State v. Huffman
| Decision Date | 30 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 31375.,SD 31375. |
| Citation | 374 S.W.3d 382 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Robbie Ray HUFFMAN, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Ellen H. Flottman, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.
Chris Koster, Attorney General, and, Dora A. Fichter, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Robbie Ray Huffman (“Defendant”) appeals his conviction after a jury trial of the class B felony of attempt to manufacture a controlled substance (methamphetamine). See section 195.211.1 In two points relied on, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court plainly erred in admitting into evidence a pre-trial statement he made to a law enforcement officer because there was “no showing by the state that [Defendant] was given his Miranda [ 2] warnings prior to being questioned in custody by [the officer;]” and 2) the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his objection to the admission of his “prior conviction of methamphetamine manufacturing” because it violated his right to be tried only for the offense charged. Finding no merit in either contention, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence was as follows. On July 23, 2009, Defendant came into a Wal–Mart store in Kennett and purchased “hypodermic needles and [ ] instant cold compress packs.” The store's pharmacist testified that he was familiar with Defendant, who was frequently in the store. The pharmacist was aware that the cold packs purchased by Defendant contained “a solvent of some sort[.]” He recalled that Defendant had also come into the store the day before and had purchased pseudoephedrine. The pharmacist knew that those items, taken together, could be used in the manufacture or abuse of drugs.
Because he had been asked to report any suspicious actions taken by certain individuals, a group that included Defendant, the pharmacist reported Defendant's purchases to officer James Decker of the Bootheel Drug Task Force. He also reported that another person he was familiar with and who was a member of that group, Chris Crittendon, had also purchased pseudoephedrine on July 23, 2009. Officer Decker shared this information with Kennett Police Department detective Jeremy Yates, who observed Defendant with Crittendon later that same afternoon.
Upon seeing the two men together, Detective Yates followed them as they traveled in Crittendon's truck to Defendant's residence in Kennett and then watched them go inside. Detective Yates alerted officer Decker, who then joined him at that location. After officer Decker arrived, the two officers knocked on the door but received no response. Detective Yates noticed “a strong chemical smell coming from one of the north windows[.]” After knocking again to no response, the officers became concerned about the safety of those inside the residence. They then “[d]ecided to force open the door and check for anyone inside the residence[.]”
Once inside, Detective Yates first saw Crittendon. He then saw Defendant walk out of the bathroom with his hands and forearms “all soaking wet.” The officers took Defendant and Crittendon outside. After Defendant refused to give consent to a search of his residence, officer Decker obtained a search warrant. Defendant and Crittendon were taken to the police station.
A search of Defendant's yard yielded a 20–ounce “Mountain Dew” bottle located inside a sock. Officer Decker suspected that the bottle had been used in the methamphetamine manufacturing process, and he regarded it as a hazardous material because “it was extremely pressurized.” Officer Decker thought the bottle “could explode at any time with the chemicals in it[,]” so he delivered it to the “Kennett Fire Department DNR bunker to be properly disposed of [.]” Officer Decker said that a small amount of methamphetamine may be manufactured “in a 20–ounce soda bottle” using a method known as “a shake and bake lab.” After processing particular ingredients in the bottle, including some material that may be obtained from instant cold packs, the contents are commonly poured through coffee filters to separate the methamphetamine from the other ingredients. Officer Decker testified that the process produces an odor like the one he smelled at Defendant's residence. Overexposure to the gas produced during a “shake and bake” can result in unconsciousness and, eventually, death.
A subsequent search of Defendant's residence revealed instant cold packs, ceramic plates with some sort of residue on them, pieces of lithium batteries, spoons with residue, a white pipe, damp coffee filters that had a chemical smell, a small piece of burned aluminum foil, two leaking bottles of “Drano” drain cleaner, and store receipts for storage bags, pliers, “Coleman fuel,” and Mountain Dew. Officer Decker suspected that each of these items had been used to either manufacture or ingest methamphetamine.
