State v. Hudson
| Decision Date | 20 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | A13-1338 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Wilfred Carl Hudson, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Affirmed
Clay County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Pamela Harris, Assistant County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Chutich, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges his convictions of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. He argues that Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4 (2012), which permits childvictims of sexual assault to testify outside of the defendant's presence, is unconstitutional because it violates his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. He also contends that the district court committed plain error by permitting the state to introduce evidence vouching for another witness's credibility, that the district court erred in finding that his three offenses did not arise out of the same behavioral incident, and that the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.
Appellant Wilfred Carl Hudson and S.F. are married and share parenting responsibilities for appellant's daughter, B.W. Approximately one year after they were married, S.F. and appellant separated; B.W. began to live with S.F. during the week and with appellant on weekends. B.W. also stayed with appellant after school if S.F. had to work late.
In September 2012, a few months after appellant and S.F. separated, B.W. told S.F. that appellant "hurts [her] down there" and pointed to her vagina. S.F. testified that B.W. later told her that appellant had put his mouth on her vagina. S.F. reported B.W.'s allegations to law enforcement officers, who subsequently conducted a forensic interview and sexual assault examination of B.W. She told the interviewing detective that appellant had engaged in oral, vaginal, and anal intercourse with her on separate occasions. She indicated that the abuse occurred in appellant's bedroom, her bedroom, and the living room of appellant's apartment. B.W. was eight years old at that time.
Appellant was arrested and charged with eight counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.1 Prior to trial, the state moved, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4, for an order permitting B.W. to testify outside of appellant's presence and via one-way, closed-circuit television. The district court granted the order, finding that B.W. would be traumatized if she was required to testify in appellant's presence. Appellant, the district court, and the jury observed B.W.'s testimony from a separate room, and B.W. was informed that appellant was watching her testimony. Appellant's counsel was in the room with B.W. and was allowed to cross-examine her. B.W. testified that appellant engaged in vaginal intercourse with her in her bedroom and anal intercourse with her in his bedroom. She also stated that appellant "licked" the "inside" of her vagina on multiple occasions. She said that appellant told her that if she told her mother, he "would break [S.F.] into pieces of bones."
Appellant testified that he never abused B.W. He stated that S.F. coached B.W. to falsify allegations against him and that B.W. imitated "whatever [S.F.] [did]." He indicated that S.F. had previously threatened to report false child abuse allegations to law enforcement. The jury found appellant guilty of the first three counts of criminal sexual conduct and not guilty of the remaining four counts. The district court imposed concurrent, respective prison sentences of 172, 201, and 360 months for the three offenses.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal, but subsequently stayed that appeal to file a petition for postconviction relief. In his petition for postconviction relief, he alleged thathe had located a witness, S.B., who could offer new testimony regarding S.F.'s bias. At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, S.B. testified that he had been in a relationship with S.F. while she was married to appellant, and that S.F. asked him and several other people to kill appellant so that she could obtain an insurance settlement that she believed that appellant was entitled to receive. He also stated that S.F. believed that obtaining custody of B.W. would assist her in obtaining the insurance settlement. The district court found that S.B.'s testimony was not credible and denied the petition for postconviction relief. We dissolved the stay of appeal and ordered briefing on all postconviction issues. This appeal follows.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by permitting B.W. to testify outside of his presence via one-way, closed-circuit television.2 A child witness who is a victim in a criminal sexual conduct case may testify outside the presence of the defendant if the child is less than 12 years old and the district court finds that the defendant's presence "would psychologically traumatize the witness so as to render the witness unavailable to testify." Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4(c). The district court may permit a child to testify via closed-circuit television only after making an "individualized finding of necessity"and having found "by specific evidence that the particular witness is or would be psychologically traumatized and that traumatization is substantially caused by the presence of the defendant." State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 272, 274 (Minn. 1989). Here, the district court made detailed findings regarding the evidence that supported its conclusion that B.S. would be psychologically traumatized if forced to testify in appellant's presence.
Appellant contends, however, that because Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4, permits witnesses to testify outside of the defendant's presence, it violates the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that a criminal defendant has the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. We review de novo whether a statute is unconstitutional. State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Minn. 2011). We presume that Minnesota statutes are constitutional and we exercise our authority to declare a statute unconstitutional with "extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary." In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989).
The United States Supreme Court has previously considered whether the Confrontation Clause prohibits a child witness in a sexual abuse case from testifying outside the presence of the defendant by one-way, closed-circuit television. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851-52, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3166-67 (1990). The Court explained that though the Confrontation Clause reflected a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, that preference "must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case." Id. at 849, 110 S. Ct. at 3165 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the Court determined that face-to-face confrontation was notconstitutionally mandated if (1) the denial of face-to-face confrontation was necessary to further an important public policy and (2) the reliability of the testimony was assured by other means. Id. at 850, 110 S. Ct. at 3166. Because the state had a substantial and important interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child-sexual-abuse victims, and because testimony via closed-circuit television ensured the reliability of the child's testimony by permitting cross examination, testimony under oath, and an opportunity for the judge, defendant, and jury to assess the child's demeanor, the Court concluded that face-to-face confrontation was not required if the district court made a case-specific finding that such confrontation would cause a child witness trauma from testifying. Id. at 851-53, 110 S. Ct. at 3166-67.
Appellant concedes that Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4, is constitutional under Craig, but argues that Craig has since been overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). In Crawford, the Court rejected the use of "open-ended balancing tests" to determine whether the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements violated a defendant's confrontation rights, instead concluding that such evidence was admissible only when the witness was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 67-68, 124 S. Ct. at 1373-74. The Court explained that the Confrontation Clause was a procedural guarantee that required the reliability of evidence "be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." Id. at 61, 124 S. Ct. at 1370. Appellant asserts that Crawford's rejection of open-ended balancing tests to determine the admissibility ofevidence under the Confrontation Clause renders the analysis established by Craig invalid and Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4, unconstitutional.
We disagree. The Supreme Court did not expressly state in Crawford that it intended to overrule Craig. Indeed, the majority opinion does not cite to Craig once, and the concurring opinion cites to it only for the proposition that cross-examination is a necessary tool "used to flesh out the truth." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 74, 124 S. Ct. at 1377 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Rather, the Court explains that it is expressly rejecting the rationale of its previous decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980). See id. at 63-64, 124 S. Ct. at 1371 (majority opinion). When the Supreme Court expressly overrules one case in a decision, we do not assume that it implicitly intended to overrule a separate decision as well. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 538,...
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