State v. Hoskins

• Decision Date: 13 December 1899
• Citation: 80 N.W. 1063,109 Iowa 656
• Parties: STATE v. HOSKINS.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

109 Iowa 656

80 N.W. 1063

STATE

v.HOSKINS.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 13, 1899.

Appeal from district court, Buena Vista county; W. B. Quarton, Judge.

Indictment for libel. There was a trial to jury, verdict of guilty, and from the judgment entered thereon defendant appeals. Affirmed.T. H. Chapman, for appellant.

Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., and Carr & Parker, for the State.

WATERMAN, J.

Defendant is the editor and publisher of a newspaper printed in the county of Buena Vista, one of the counties composing the Fourteenth judicial district of this state. The article upon which this prosecution is founded was written by one Bruce, and published by defendant in his paper, at a time when one F. H. Helsell was a candidate for the office of judge of the district court in and for said district. The article charged Helsell with fraudulently altering a public record. No claim is here made that the charge was true. It is, however, insisted by defendant that if he published the article in good faith, believing it to be true, and actuated by justifiable motives, he cannot properly be convicted. A determination of the question thus presented will dispose of several of the assignments of error.

In order to make plain our reasons for the conclusion at which we have arrived, it will be necessary to consider, to some extent, the common law relating to this subject. First, let us say there have always been some material distinctions preserved between civil actions, in which damages were sought for this offense, and criminal proceedings. In a criminal proceeding at common law, the defenses were but two,--a denial and a plea of privileged communication. The truth of the matter charged could not be given in evidence by a defendant. It was a maxim that “the greater the truth the greater the libel.” A prosecution for this offense was founded on the thought that a publication of a libel was likely to provoke a breach of the peace, and the fact that it was true tended rather to increase the probabilities of such a result. 1 Kent, Comm. 621. But, in a private action for pecuniary recompense, the truth of the charge could always be shown in justification or in mitigation of damages, since, as it is said, a man is entitled to no better reputation than his actual character would warrant. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 421; J'Anson v. Stuart, 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. 986, note. In course of time, the rule was adopted in many of the states of the Union allowing the truth of the charge to be shown as a defense. In our own state this principle is embodied in the constitution. Article 1, § 7. But with us it is qualified. The truth can be shown only when the publication is made “with good motives and for justifiable ends.” Except as thus modified, the common law relating to libel governs in this state. Without the constitutional provision mentioned, the truth itself would be no defense. There is no little uncertainty in the books on the question of what constitutes a privileged communication, or rather what publications are protected as such. There are cases which hold that a charge of crime made against one who is a candidate for public office may be the subject of privilege. Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404, 2 Atl. 513. The contrary is held by many courts of high standing. See Bronson v. Bruce (Mich.) 26 N. W. 671, and cases cited. We need not determine between these conflicting authorities, for reasons which will presently appear. An absolute privilege is a complete defense. No legal complaint can be founded upon words spoken or written under its protection. Of this nature are proceedings in legislative assemblies, and generally in judicial tribunals. A qualified privilege is where the communication is made in the discharge of some duty, social, legal, or moral. Such a defense may be rebutted by a showing of actual malice. To establish a qualified privilege, it must be shown that defendant here believed the charge to be true, and published it in the discharge of some duty, and we may assume that it was a duty on his part to make known to the electors of the Fourteenth judicial district the true character of a candidate for the office of district judge. But, if this duty was in any way transcended, the good faith of defendant ceased to be material. Evidence of good faith is admissible, not as a defense in itself, but only as an element going to make up the defense of qualified privilege. It appeared in this case, from defendant's own testimony, that he voluntarily published the charge, not only outside the Fourteenth judicial district, but outside the state...