State v. Hotchkiss
| Decision Date | 07 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 48963-5-II.,48963-5-II. |
| Citation | 404 P.3d 629 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Lafe William HOTCHKISS, II, Appellant. |
Kathryn A. Russell Selk, Russell Selk Law Office, 1037 N.E., 65th St., Seattle, WA, 98115-6655, for Appellant.
Rachael Rogers Probstfeld, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, P.O. Box 5000, Vancouver, WA, 98666-5000, for Respondent.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶1 Lafe Hotchkiss, II appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver—methamphetamine.1 Law enforcement discovered 8.1 grams of methamphetamine and $2,150 in cash in a search of Hotchkiss's residence, and during questioning Hotchkiss admitted that he was selling the methamphetamine to several customers.
¶2 Hotchkiss argues that, under the corpus delicti rule, there was insufficient corroborating evidence independent of his incriminating statement that he intended to deliver methamphetamine. As a result, he argues that the trial court could not consider his statement and that without the statement there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession with intent to deliver.
¶3 We hold that the quantity of the methamphetamine combined with the amount of cash in Hotchkiss's possession provided sufficient corroborating evidence of intent to deliver independent of Hotchkiss's incriminating statement to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. Accordingly, we affirm Hotchkiss's conviction.
¶4 Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant on Hotchkiss's residence in Vancouver. During the search, Hotchkiss admitted that he had an "8-ball"—approximately 3.8 grams—of methamphetamine in a safe and provided the officers with the code. Report of Proceedings at 271. He also stated that he procured about one 8-ball of methamphetamine every day and broke it down, and estimated that he had about 10 customers. Inside the safe, officers found 8.1 grams of methamphetamine and $2,150 in cash. The State charged Hotchkiss with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver—methamphetamine.
¶5 At a bench trial, officers testified about finding the methamphetamine and cash and about Hotchkiss's statement that he had 10 methamphetamine customers. After the State rested, Hotchkiss requested that the trial court disregard the testimony regarding his incriminating statement under the corpus delicti rule because there was insufficient evidence corroborating his statement. The court reserved its ruling on the corpus delicti issue.
¶6 Hotchkiss then testified that he and a woman who lived with him used three or four grams of methamphetamine per day. He also testified that the cash in the safe came from other people living at his residence, who paid rent of $1,150 per month in cash, and from his employment. He claimed that any statement he made to the officers about selling methamphetamine referred to his actions 20 years earlier.
¶7 On rebuttal, an officer with extensive experience dealing with methamphetamine users and sellers testified that a typical methamphetamine dose is 0.2 to 0.4 grams. He also testified that it would be very rare that someone would possess eight grams of methamphetamine solely for personal use.
¶8 The trial court found that the quantity of methamphetamine in Hotchkiss's possession combined with the amount of cash recovered with the drugs was sufficient corroborating evidence to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. The court then found Hotchkiss guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.
¶9 Hotchkiss appeals his conviction.
¶10 The corpus delicti rule prevents the State from establishing that a crime occurred solely based on the defendant's incriminating statement. State v. Green , 182 Wash.App. 133, 143, 328 P.3d 988 (2014). The State must present corroborating evidence independent of the incriminating statement that the charged crime occurred. Id. Without such corroborating evidence, the defendant's statement alone is insufficient to support a conviction. State v. Dow , 168 Wash.2d 243, 249-51, 227 P.3d 1278 (2010).
¶11 We review de novo whether sufficient corroborating evidence exists to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. Green , 182 Wash.App. at 143, 328 P.3d 988. In making this determination, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the State. Id. And we consider the totality of the independent evidence. See State v. Aten , 130 Wash.2d 640, 661, 927 P.2d 210 (1996). The independent evidence by itself need not be sufficient to support a conviction or even show that the offense occurred by a preponderance of the evidence; it must only support a logical and reasonable inference that the charged crime has occurred. Id. at 656, 927 P.2d 210.
