State v. Hurles

Decision Date16 April 1996
Docket NumberNo. CR-94-0366-AP,CR-94-0366-AP
Citation914 P.2d 1291,185 Ariz. 199
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Richard Dean HURLES, Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court
OPINION

FELDMAN, Chief Justice.

On April 15, 1994, a jury found Richard Dean Hurles guilty of first-degree burglary of the Buckeye Public Library, as well as attempted sexual assault and first-degree murder of Kay Blanton. The trial court sentenced Hurles to death on his murder conviction. This is Hurles' direct, automatic appeal of his murder conviction and death sentence. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 26.15 and 31.2(b). This court has jurisdiction under Ariz.Const. art. VI, § 5(3) and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4033(A).

BACKGROUND

After serving nearly fifteen years in prison for sexually assaulting two young boys, Richard Dean Hurles was released on parole in June 1992. Following his release, Hurles moved to Buckeye, where some of his family lived.

On the afternoon of November 12, 1992, Hurles went to the Buckeye public library, a small, house-type building in a residential neighborhood. The only employee in the library at the time was Kay Blanton. The last patron, other than Hurles, left the library just before 2:40 p.m. Hurles then locked the front doors to the library and attacked Blanton in the back room. He stripped off her underwear and pulled her skirt above her waist in an unsuccessful attempt to rape her. Using a paring knife found in the back room of the library, Hurles mortally wounded Blanton, stabbing her thirty-seven times and inflicting blunt force trauma by kicking her to such an extent he tore her liver.

At approximately 2:45 p.m., Mark Porter and his friend, John Kale, went to the library and discovered the front doors were locked. Porter looked through the window and saw Blanton lying in a pool of blood. While Porter went around to the back door of the library, Kale ran across the street to a house where Dale Capper was working on his truck. Capper had noticed Porter and Kale try to open the library door and had, at the same time, seen Hurles "crash" through the back door of the library, run toward him, and then head down the street. After Kale explained what he and Porter had seen, Capper got into his truck and followed Hurles. Meanwhile, Porter entered the library through the open back door and called 911. The call to 911 was received at 2:50 p.m.

Capper followed Hurles down the street and caught up to him at a four-way stop. While he was stopped, Capper had an excellent opportunity to identify Hurles when the latter approached the truck and asked Capper "How are you doing?," to which Capper responded "I'm doing okay." Capper then observed Hurles enter an apartment complex, at which point Capper left his truck and continued following Hurles.

At the apartment complex, Capper saw Hurles talking to Robert Phillips, who knew Hurles. Phillips was outside fixing a lawnmower when Hurles approached and asked to borrow the bicycle laying next to him. Phillips initially refused to let Hurles take the bike but relented after Hurles asked him ten to twenty times. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Capper watched Hurles ride away on the bicycle; he then returned to the library to tell police what he had seen.

Between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., Hurles rode the bicycle to the home of his nephew, Thomas, in Buckeye and asked Thomas for a ride to Phoenix. Hurles had changed his clothes and cleaned himself up somewhat, and Thomas, who had been asleep and was unaware of Blanton's murder, agreed to drive Hurles to Phoenix. As the two left the house, Hurles was carrying a bundle of clothes. During the drive to Phoenix, Thomas noticed that Hurles had bite marks on his wrist. When asked about them, Hurles told Thomas he had been in a fight with a Spanish man at the library, that he had stabbed the man with the man's knife, and that he had received the bite marks in the fight. As part of his insanity defense, however, Hurles later claimed he had no recollection of anything that occurred between sitting in the library and going out the back door.

As they continued toward Phoenix, Hurles had Thomas pull over so he could toss the bundle of clothes out the car window. Thomas left Hurles at a Phoenix bus station, where he purchased a bus ticket to Las Vegas. Thomas returned to Buckeye, where he ultimately made contact with the police and told them of Hurles' destination. Later that evening, the police intercepted Hurles' bus on the way to Las Vegas; Hurles was removed from the bus, arrested, and returned to Phoenix.

With Thomas' help, the police recovered Hurles' discarded clothes. Police found blood on the clothing that matched Blanton's blood type, which occurs in one percent of the population. Police also found blood matching Blanton's type on Hurles' shoes, which he was still wearing when taken from the bus. Four bloody shoeprints at the murder scene matched the soles of Hurles' shoes, and Hurles' palm print was found on the paring knife left at the scene.

On April 15, 1994, all twelve jurors found Hurles guilty of both premeditated and felony murder. The trial court sentenced Hurles to death and this appeal followed.

