State v. Wills

• Decision Date: 05 November 2021
• Docket Number: No. 122,493,122,493
• Citation: 498 P.3d 184 (Table)
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Casey L. WILLS, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

498 P.3d 184 (Table)

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Casey L. WILLS, Appellant.

No. 122,493

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Opinion filed November 5, 2021.

Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before Malone, P.J., Powell and Cline, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Per Curiam:

Casey L. Wills pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of aggravated domestic battery and was sentenced by the district court to 62 months in prison. The district court also ordered Wills to pay restitution in the amount of $3,228.68 to one victim; $2,907.52 to the Kansas Crime Victims Compensation Board (Board); and $11,903.59 to the second victim. On appeal, Wills only challenges the restitution order as it pertains to the second victim. He does not challenge his convictions or sentence. For reasons we more fully explain below, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

For crimes committed in October and December 2017, Wills entered a Brady plea to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of aggravated domestic battery. See Brady v. United States , 397 U.S. 742, 751, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) (defendant's plea voluntary even if done with desire to suffer lesser penalty). The district court sentenced Wills to a controlling prison term of 62 months.

Wills agreed to pay restitution to one victim but not the other—M.H.—or to the Board. M.H. testified at the restitution hearing that because of Wills' sexual assault against her, she had missed work, been unable to perform her job duties, and received mental health treatment to cope with the emotional and posttraumatic stress she suffered after the sexual assault. The State also produced several exhibits detailing M.H.'s restitution claims.

After listening to M.H.'s testimony, the district court ordered Wills to pay M.H. $11,903.59 in restitution for the lost compensation from her part-time jobs, the costs of her mental health services, and for used sick and vacation leave from her full-time job. It also ordered Wills to reimburse the Board for payments it made to M.H. for part-time wages lost and some counseling costs but not for the remaining balance of what the Board had paid to M.H. because there was no proximate cause to the crime. The district court also did not award restitution for physical therapy and treatment for M.H.'s shoulder pain, finding no causal connection between the injury and Wills' crime of conviction. The total restitution award was $18,039.79.

Wills timely appeals.

I. DID SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORT THE RESTITUTION ORDER?

Wills' first two issues on appeal address the existence of substantial competent evidence to support the restitution order. First, Wills argues the State did not establish a causal link between his crime of conviction and M.H.'s alleged losses. Second, Wills asserts there is not substantial competent evidence M.H.'s use of her sick and vacation leave resulted in an actual loss.

Standard of Review

We review a district court's factual findings on the causal link between the crime committed and the victim's losses for substantial competent evidence. State v. Arnett , 307 Kan. 648, 653, 413 P.3d 787 (2018) (Arnett I ). " ‘Substantial competent evidence is "such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as being sufficient to support a conclusion." ’ [Citations omitted.]" State v. Doelz , 309 Kan. 133, 138, 432 P.3d 669 (2019).

Analysis

Upon a finding of the defendant's guilt, the district court must conduct a hearing to establish restitution when requested by the victim. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3424(d)(1). When a defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, "the court shall order the defendant to pay restitution, which shall include, but not be limited to, damage or loss caused by the defendant's crime." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(b)(1). A district court must base its restitution determination " ‘on reliable evidence which yields a defensible restitution figure.’ " State v. Hunziker , 274 Kan. 655, 660, 56 P.3d 202 (2002). The appropriate restitution amount is what compensates the victim for the actual loss caused by the defendant's crime. Provided a causal connection exists and the district court's determination is based on reliable evidence that " ‘yields a defensible restitution figure,’ " we will uphold the district court's discretionary decision. State v. Hall , 297 Kan. 709, 713-14, 304 P.3d 677 (2013).

The causal link between a defendant's crime and the restitution must satisfy the traditional proximate cause elements: cause-in-fact and legal causation. "[T]hese elements limit a defendant's liability to ‘ "those consequences that are probable according to ordinary and usual experience." ’ " Arnett , 307 Kan. at 654. Causation-in-fact requires proof that it is more likely than not the result would not have happened but for the defendant's conduct. 307 Kan. at 654.