¶12 In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that to satisfy the corpus delicti rule, "the independent evidence ‘must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with a [ ] hypothesis of innocence.’ " State v. Brockob , 159 Wash.2d 311, 329, 150 P.3d 59 (2006) (quoting Aten , 130 Wash.2d at 660, 927 P.2d 210 ). The court stated that independent evidence is insufficient to corroborate a defendant's incriminating statement when it "supports ‘reasonable and logical inferences of both criminal agency and noncriminal cause.’ " Brockob , 159 Wash.2d at 329, 150 P.3d 59 (quoting Aten , 130 Wash.2d at 660, 927 P.2d 210 ). "In other words, if the State's evidence supports the reasonable inference of a criminal explanation of what caused the event and one that does not involve criminal agency, the evidence is not sufficient to corroborate the defendant's statement." Brockob , 159 Wash.2d at 330, 150 P.3d 59.
¶13 Hotchkiss argues that under the corpus delicti rule, the State failed to present sufficient independent evidence to corroborate his incriminating statement that he intended to deliver methamphetamine and therefore the trial court could not consider that statement. We disagree.
¶14 Analyzing the corpus delicti rule in the context of a possession with intent to deliver charge requires an understanding of the evidence necessary to convict a defendant of that charge.
¶15 Several cases involving sufficiency of evidence to convict (rather than the corpus delicti rule) have addressed whether a finder of fact can draw an inference of intent to deliver from a defendant's possession of significant amounts of a controlled substance. The general rule is that "[m]ere possession of a controlled substance, including quantities greater than needed for personal use, is not sufficient to support an inference of intent to deliver." State v. O'Connor , 155 Wash.App. 282, 290, 229 P.3d 880 (2010).
¶16 For example, in State v. Brown the defendant was in possession of 20 rocks of crack cocaine, which an officer testified was definitely more than the amount commonly possessed for personal use only. 68 Wash.App. 480, 482, 843 P.2d 1098 (1993). The court held that the possession of more than a normal amount needed for personal use did not provide sufficient evidence to establish an intent to deliver. Id. at 485, 843 P.2d 1098. The court expressly rejected a rule that "any person possessing a controlled substance in an amount greater than some experienced law enforcement officer believes is ‘usual’ or ‘customary’ for personal use is subject to conviction for possession with intent to deliver." Id.
¶17 However, the cases also state that a finder of fact can infer intent to deliver from possession of a significant amount of a controlled substance plus at least one additional factor. O'Connor , 155 Wash.App. at 290, 229 P.3d 880 ; Brown , 68 Wash.App. at 484, 843 P.2d 1098. And one of those additional factors is the defendant's possession of a large amount of cash.
O'Connor , 155 Wash.App. at 290, 229 P.3d 880 ; see also State v. Campos , 100 Wash.App. 218, 223-24, 998 P.2d 893 (2000) (); State v. Hagler , 74 Wash.App. 232, 236-37, 872 P.2d 85 (1994) (); State v. Lane , 56 Wash.App. 286, 290, 297-98, 786 P.2d 277 (1989) (). In fact, in Brown the court specifically noted when finding insufficient evidence of intent to deliver that the defendant did not possess a substantial amount of money. 68 Wash.App. at 484, 843 P.2d 1098.
¶18 The same general rules for sufficiency of evidence to convict apply for corroborating evidence under the corpus delicti rule. Possession of a controlled substance standing alone cannot constitute sufficient corroborating evidence of an intent to deliver. State v. Cobelli , 56 Wash.App. 921, 925, 788 P.2d 1081 (1989) ; see also State v. Whalen , 131 Wash.App. 58, 63, 126 P.3d 55 (2005) (). However, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied if "at least one additional factor, suggestive of intent" is present. Whalen , 131 Wash.App. at 63, 126 P.3d 55.
¶19 Here, the State presented evidence that (1) Hotchkiss had 8.1 grams of methamphetamine in his possession; (2) given an average dose size of 0.2 to 0.4 grams, such an amount typically would produce 20 to 40 doses; and (3) it would be very rare for a person to possess that amount merely for personal use. Under the general rule, this evidence standing alone would not be sufficient either to convict Hotchkiss of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver or to provide corroborating evidence under the corpus delicti rule.
¶20 But the State presented evidence of an additional factor suggestive of intent to deliver—$2,150 of cash in
Hotchkiss's safe next to the methamphetamine. Under the cases discussed...
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