State v. Hunsberger
| Decision Date | 05 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | 2014-UP-381 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The State, Respondent, v. Alexander L. Hunsberger, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2012-206608 |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Heard September 9, 2014
Appeal From Edgefield County Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge
Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.
Alexander L. Hunsberger appeals his conviction for murder, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge against him because his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated as a result of the almost ten-year delay in bringing his case to trial. We affirm.
On September 3, 2001, Samuel J. Sturrup was shot and killed in South Carolina. Hunsberger was arrested for his murder on January 25, 2002. Hunsberger's brother, Julio, and Steven Louis Barnes were also charged with Sturrup's murder.[1]
Hunsberger was denied bail by order dated June 14, 2002. On November 17 2004, he filed a motion for speedy trial. Judge William Keesley filed an order addressing Hunsberger's speedy trial motion on December 2, 2004. Judge Keesley noted he was "deeply concerned about the length of time that has transpired without bringing [Hunsberger] to trial." Judge Keesley acknowleged that part of the delay was because multiple defendants and different jurisdictions were involved and there was the possibility the State could seek the death penalty. However, Judge Keesley stated Georgia had disposed of the co-defendants' cases more than a year before and the court had instructed the Solicitor's office to make a decision about whether to serve the death penalty notice. Judge Keesley determined no circumstances warranted modification of his previous order, admonished the State to bring the case to trial in February 2005, and provided Hunsberger could reassert his motions if the case was not brought to trial in February 2005.
The State subsequently informed the court that it did not intend to try the case in February. As a result, Hunsberger renewed his motion. Judge Keesley filed a second order on January 28 2005, denying Hunsberger's motion to dismiss, but granting him a $50, 000 personal recognizance bond. Judge Keesley stated Hunsberger Thereafter, the State released custody of Hunsberger to the State of Georgia. On September 12, 2006, Hunsberger was tried and convicted in Georgia for kidnapping Sturrup. Some time later, the State learned that although Hunsberger was given a life sentence in Georgia, he was eligible for parole after serving a term of imprisonment. Hunsberger was eventually returned to South Carolina to be tried for murder.
Hunsberger's South Carolina trial began on January 3, 2012. At the beginning of trial, Hunsberger renewed his motion to dismiss his case, asserting his right to a speedy trial was violated. Hunsberger asserted he would be prejudiced by the delay because the State's theory rested on the theory of "the hand of one is the hand of all" and the witnesses' memories would be faded or nonexistent. He also argued the State created the almost ten-year delay by waiting until he was eligible for parole in Georgia to bring the case to trial.
The State asserted the solicitor had wanted to proceed with Barnes' trial first to give Hunsberger the opportunity to testify against Barnes if he wanted to and the solicitor was not sure whether he intended to seek the death penalty against Hunsberger until after Barnes' trial was completed. Meanwhile, Georgia had wanted to try Hunsberger and sought his extradition back to Georgia. The solicitor relented and allowed Georgia to try him first. The State asserted it attempted to proceed with Hunsberger's trial in October 2011 upon completing Barnes' trial; however Hunsberger refused to sign the extradition papers, which delayed transporting him back to South Carolina. Additionally, the State argued Hunsberger never asserted his right to a speedy trial during the seven years he was serving his life sentence in Georgia. Finally, the State contended Hunsberger was not prejudiced by the delay because all the witnesses testified in the Georgia case and he had the benefit of their sworn testimony to impeach them. All the co-defendants were also extradited to South Carolina and were prepared to testify against Hunsberger. After considering arguments from both sides, Judge Clifton Newman denied Hunsberger's motion to dismiss. Judge Newman asserted the State had "demonstrated legitimate reasons for the delay given the complex nature of the cases, [and] the problems involving prosecutions in multiple jurisdictions in this state as well as the State of Georgia."
Hunsberger renewed his motion to dismiss his case at the close of the State's case, arguing the changes in witnesses' testimony provided an example of the prejudice he suffered from the delay in bringing his case to trial. Judge Newman denied the motion, stating Hunsberger's counsel did "an effective job at pointing out to the witnesses in cross-examining them and impeaching them on prior inconsistent statements." He added the transcript was available to refresh witnesses' recollection and impeach them when needed. He further stated Hunsberger had not "been deprived of his liberty because he's been incarcerated under another sentence." The jury convicted Hunsberger of murder, and the court sentenced him to thirty-three years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
In criminal cases, this court sits to review errors of law only and is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009); see State v. Evans, 386 S.C. 418, 422, 688 S.E.2d 583, 585 (Ct. App. 2009) (). Thus, on review, the court is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision is unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law. State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16, 732 S.E.2d 880, 884 (2012). "This [c]ourt does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply determines whether the trial court's ruling is supported by any evidence." Edwards, 384 S.C. at 508, 682 S.E.2d at 822.
Hunsberger argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge against him because the almost ten-year delay in bringing his case to trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We disagree.
A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; S.C. Const. art. I, § 14. "This right 'is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.'" State v Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 548-49, 647 S.E.2d 144, 155 (2007) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982)). A "'speedy trial does not mean an immediate one; it does not imply undue haste, for the [S]tate, too, is entitled to a reasonable time in which to prepare its case; it simply means a trial without unreasonable and unnecessary delay.'" State v. Langford, 400 S.C. 421, 441, 735 S.E.2d 471, 481-82 (2012) (quoting Wheeler v. State, 247 S.C. 393, 400, 147 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1966)). "There is no universal test to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated." Evans, 386 S.C. at 423, 688 S.E.2d at 586.
When determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his or her right to a speedy trial, this court should consider four factors: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. State v. Brazell, 325 S.C. 65, 75, 480 S.E.2d 64, 70 (1997) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). These four factors are related and must be considered together with any other relevant circumstances. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. "Accordingly, the determination that a defendant has been deprived of this right is not based on the passage of a specific period of time, but instead is analyzed in terms of the circumstances of each case, balancing the conduct of the prosecution and the defense." Pittman, 373 S.C. at 549, 647 S.E.2d at 155. However, in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992), the United States Supreme Court suggested in dicta that a delay of more than a year is "presumptively prejudicial." Also, in State v. Waites, 270 S.C. 104, 108, 240 S.E.2d 651, 653 (1978), our supreme court found a two-year-and-four-month delay was sufficient to trigger further review. "[A] delay may be so lengthy as to require a finding of presumptive prejudice, and thus trigger the analysis of the other factors." Pittman, 373 S.C. at 549, 647 S.E.2d at 155.
In State v. Evans, 386 S.C. at 424-26, 688 S.E.2d at 586-87, this court found a twelve-year delay in bringing a case to trial did not violate the defendant's speedy trial rights when the defendant's statement to police was suppressed; the appeals of the suppression order lasted for five years; after the appeals the case was...
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