, Seattle, for respondent.
Seth Dawson, Snohomish County Prosecutor, Seth Aaron Fine, Deputy Snohomish County Prosecutor, Everett, amicus curiae for petitioner.
This case deals with the sufficiency of an information charging assault challenged for the first time on appeal. Applying our recently announced decision in State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d 93, 812 P.2d 86 (1991), we hold that the charging document was complete, and affirm the conviction.
Steven Hopper was arrested on June 30, 1988. While on patrol, Seattle Police Officer David Shelton and his partner observed Hopper who appeared to be having a physical altercation with a woman. The police officers approached Hopper and directed him to release the woman. When he refused to release her, he was arrested. In the course of the arrest, Hopper struggled, grabbed Officer Shelton's flashlight and struck him with it.
Initially, Hopper was charged with third degree assault for assaulting Officer Shelton with intent to prevent and resist a lawful arrest. He was also charged with simple assault involving the woman. The State moved to amend the information to charge both second and third degree assault, but the trial court did not allow that amendment. The State introduced a second amended information, at issue here, which charged one count of second degree assault and one count of simple assault. It read in part:
That the defendant Steve Mizell Hopper, in King County, Washington, on or about June 30, 1988 did assault Officer D. Shelton, a human being, with a [sic] weapon, and other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm, to-wit: a flashlight;
Contrary to RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a), (1)(c), and against the peace and dignity of the state of Washington.
At trial, Hopper was acquitted of the simple assault, and the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the second degree assault.
On June 30, 1988, the effective statute was former RCW 9A.36.020, whereas RCW 9A.36.021 did not go into effect until July 1, 1988. Under former RCW 9A.36.020(1)(c), 1 a person is guilty of second degree assault when he or she "[s]hall knowingly assault another with a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm".
At a second trial, the jury was instructed that it could convict if it found that Hopper "knowingly assaulted Officer Shelton with a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm." Hopper was convicted of second degree assault.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. State v. Hopper, 58 Wash.App. 210, 213, 792 P.2d 171 (1990). The court held that the information was insufficient because it omitted the statutory element "knowingly". The court applied the rule, expressed in State v. Holt, 104 Wash.2d 315, 320, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985), that if any statutory element is omitted, the charging document is constitutionally defective, and the charges must be dismissed. Hopper, 58 Wash.App. at 212, 792 P.2d 171. The court found that the element was missing, and that no facts supporting the element of knowledge were contained in the information. Hopper, at 213, 792 P.2d 171 (citing State v. Leach, 113 Wash.2d 679, 689, 782 P.2d 552 (1989)). The dissent relied on State v. Bailey, 114 Wash.2d 340, 348, 787 P.2d 1378 (1990), and urged that the information be upheld in the absence of prejudice. Hopper, 58 Wash.App. at 214, 792 P.2d 171 (Webster, J., dissenting). Review was granted. We now reverse the Court of Appeals, and reinstate the conviction.
Hopper contends that the information here is deficient in two respects. First, it omits explicit reference to the "knowledge" element of second degree assault. Second, it cites a statute not in effect at the time of the acts alleged. He raises these deficiencies for the first time on appeal.
Any analysis of the reach of the Sixth Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10) should begin with the minimum requirement that all essential elements of a crime, statutory and nonstatutory, must be included in the charging document so as to apprise the defendant of the charges against him and to allow him to prepare his defense. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 102, 812 P.2d 86. However, when, as is the case here, the sufficiency of a charging document is not challenged until appeal, we apply a stricter standard of review. Kjorsvik, at 105, 812 P.2d 86. This rule has its roots in United States Supreme Court cases and is utilized frequently by federal courts. In Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 417, 419, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932), the Court first expressed its view:
Upon a proceeding after verdict at least, no prejudice being shown, it is enough that the necessary facts appear in any form, or by fair construction can be found within the terms of the indictment.
The Court made it clear that the essential elements must still be charged. Hagner, 285 U.S. at 433, 52 S.Ct. at 419. Loosely or unartfully drawn charging documents, however, would henceforth be forgiven on appeal. Hagner, 285 U.S. at 433, 52 S.Ct. at 419.
Thus, charging instruments which fail to set forth the essential elements of a crime in such a way that the defendant is notified of both the illegal conduct and the crime with which he is charged are constitutionally defective, and require dismissal. See Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 102, 812 P.2d 86. However, when a deficiency is raised for the first time on appeal, this court should examine the document to determine if there is any fair construction by which the elements are all contained in the document. Kjorsvik, at 105, 812 P.2d 86. In addition, if the document can be upheld on this basis, it must also be determined that the defendant has suffered no prejudice as a result of the ambiguous or vague language in the information. Kjorsvik, at 105-06, 812 P.2d 86. If the accused can show that he or she actually lacked the requisite notice to prepare an adequate defense, the conviction should be dismissed.
This stricter standard, to be used when the sufficiency of an indictment is challenged initially on appeal, permits a court to construe a charging document quite liberally. If the information contains allegations that express the crime which was meant to be charged, it is sufficient even though it does not contain the statutory language. United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691, 695 (4th Cir.1976). A court should be guided by common sense and practicality in construing the language. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 361 (9th Cir.1976). Even missing elements may be implied if the language supports such a result. Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir.1971).
Hopper argues that the strict standard of review should not be utilized because Washington provides broader protection than the federal constitution. He relies on State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986). This argument lacks merit. First, Washington courts have frequently treated the Sixth Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10) as containing the same protection. See, e.g., Leach, 113 Wash.2d at 695, 782 P.2d 552; State v. Bergeron, 105 Wash.2d 1, 18 n. 41, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985); State v. Strong, 56 Wash.App. 715, 717, 785 P.2d 464, review denied, 114 Wash.2d 1022, 792 P.2d 533 (1990). Second, if anything, the United States Constitution's requirements are actually broader than the state protection. In addition to Sixth Amendment protection, providing a defendant with the right to notice of the charges against him, the Fifth Amendment confers the right to be indicted by a grand jury. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215, 80 S.Ct. 270, 272, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960); United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950 960 (3d Cir.1979). The right to a grand jury indictment entails a more stringently drafted charging document than is required by the Sixth Amendment. See Shoup, at 960. Clearly, no broader rights are afforded by the Washington Constitution.
Hopper's contention could, however, derive support from this court's application of the "common understanding" rule. See Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 114, 812 P.2d 86 (Utter, J., dissenting). In State v. Moser, 41 Wash.2d 29, 31, 246 P.2d 1101 (1952), this court held that: Moser followed State v. Unosawa, 29 Wash.2d 578, 589, 188 P.2d 104 (1948), in its holding that the "common understanding" rule could not be applied unless it had first been determined that the information contained all the statutory elements of the particular crime involved. Moser, 41 Wash.2d at 31-32, 246 P.2d 1101. The common understanding rule would allow the court to determine that an information was sufficient "if a person of common understanding can, from the allegations of the information, know the exact nature of the charge against him." Unosawa, 29 Wash.2d at 589, 188 P.2d 104. Thus, the common understanding rule proposed a more liberal construction of the charging document.
The application of the strict standard of review does not upset this line of cases. Here, too, the court would be constrained by the essential elements rule, and would only uphold informations which contained the elements of the crime involved. The standard of review merely states the proper method of interpretation; it does not alter the requirements for sufficiency. It is a rule of construction only. Therefore, if a document does not contain the elements of the crime, the most liberal possible reading cannot cure it.
Conversely, the State urges us to rely on State v. Bailey, 114 Wash.2d 340, 348, 787 P.2d 1378 (1990), to...
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