The officers also searched Crittendon's vehicle and seized two cans of “Heat” deicer. “Heat” contains another solvent that is commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. When Crittendon was searched, the officers found “.4 grams of methamphetamine inside [his] wallet[.]” No pseudoephedrine pills or their packaging were found anywhere on the premises. This would not be unusual if the pills were purchased to manufacture methamphetamine because the buyer often discards the packaging, and the actual pills would be transformed from their pill form during the manufacturing process. The residue on the plates seized from the home was later determined to contain methamphetamine.
Officer Decker contacted Defendant at the police station and was allowed to testify at trial as follows about statements Defendant made during that encounter:
[Prosecutor:] And did [Defendant] say anything to you regarding the items that were found?
[Officer Decker:] He did.
[Trial Court]: Overruled. He may answer.
[Officer Decker:] [Defendant] stated that he used methamphetamine on a regular basis, however, did not manufacture methamphetamine and would not know the first thing about manufacture of methamphetamine due to the fact that he had never manufactured methamphetamine before.
[Prosecutor:] And at some point later, did you determine differently?
[Officer Decker:] I'm sorry?
[Prosecutor:] At some point later did you determine differently?
[Officer Decker:] Yes. I found out that he had actually been charged prior and I believe convicted prior for manufacture of methamphetamine.
State's Exhibit 1, a certified copy of Defendant's 2001 judgment and sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine, was admitted into evidence over defense counsel's continuing objection. Defendant did not testify.
Defendant filed a motion for new trial that, among other things, challenged the admission of evidence concerning Defendant's prior conviction and the admission of Defendant's statement to Officer Decker. But the motion's legal basis for challenging the admission of Defendant's statement was that the statement was used “solely for the purpose of allowing the State to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior conviction”—it made no claim of a Miranda violation. The trial court denied the motion for new trial and sentenced Defendant to 12 years imprisonment as a persistent offender. This appeal timely followed.
Point I: No evidence of Miranda warning
Defendant's first point alleges the trial court plainly erred in permitting officer Decker to testify about his pre-trial statements “because the statements were taken in violation of [Defendant's] privilege against self-incrimination and right to due process of law ... in that there was no showing by the state that [Defendant] was given his Miranda warnings prior to being questioned in custody by Officer Decker.” (Emphasis added.) 3 Because the State was not required to lay such a foundation in the absence of a proper, prior request to suppress the statement, we deny the point.
Defendant acknowledges that although he objected to the admission of his statement on this basis at trial, he did not file a pretrial motion to suppress his statement and did not include the claim in his motion for new trial. As a result, Defendant seeks plain error review under Rule 30.20.4See State v. Young, 230 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Mo.App. E.D.2007) ().
“Plain error is evident, obvious and clear error.” State v. Garrison, 276 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Mo.App. S.D.2009). Plain error review is discretionary and should occur only when the alleged error involves “substantial rights” and results in a “manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.” Rule 30.20. Defendant has the burden of establishing that the trial court committed plain error and that it resulted in a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. State v. Green, 358 S.W.3d 546, 548 (Mo.App. S.D.2012). Only if we find that the trial court committed error that is “evident, obvious and clear” do we next proceed to determine whether it resulted in a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. Id. (quoting State v. Jennings, 322 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Mo.App. S.D.2010)).
Here, Defendant argues that “[t]here was no showing that [he] was read his Miranda warnings before he was questioned in custody at the police station.” Defendant points out that the privilege against self-incrimination requires police to warn someone in custody of his right to remain silent, citing State v. Mahan, 971 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Mo. banc 1998). He further urges that a...
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...the two front seats). 4. It is well settled that false exculpatory statements evidence a consciousness of guilt. See State v. Huffman, 374 S.W.3d 382, 388 (Mo.App.2012). 5. Defendant also argues the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed the stolen identities because the means......