State v. Huff
| Decision Date | 24 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | 110,750. |
| Citation | 50 Kan.App.2d 1094,336 P.3d 897 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Wendy HUFF, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Christina M. Kerls, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Ellen H. Mitchell, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before POWELL, P.J., McANANY, J., and BUKATY, S.J.
According to the United States Supreme Court, with the exception of any prior conviction, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Wendy Huff argues in the present appeal that the district court violated this directive when it imposed restitution without requiring the State to prove to a jury whether her actions caused the victim's damages. Because restitution is neither a penalty nor an increase in a defendant's maximum sentence, we hold Apprendi is inapplicable to restitution and, therefore, affirm the district court.
In January 2010, Ankit Patel, Vice President of Diamond Saline, LLC, a Howard Johnson Motel, hired Wendy Huff as a hotel manager. When Patel arrived at the hotel on December 15, 2010, the motel doors were locked and he discovered that Huff had moved out of her residence at the motel. Later that day, Patel discovered that Huff had transferred $19,745.10 from the corporation's bank account to her personal bank account and had attempted to transfer an additional $8,407.90, but those transactions had failed to clear. Patel also learned there was $14,575.00 in cash missing and $2,224.31 worth of supplies missing.
Huff ultimately pled no contest in two cases. In the first, she pled to one count of felony theft pursuant to K.S.A. 21–3701(b)(2), a severity level 7 nonperson felony, and in the second, she pled to one count of giving a worthless check, a class A nonperson misdemeanor. See K.S.A. 21–3707. In exchange, the State dismissed a number of other charges. According to the language of the plea agreement, in the first case, Huff agreed that “restitution will be determined by hearing to be scheduled after sentencing is completed.” In the second case, Huff agreed to be “responsible for full restitution.”
On April 15, 2013, the district court imposed an underlying sentence of 12 months' imprisonment but granted probation for a term of 24 months. The court also imposed restitution of $80 in the second case, as agreed by the parties, but noted that restitution in the first case would be decided on a later date. Huff subsequently filed a motion to bar restitution pursuant to Apprendi, arguing restitution would increase her maximum statutory sentence, thereby requiring restitution to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The State filed a response, arguing Apprendi was not applicable to restitution. The parties agreed to forego a hearing and submitted the issue of restitution to the district court on their written arguments. On October 7, 2013, the district court determined that Apprendi was not applicable and ordered Huff to pay $105,000 in restitution.
Huff timely appeals.
Huff argues the district court violated her constitutional right to a jury trial under Apprendi when it imposed restitution without requiring the State to prove to a jury that her actions caused $105,000 in damages or loss. Conversely, the State argues Huff's plea agreement bars her argument and Apprendi is inapplicable to restitution. Huff does not challenge the district court's decision as to the amount of restitution to be paid.
Standard of review
Whether the district court violated Huff's constitutional rights by ordering restitution without a jury determination is a question of law over which we exercise unlimited review. See State v. Tyler, 286 Kan. 1087, 1095–96, 191 P.3d 306 (2008).
At the time Huff was sentenced, she was placed on probation. Because a defendant is sentenced pursuant to the law in effect at the time the crime was committed, K.S.A. 21–4610(d)(1), which applied to restitution ordered as a condition of probation, governed the district court's authority to order restitution. See State v. Williams, 291 Kan. 554, 559, 244 P.3d 667 (2010). K.S.A. 21–4610(d)(1) provided in pertinent part:
“[T]he court shall order the defendant to ... [m]ake reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by the defendant's crime, in an amount and manner determined by the court and to the person specified by the court, unless the court finds compelling circumstances which would render a plan of restitution unworkable.”
In her brief, Huff correctly argues that the district court was required to make three factual findings in order to impose restitution: (1) the causal link between the defendant's crime and the victim's loss; (2) the amount of restitution; and (3) a determination of whether the restitution plan was unworkable. See State v. Goeller, 276 Kan. 578, 580–81, 77 P.3d 1272 (2003) ); see also State v. Hall, 298 Kan. 978, 986, 319 P.3d 506 (2014) (); Goeller, 276 Kan. at 583, 77 P.3d 1272 (). Huff maintains that in light of Apprendi and the more recent case of Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2344, 183 L.Ed.2d 318 (2012), the restitution statute unconstitutionally permits an increase in her maximum sentence by allowing the district court to make the necessary factual findings to impose restitution, which Huff argues is impermissible and violates her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because these factual findings must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.
The State responds with two lines of defense: First, because Huff agreed in her plea agreement to pay restitution in an amount to be determined at a later hearing, her challenge to the restitution order is barred; and second, relying principally on United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir.2012), cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2038, 185 L.Ed.2d 887 (2013), because the restitution statute contains no prescribed maximum, Apprendi is inapplicable to restitution. Huff acknowledges that a similar argument to hers was rejected in Day but argues Day was wrongfully decided.
First, we easily reject the State's argument that the plea agreement bars Huff's challenge to the restitution order. Plea agreements are contracts between the State and a defendant, see State v. Wills, 244 Kan. 62, 67–68, 765 P.2d 1114 (1988) ; therefore, the interpretation of such a contract is a legal question over which we exercise unlimited review. Osterhaus v. Toth, 291 Kan. 759, 768, 249 P.3d 888 (2011). An ambiguous plea agreement must be strictly construed against the State. Wills, 244 Kan. at 69, 765 P.2d 1114. A review of the language in the plea agreement reveals one agreement involving two cases. Only in the second case—the misdemeanor charge of giving of a worthless check—did Huff agree to be responsible for full restitution. In fact, at sentencing, the district court imposed the agreed-upon restitution amount of $80. Huff does not challenge this order.
However, in the case to which Huff pled guilty to felony theft, the parties merely agreed that restitution would be determined at a hearing to be scheduled after sentencing. The plea agreement did not contain any language providing for Huff's agreement to pay restitution. While the plea agreement did contain Huff's waiver of her right to a jury trial, we note the waiver language was in the context of the State's requirement to prove each element of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewing the plea agreement language strictly against the State, we conclude that Huff did not agree to restitution and is not barred from challenging it, though we note on appeal that she does not challenge the restitution amount of $105,000.
Second, when considering the merits of Huff's argument, we must reject them. Restitution, although part of a defendant's sentence, is not punishment; even if restitution were considered punishment, it does not exceed the statutory maximum of a defendant's sentence.
While it is undeniable that restitution is part of a defendant's sentence, it does not mean restitution is punishment. See State v. McDaniel, 292 Kan. 443, 446, 254 P.3d 534 (2011) ; State v. Hall, 45 Kan.App.2d 290, 298, 247 P.3d 1050 (2011) (), aff'd 297 Kan. 709, 304 P.3d 677 (2013). In fact, a sentence does not contain only punishment or sanctions. See State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 543, 132 P.3d 934 (2006) (). Our Supreme Court has found: “Restitution imposed as a condition of probation is not a legal obligation equivalent to a civil judgment, but rather an option which may be voluntarily exercised by the defendant to avoid serving an active sentence.” State v. Applegate, 266 Kan. 1072, 1075, 976 P.2d 936 (1999).
In Applegate, our Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a district court could refuse to impose restitution when the victims successfully obtained a civil judgment against the defendant and the defendant received a release of all claims from the victims. The court noted that while...
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State v. Wills
...not running afoul of Apprendi . Arnett II , 2021 WL 4806611, at *3 ; see Robison , 58 Kan. App. 2d at 389-90 ; State v. Huff , 50 Kan. App. 2d 1094, 1100, 336 P.3d 897 (2014). The court further noted that as the United States Supreme Court has allowed such lower federal court rulings to sta......