State v. Hudson

• Decision Date: 09 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 60482-7,60482-7
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. David C. HUDSON, Respondent.

Page 107

124 Wn.2d 107

874 P.2d 160

STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. David C. HUDSON, Respondent.

No. 60482-7.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

June 9, 1994.

Reconsideration Denied Aug. 12, 1994.

Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Theresa Fricke, Sr. Pros. Atty., Synthia Gannett, Senior Deputy, Catherine Shaffer and Amy J. Freedheim, Deputies, Seattle, for petitioner

Washington Appellate Defender Ass'n, Andrew P. Stanton, for respondent.

MADSEN, Justice.

This case concerns the admissibility of contraband evidence discovered during a weapons frisk and seized without a warrant from Defendant David Hudson's coat pockets. Before trial Hudson moved to suppress the evidence, asserting a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. At

                the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified that he immediately recognized the contraband as cocaine through his sense of touch.   The State argued that the evidence should be admitted under a "plain feel" exception to the warrant requirement.   Video Tape Recorded Proceedings, at 122.   The trial court suppressed, holding as a matter of law that touch alone could not satisfy the requirements of the plain view doctrine.   The Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression order in State v. Hudson, 69 Wash.App. 270, 848 P.2d 216 (1993), and the State petitioned for review.   This court granted review to determine whether a plain feel corollary to the plain view doctrine is precluded as a matter of law by prior decisions of this court.   We conclude that it is not and remand for a determination in light of this holding
                

FACTS

On February 6, 1991, undercover King County police officers were observing a controlled drug purchase by a confidential police informant at a trailer home in south King County. While the police informant and the suspect, Kelly Higgins, were negotiating the drug purchase inside the trailer home, the officers saw a man drive up in a maroon Toyota Celica. The man, Defendant Hudson, went into the trailer, remained for 3 or 4 minutes, and then left in his car. The informant subsequently made the purchase from Higgins and left. The next day the officers obtained a search warrant for the trailer and arranged for their informant to make a second controlled purchase from Higgins. During the purchase the informant showed Higgins $2,400 but, pursuant to police policy, insisted that Higgins have the drugs before giving her the money. Higgins left the trailer but returned a few moments later. She then sold cocaine to the informant. Thereafter, Higgins attempted to leave but the police blocked her exit and arrested her as she started to drive away.

Detectives Gaddy and Turney-Loos believed that Higgins had obtained the cocaine from a source with whom she had just made contact and that the source would come looking The State charged Hudson with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Hudson moved to suppress the contraband As soon as the detective realized he was not feeling a weapon, any further search of the baggie was unjustified.

                for the money.   While the detectives were talking with Higgins on the steps of the trailer, Hudson drove up in the same Toyota Celica that the detectives had seen the previous day.   He approached the detectives and asked what was going on.   Both of his hands were in the large front pockets of his heavy leather jacket.   As Hudson approached, Gaddy displayed his badge, explained to Hudson that he was executing a search warrant of the premises, and told Hudson to remove his hands from his pockets.   Hudson appeared dumbfounded and kept his hands in his pockets.   The detectives were concerned that Hudson might have a weapon in one of his pockets.   Both detectives approached Hudson on either side and held him by the arms.   They told him again to take his hands out of his jacket and explained to him that they needed to make sure he had no weapons.   When Hudson failed to cooperate, the detectives forcibly removed his hands and placed them on the top of his head.   The detectives then patted down the outside of his jacket.   Turney-Loos "felt a quite substantial bulge, hard something" in the right jacket pocket which made him "believe even more so that there was likely some kind of a weapon, something in his pocket".   Video Tape Recorded Proceedings, at 50-51.   Suspecting a weapon, Turney-Loos reached into the pocket to determine whether Hudson was armed.   Turney-Loos felt the item he had suspected was a weapon and instantly recognized it as a pager.   He also felt paperwork and a baggie containing a "ragged edge chunk" of a substance.   Video Tape Recorded Proceedings, at 54.   Turney-Loos later testified that he " 'knew immediately from feeling it that [the substance in the baggie] was likely one large chunk of a hard substance, which was likely cocaine' ".   Video Tape Recorded Proceedings, at 72.   Turney-Loos then informed Gaddy of this discovery, removed the baggie and pager from Hudson's pocket, and confirmed his suspicions.   The detectives then arrested Hudson and searched the rest of his pockets finding additional baggies of cocaine and a large quantity of money
                evidence seized from his person.   Following the suppression hearing, the court found that the detectives had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Hudson was involved in a criminal activity warranting an investigative stop.   The court also found that the detectives had the right to frisk Hudson because they had particularized and reasonable grounds to believe that Hudson was armed and dangerous.   The trial court suppressed the evidence, however, because it also found that
                

State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.2d 289, 654 P.2d 96 (1982) guides this court with an expression of disapproval regarding a "plain feel" doctrine. "The tactile sense does not usually result in the immediate knowledge of the nature of the item." Broadnax, at 298, 654 P.2d 96. As in Broadnax, Det. Turney-Loos' observations lacked the distinctive smell of marijuana or the unique feel of a weapon. Based on Broadnax, as a matter of law the sense of touch alone will not raise a reasonable suspicion to probable cause.

Clerk's Papers, at 48.

The State challenged the trial court's third conclusion and its suppression of the evidence, arguing that a "plain touch" exception "exists in Washington and is a narrow exception to the search warrant requirement". Hudson, 69 Wash.App. at 273, 848 P.2d 216. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It reasoned that plain touch alone could never meet the requirements of the plain view doctrine because "[t]he tactile sense does not usually result in the immediate knowledge of the nature of the item". Hudson, at 275, 848 P.2d 216 (quoting State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.2d 289, 298, 654 P.2d 96 (1982)). The Court of Appeals held that since Washington "has not recognized a plain touch exception to the search warrant requirement" the trial court's suppression was proper. Hudson, at 275, 848 P.2d 216. The court then stated that "even if Washington recognized a plain touch exception to the warrant requirement, which it does not", suppression was proper because substantial evidence supported a finding that the detective did not have immediate knowledge that the substance was cocaine. Hudson, at 276, 848 P.2d 216. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court, holding that the detective did

                not have probable cause to arrest Hudson and that he exceeded the permissible scope of the Terry frisk.   The State then petitioned for and was granted review
                

ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961). Searches and seizures must be supported by probable cause whether or not formal arrest or search by way of warrant has been made. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). Although there are exceptions that authorize seizure on lesser cause, these are narrowly drawn and carefully circumscribed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. White, 97 Wash.2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). One such exception is an investigatory stop or Terry stop. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash.2d 1, 6, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). In addition to questioning, Terry permits the officer to frisk the person for weapons if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to be armed and presently dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. at 1884; State v. Hobart, 94 Wash.2d 437, 441, 617 P.2d 429 (1980). The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1922-23, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).

A search pursuant to a Terry stop must be justified not only in its inception, but also in its scope. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. A valid weapons frisk is strictly limited in its scope to a search of the outer clothing; a patdown to discover weapons which might be used to assault the officer. Terry, at 29-30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884-85. There are, however, cases where the patdown is inconclusive, in which case reaching into the clothing is the only reasonable course of action for the police officer to follow. State v. Allen, 93 Wash.2d 170, 172, 606 P.2d 1235 (1980); see also State v. Vasquez, 167 Ariz. 352, 807 P.2d 520 (1991) (heavy clothing rendered exterior patdown inconclusive). If the officer feels an item of questionable identity that has the size and density such that it might or might not be a weapon, the officer may only take such action as is necessary to examine such object. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. "[O]nce it is ascertained that no weapon is...