TRIAL ISSUES
A. The insanity defense

1. Hurles' consent

After Hurles entered a not guilty plea, his lawyer filed notice of an insanity defense. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 15.2(b). On appeal, Hurles claims the insanity defense is, in essence, a distinct "plea" of not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity, which he equates to a guilty plea. Hurles contends that he never agreed to enter such a plea and therefore that his fundamental right to due process under the 14th Amendment was violated. Hurles argues that an insanity defense eliminates the presumption of innocence and removes the state's burden of proving the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Hurles submits, therefore, that a defendant's express consent to the insanity plea must be demonstrated in the same manner as a defendant's consent to such things as pleading guilty and waiving a jury trial.

We find no support for Hurles' proposition that Arizona recognizes a distinct plea of "not guilty-by-reason-of-insanity." See State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 249, 250, 403 P.2d 806, 807 (1965) ("The rule ... that in a prosecution for homicide, defendant, under the general plea of not guilty, may set up the defense of insanity ... has not been changed by adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.") (emphasis added). Thus, Arizona maintains a distinction between recognized pleas and affirmative defenses, such as insanity. See A.R.S. § 13-502 (setting forth the standard for insanity and defendant's burden of proof in asserting that defense); Rule 14.3(a) (delineating those pleas the court must ascertain the defendant is entering as including guilty, not guilty, and no contest).

Hurles participated in a Rule 11 competency hearing and was found competent to stand trial. See State v. Gretzler, 126 Ariz. 60, 73-74, 612 P.2d 1023, 1036-37 (1980). Therefore, on this record, we must presume that because Hurles was competent to stand trial he understood the nature of the proceedings and was able to participate in his defense. Hurles also had psychiatric evaluations by both his expert and the state's, was present in court for the trial, and heard the lawyers and witnesses. Yet, Hurles never objected or expressed concern to the judge when his lawyer conceded certain facts, explained what "insanity can mean," and told the jury in her opening statement to think of Hurles as Frankenstein: "He can't help it, he's just a monster."

We refuse to speculate that Hurles either sat through the entire proceeding unaware that his lawyer was presenting an insanity defense, or that Hurles was aware of but sat in silent opposition to such a defense. On this record, therefore, we assume that Hurles was aware of the proceedings and consented to the strategy pursued by his lawyer. Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant may control the decision, the failure of counsel to show on the record express permission from the defendant to advance an insanity defense is not fundamental error. Absent an objection on the record or proof that the defendant was unaware that the defense was advanced, the claim is waived. See State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 154, 812 P.2d 626, 627 (1991). Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (reversible error where record did not disclose defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered guilty pleas). Accordingly, Hurles' claim on this issue is waived. See State v. Ryan, 248 Neb. 405, 534 N.W.2d 766 (1995) (holding that defendant acquiesced in insanity defense by cooperating with the psychiatrists and that attorneys made reasonable strategic choice in asserting insanity defense).

2. Burden of proof

We also disagree with Hurles' assertions that the insanity defense vitiates the presumption of innocence or negates the state's burden of proof. Even though criminal defendants have the burden of proving insanity under A.R.S. § 13-502(B), which may but need not result in a strategy of admitting certain facts of the crime charged, the presumption of innocence and the state's burden remain unchanged.

Recognizing insanity as an affirmative defense does not negate the state's burden of proof. State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 192, 717 P.2d 866, 871 (1986). The state is still required, as it did in this case, to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Because the insanity defense does not require the defendant to prove or to disprove any element of the offense charged, there is no change in the...

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21 cases
  • Hurles v. Ryan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • July 7, 2011
    ...leave the library through the back door and followed him down the street, where they had a brief conversation. State v. Hurles, 185 Ariz. 199, 914 P.2d 1291, 1293–94 (1996). Hurles then went home on a borrowed bicycle and requested that his nephew Thomas drive him to a Phoenix bus station. ......
  • Hurles v. Ryan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • May 16, 2014
    ...fifteen years for prior crimes, went to the library in Buckeye, Arizona on a November afternoon in 1992. State v. Hurles, 185 Ariz. 199, 914 P.2d 1291, 1293 (1996) (en banc). He attacked librarian Kay Blanton by attempting to rape her and then stabbing her thirty-seven times. Id. Hurles lef......
  • Hurles v. Ryan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • January 18, 2013
    ...fifteen years for prior crimes, went to the library in Buckeye, Arizona on a November afternoon in 1992. State v. Hurles, 185 Ariz. 199, 914 P.2d 1291, 1293 (1996) (en banc). He attacked librarian Kay Blanton by attempting to rape her and then stabbing her thirty-seven times. Id. Hurles lef......
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    • October 25, 2012
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