State v. Horn
| Decision Date | 30 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 114,078,114,078 |
| Citation | 386 P.3d 932 (Table) |
| Parties | State of Kansas, Appellee, v. David Horn, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Nicholas David, of The David Law Office, LLC, of Topeka, for appellant.
Natalie Yoza, assistant district attorney, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before Pierron, P.J., Atcheson and Arnold–Burger, JJ.
Defendant David Horn appeals his conviction for domestic battery on the grounds the Douglas County District Court erred during the jury trial by admitting statements he made to law enforcement officers without granting his request for a hearing to determine whether those statements were voluntary or the product of an impermissibly coercive interrogation. We agree the district court erred. As an appropriate remedy, we conditionally affirm Horn's conviction and remand to the district court for the limited purpose of conducting a voluntariness hearing and any related proceedings that may be necessary.
For purposes of dealing with the issue Horn has raised, we may set the necessary factual predicate in summary fashion. The parties, of course, are familiar with the details. On January 22, 2015, Horn and his wife Tabatha had a disagreement that extended over the course of the day. Late in the afternoon, officers from the Lawrence police department responded to a call about a domestic dispute at the duplex where the Horns lived. During the jury trial, Tabatha testified to a version of events that, if believed, would support Horn's conviction for domestic battery under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21–5414(a). Horn testified in his own defense and offered a different account that tended to exonerate him. So the jurors had to resolve a classic credibility contest between Tabatha and Horn.
When the police arrived at the duplex on January 22, one of the officers questioned Horn about what was going on. The other officer spoke with Tabatha. The questioning of Horn took place in one of the bedrooms. The description Horn gave the officer of the disagreement with Tabatha was largely exculpatory. But, according to the officer's version, what Horn said then differed in some material respects from what Horn told the jurors. The State called the officer as a witness during the trial to recount the statements Horn made the day of the incident.
Horn's trial lawyer objected and requested the district court hold a hearing outside the presence of the jurors to determine if the statements Horn made to the officer were voluntary and, therefore, admissible. The State argued a hearing was unnecessary because the officer's interaction with Horn did not amount to a custodial interrogation. The district court then denied Horn's request for a hearing and admitted the statements. As we have indicated, the jury convicted Horn of domestic battery. He has appealed.
If government agents extract statements from a person through unduly coercive physical or psychological pressure—rendering the statements involuntary and the product of a will overborne—the government cannot, then, use those statements as evidence against that person in a criminal prosecution. Kansas v. Ventris , 556 U.S. 586, 590, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 173 L.Ed. 2d 801 (2009) ; Jackson v. Denno , 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed. 2d 908 (1964). To do otherwise would contravene a defendant's rights against self-incrimination and due process protected in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Ventris , 556 U.S. at 590 ; Dickerson v. United States , 530 U.S. 428, 433, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed. 2d 405 (2000) ; State v. Schultz , 289 Kan. 334, 342–43, 212 P.3d 150 (2009). Criminal defendants must be afforded hearings to challenge the voluntariness of their statements before those statements may be used against them. Jackson , 378 U.S. at 376–77 ; State v. Miles , 233 Kan. 286, 295, 662 P.2d 1227 (1983). The proceeding is commonly known as a Jackson v. Denno hearing. See State v. Betancourt , 301 Kan. 282, 289, 342 P.3d 916 (2015) ().
At a Jackson v. Denno hearing, the district court is to assess the voluntariness of the defendant's statements based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interaction between the government agents and the defendant. State v. Fernandez–Torres , 50 Kan. App. 2d 1069, 1075–76, 337 P.3d 691 (2014). Among the factors the district court may consider are: "(1) the accused's mental condition; (2) the duration and manner of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; (4) the accused's age, intellect, and background; (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation; and (6) the accused's fluency with the English language." State v. Gilliland , 294 Kan. 519, Syl. ¶ 3, 276 P.3d 165 (2012) ; see also Fernandez–Torres , 50 Kan. App. 2d at 1075. A government agent may induce an involuntary statement through improper threats of harm, promises of benefit, a combination of the two, or other undue influence over the suspect. Hutto v. Ross , 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97 S. Ct. 202, 50 L.Ed. 2d 194 (1976) ; State v. Brown , 286 Kan. 170, 174, 182 P.3d 1205 (2008). The State has to prove the voluntariness of a defendant's statements by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Randolph , 297 Kan. 320, 326, 301 P.3d 300 (2013).
Here, the district court never conducted a hearing and made no determination as to voluntariness. The district court presumably concluded that Horn was not subject to a custodial interrogation based on the trial evidence presented up to the point he objected to the State's use of his statements to the police officer. And the district court accepted the State's argument that absent a custodial interrogation, no Jackson v. Denno hearing was necessary. All of that reflects a bundle of interlocking errors.
The issue for us ultimately presents a controlling question of law: Did the district court err in failing to hold a voluntariness hearing when Horn objected, during trial, to the State's offer of his extrajudicial statements as evidence against him? Because the facts bearing on that issue are undisputed, we owe no deference to the district court's decision to dispense with a hearing. See State v. Arnett , 290 Kan. 41, 47, 223 P.3d 780 (2010) (); State v. Bennett , 51 Kan. App. 2d 356, 361, 347 P.3d 229 (), rev. denied 303 Kan. –––– (2015); Estate of Belden v. Brown County , 46 Kan. App. 2d 247, 258–59, 261 P.3d 943 (2011) ().
First, the district court should not have accepted the State's premise that in the absence of a custodial interrogation, a suspect's statements to government agents must be considered voluntary. The argument confuses the circumstances in which a law enforcement officer has to give Miranda warnings to someone being questioned with the circumstances rendering a statement involuntary. They overlap to some extent but ultimately involve different considerations.
When law enforcement officers interrogate a person who is in custody, they are obligated to inform that individual of various constitutional rights, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966). See State v. Warrior , 294 Kan. 484, 496, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012). A person is considered "in custody" for that purpose if he or she has been formally arrested or has been deprived of his or her freedom in a significant way functionally equivalent to an arrest. Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444, 478–79. The accepted judicial test explores whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude he or she could not terminate the questioning and leave. See Stansbury v. California , 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed. 2d 293 (1994) (); Warrior , 294 Kan. at 497 ; State v. Fritschen , 247 Kan. 592, 601–03, 802 P.2d 558 (1990) (). The loss of freedom that marks a custodial interrogation also creates a fertile environment for eliciting involuntary statements. A person detained in unfamiliar and intimidating surroundings without the ability to leave—handcuffed to a table in an interrogation room at a police station, for example—has been placed in a situation in which extended questioning by a relay team of officers or even a single, persistent examiner may break that person's free will, yielding constitutionally involuntary statements. See Fernandez–Torres , 50 Kan. App. 2d at 1079 ().
The Miranda warnings inform suspects they need not answer questions and may have a lawyer present even if they cannot afford to hire one. By design, the warnings aim to reduce the likelihood government agents will ratchet up a custodial interrogation in ways that produce involuntary statements. Miranda , 384 U.S. at 456–58, 467–69. But a custodial interrogation is not itself inherently so coercive that any statement a suspect makes must be involuntary. The converse, however, is also true: A suspect may give involuntary statements during noncustodial questioning, depending on the circumstances. See Beckwith v. United States , 425 U.S. 341, 347–48, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1976) (...
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