State v. Hueser

Decision Date18 October 1927
Docket Number38537
Citation215 N.W. 643,205 Iowa 132
PartiesSTATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. PAUL HUESER, Appellant
CourtIowa Supreme Court

REHEARING DENIED JANUARY 21, 1928.

Appeal from Mahaska District Court.--CHARLES A. DEWEY, Judge.

Defendant was prosecuted for the crime of engaging in the practice of medicine without having obtained from the state department of health of the state of Iowa a license or certificate so to do. Trial was had to a jury, the trial resulting in a verdict of guilty, and judgment was entered thereon in conformity to law. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Liston McMillan, for appellant.

John Fletcher, Attorney-general, Neill Garrett and Earl F. Wisdom Assistant Attorney-generals, and Blanchard W. Preston, County Attorney, for appellee.

DE GRAFF, J. EVANS, C. J., and STEVENS, ALBERT, and MORLING JJ., concur. WAGNER, J., not participating.

OPINION

DE GRAFF, J.

A county attorney's information accused the defendant that he did willfully and unlawfully engage in the practice of medicine, in that he "did publicly profess and represent himself to be a physician and to assume the duties incident to the practice of medicine, and did then and there unlawfully and willfully profess to treat, heal, and cure diseases of the human body, and did then and there unlawfully and willfully prescribe, furnish, and administer medicine for human ailments, and did then and there unlawfully and willfully treat and attempt to heal and cure diseases of the human body," without first having obtained a license or certificate authorizing him "to engage in the practice of medicine."

The Medical Practice Act of this state has had the consideration of this court in divers cases. State v. Heath, 125 Iowa 585, 101 N.W. 429; State v. Wilhite, 132 Iowa 226, 109 N.W. 730. Sufficient to state that it has been quite universally held that statutes regulating the practice of medicine and surgery are a proper exercise of police power. State ex rel. Powell v. State Medical Exam. Board, 32 Minn. 324, 20 N.W. 238; Musser's Exr. v. Chase, 29 Ohio St. 577; Wert v. Clutter, 37 Ohio St. 347, 348; Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228; State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 429, 30 P. 729; State v. Buswell, 40 Neb. 158, 58 N.W. 728; People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6, 37 N.W. 888.

Free trade in physic no longer prevails, although, under the early common-law rule, any person undertaking to treat the sick in the exercise of his vocation was legally a physician; but, as a matter of history, Parliament, in 1422, enacted a statute regulating the practice of medicine and surgery, and confined it to those who had studied the subject in a university, and who were bachelors of science.

In Iowa, a person is deemed to be engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery who (1) publicly professes to be a physician or surgeon, or (2) publicly professes to assume the duties incident to the practice of medicine or surgery, or (3) prescribes and furnishes medicine for human ailments or treats the same by surgery. Section 2538, Code of 1924.

It is further provided that the opening of an office or place of business for the practice of any profession for which a license is required or the announcing to the public in any way the intention to practice any such profession, or the use of any professional degree or designation or of any sign, card, circular, device, or advertisement as a practitioner, or as a person skilled in same, shall be deemed prima facie evidence "of engaging in the practice of such profession." Section 2528, Code 1924.

The evidence in the instant case is replete with facts affirmatively showing that the defendant violated the prohibitions of the Medical Practice Act. It is conceded of record that he was not a licensed physician. It may be that the defendant is not in the class of the learned "Doctour of Phisike" in the Canterbury Tales of Chaucer, wherein we read:

"He knew the cause of every maladie,
Were it of cold or hote or moist or drie,
And when engendered and of what humour.
He was a veray parfite practisour."

He had patients, and treated them and prescribed for them. In one instance, he gave a woman a physical examination, to determine the condition of her ovaries, and after the examination, pronounced her ovaries all right. This person submitted to the examination on the belief that the defendant was a doctor. He used a violet-ray machine. He prescribed, for one patient suffering from alleged female trouble, an antiseptic salve containing chemicals, medicine, and pharmaceutical preparations, which salve bore the trade-mark "Franze."

It is quite apparent that the acts of this defendant were within the prohibition of the criminal statute.

We now turn to the appellant's contentions which have to do with legal propositions. Before plea, the defendant filed motions to set aside the order of the trial judge approving the county attorney's information, and to set aside the information. Both motions were based primarily on the ground that "no minutes of any evidence signed by any witness and sworn to by any witness were returned with the information." The trial court overruled the motions and properly so. Under the statute governing a county attorney's information, the county attorney, at the time of filing such information, shall indorse or cause to be indorsed thereon the names of the witnesses whose evidence he expects to introduce and use on the trial, and shall also file with such information a minute of the evidence of each witness whose name is indorsed upon the information. Section 13647, Code of 1924. The information shall be sworn to by the county attorney. Section 13649, Code of 1924. Thereupon, the information, before being filed, shall be presented to some judge of the district...

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