"Legal cause limits the defendant's liability even when his or her conduct was the cause-in-fact of a result by requiring that the defendant is only liable when it was foreseeable that the defendant's conduct might have created a risk of harm and the result of that conduct and any contributing causes were foreseeable. When causation is based on a chain of events, an intervening cause may absolve the defendant of liability. However, ‘[i]f the intervening cause is foreseen or might reasonably have been foreseen’ by the defendant, his or her conduct may still be considered to have proximately caused the result. [Citation omitted.]" 307 Kan. at 655.

A. Substantial competent evidence supported a causal link between Wills' crime of conviction and M.H.'s losses.

Wills first claims the evidence did not support a causal link between M.H.'s claimed losses and his crime of conviction. Wills argues no evidence supported the State's three categories of claims: (1) lost wages for part-time jobs; (2) costs associated with hypnosis

and therapy appointments; and (3) expended sick and vacation leave.

1. Lost wages for part-time jobs

M.H. worked part-time as a security officer at QuikTrip, Sowers Alternative High School, and Life Church and requested restitution for shifts she missed resulting from Wills' sexual assault.

Wills argues the Board provided "wage loss" to M.H. and there is no evidence the restitution awards by the Board did not cover the wage loss M.H. claimed from her part-time jobs. However, M.H. testified her wage loss claims were for her missed part-time shifts and she had not been fully compensated for these wage losses by payments from the Board. In fact, the record shows M.H.'s part-time wage loss claims were for different dates than those reimbursed by the Board.

Wills argues the State did not establish records of when M.H. worked her part-time jobs or that she would have worked those shifts but for Wills' actions. But Wills' argument ignores M.H.'s testimony. M.H. testified she started working at QuikTrip in late 2016 or early 2017 and worked there every other Thursday; she worked every Sunday for two or three years at Life Church; and she worked every Thursday afternoon at Sowers. M.H.'s testimony established a pattern of working these part-time jobs, which only stopped after Wills' sexual assault.

Wills further argues that M.H. admitted QuikTrip no longer hires police as security officers and did not provide a date when that stopped, making it unclear whether QuikTrip still employed officers during the dates for when M.H. was requesting lost wages. However, M.H. testified QuikTrip stopped hiring police officers the month before the restitution hearing, and she made no restitution claims for lost wages during that time. We conclude the State did establish when and how often M.H. worked her part-time jobs. M.H.'s testimony established the frequency of her shifts and supported the claimed number of shifts she missed subsequent to Wills' sexual assault.

Wills also argues the State failed to provide substantial competent evidence his sexual assault was the proximate cause of her missed shifts. M.H. testified she was unable to work these shifts because her full-time employer—the Wichita Police Department—placed her on light duty. Department policy did not permit police officers to work security jobs when on light duty, as M.H. had been.

Wills asserts it is unclear why M.H. missed her shifts, claiming she testified it was because she was placed on light duty but also that it was because of sleep, stress, and shoulder issues. We think Wills' argument misinterprets M.H.'s testimony. M.H. gave two reasons why she missed her part-time shifts: She was on light duty and was not allowed; other shifts she missed because of her posttraumatic stress and related issues such as stress and lack of sleep. Both reasons are related to Wills' sexual assault.

Wills also asserts M.H. did not explain how the light duty policy prevented her from working the part-time jobs and the State failed to introduce the policy into evidence. While it is true the State did not introduce the policy, M.H. did explain it. M.H. testified the policy did not allow her to work part-time jobs while she was on light duty. Moreover, before Wills sexually assaulted her, M.H. regularly worked three part-time shifts. After, M.H. was forced to stop when the Wichita Police Department placed her on light duty in response to the issues she was having after Wills' sexual assault.

While the district court found there was no causal connection between M.H.'s shoulder injury and Wills' sexual assault, substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding that Wills' crime of conviction led to M.H. missing her part-time shifts and losing the income associated with those shifts.

2. Costs associated with hypnosis

and therapy appointments

Wills makes a brief argument that there was not substantial evidence to...