State v. Hughes

• Decision Date: 22 May 1919
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 10
• Citation: 203 Ala. 90,82 So. 104
• Parties: STATE v. HUGHES et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

82 So. 104

203 Ala. 90

STATE v. HUGHES et al.

7 Div. 10

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 22, 1919

Appeal from Circuit Court, Calhoun County; Hugh D. Merrill, Judge.

Proceedings by the State against Arthur J. Hughes and others to condemn a mule, a buggy, and a harness which were being used in the transportation of intoxicating liquors in violation of the Bone Dry Law. Judgment for defendants, and the State appeals. Affirmed.

J.Q Smith, Atty. Gen., and Horace Wilkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.

Charles F. Douglass, of Anniston, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This is a proceeding by the state to condemn a mule, a buggy, and harness, which were being used in the transportation of intoxicating liquors, in violation of a recent statute of this state passed at the present session of the Legislature and referred to as the Bone Dry Prohibition Law of this state. This act, among other things, provides for the condemnation of "all conveyances and vehicles of transportation of any kind *** used for the illegal conveying of any prohibited liquors or beverages."

The property in question was seized by the sheriff of Calhoun county while in the possession of one Arthur J. Hughes, and while it was being used to convey prohibited liquors in violation of the statute. As to these facts there seems to be no dispute, and no question is here raised as to the validity of the seizure.

After seizure of the property, the statute provides for condemnation proceedings. As a part of this procedure, it provides that "any party claiming a superior right may intervene by petition in said suit and have his claim adjudicated." After the adjudication by the court of the claimant's rights, and as to whether the property is subject to condemnation, the statute provides for a sale of the property, but only authorizes the sale of the right of those "who aided or assisted in the illegal transportation, or who had knowledge or notice thereof, or who could be reasonable diligence have obtained knowledge or notice thereof."

The statute therefore clearly never contemplated condemning and selling the property of those who did not aid or assist in the illegal act, or who were not chargeable with notice or knowledge that their property was to be used for such illegal purpose. It seems to us too clear for argument that the Legislature did not intend that the property of a person wholly innocent of any intent to violate the law, or to aid or assist another in violating, and without knowledge or notice of facts to put him on notice that his property was to be used in violation of the statute, should be confiscated.

The language used in section 13 of the act is not susceptible of the construction contended for by the state in its argument. The contention of the state is thus stated in brief of counsel:

"The state contends in this case that a proper interpretation of section 13 of the act approved January 25 1919, known as the Bone Dry Law, must result in a holding to the effect that any vehicle that is used for unlawfully transporting liquor is subject to forfeiture, if it was lawfully in the possession of the wrongdoer at the time the unlawful act was performed, and this without regard to knowledge or notice on the part of the true owner of the unlawful use to which it was put."

We cannot assent to the interpretation of the phrase "aided or assisted" which counsel for the state place on it. Counsel thus state their interpretation of this phrase:

"The words 'aided or assisted,' as used in the statute, merely imply a contribution to the general result, and a person may 'aid' in illegally transporting liquor by unconsciously, and therefore innocently, doing some act essential to its accomplishment."

It is perfectly plain that the lawmakers intended to forfeit and confiscate only the property interest and right of those who were culpable as to its use in violating the law. It is not necessary to the forfeiture that the owner be guilty of the crime or offense of unlawfully transporting the liquors; but it is necessary that he be culpable or derelict in the use of his property in allowing it to be used for an unlawful purpose. Why allow an owner to intervene and file his superior claim for the purpose of having it adjudicated, if the mere use of the property for the unlawful purpose by a wrongdoer, without the consent of the owner, ipso facto forfeits it?

The only condition which the state's construction places upon the provision in question is that the possession of the wrongdoer must be unlawful. According to this construction if the wrongdoer obtains the possession of the property for a...