State v. Hutchinson
| Decision Date | 16 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 65876-5,65876-5 |
| Citation | 135 Wn.2d 863,959 P.2d 1061 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Darrin Rand HUTCHINSON, Sr., Respondent. |
Russell Hauge, Kitsap County Prosecutor, Pamela Loginsky, Deputy Kitsap County Prosecutor, Port Orchard, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.
Ketherine Collings, Port Orchard, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Sheriffs.
William Hawkins, Island County Prosecutor, Coupeville, Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, Gregory P. Canova, Todd Bowers, Assistant Attorney Generals, Seattle, for Petitioner.
Jones, Ross, Besman & Connolly, Kathryn Ross, Seattle, Paul Wasson, II, Spokane, for Respondent.
We granted review of the Court of Appeals decision reversing Defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated first degree murder. State v. Hutchinson, 85 Wash.App. 726, 733, 938 P.2d 336 (1997) (Hutchinson II). We now affirm the Defendant's convictions.
On November 14, 1987, Island County Sheriff Deputies Saxerud and Heffernan arrested the Defendant, Darrin Rand Hutchinson, at the Clinton ferry terminal for driving under the influence. A search incident to arrest failed to yield a .32 caliber handgun which the Defendant concealed inside the waistband of his pants.
The Defendant rode in the backseat of the patrol car to the Sheriff's office in Coupeville, where the deputies drove into the garage and closed the door behind them. After removing their own service revolvers and placing them in a lockbox, the officers escorted the Defendant inside to administer a breathalyzer. At approximately 6 a.m., the Defendant using his own gun, shot both deputies to death. Deputy Saxerud received a single gunshot wound to the side of the head, fired from close range. Deputy Heffernan received two gunshot wounds to the head, fired from two feet or more away.
After shooting the deputies, the Defendant removed the key from Deputy Saxerud's pocket and stole the patrol car, ramming it through the locked garage door to escape. The Defendant drove first to his brother's house and told him what had happened. Following his brother's advice, the Defendant drove the patrol car over the edge of a steep ravine to "get it out of [there]," then walked to his parents' house. Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 1044 (June 12, 1989).
Sergeant Ridley, an 11-year veteran of the Island County Sheriff's Department, arrested the Defendant at his parents' house shortly thereafter. Sergeant Ridley was well-acquainted with the Defendant through prior contacts. After handcuffing the Defendant, Sergeant Ridley read him his rights. The Defendant stated he understood and wanted to speak to the police. Sergeant Edwards, another Island County Deputy, then appeared and asked Sergeant Ridley to reread the Defendant his rights in Edwards' presence. Sergeant Ridley did so, and, after saying once that he did not understand, the Defendant stated he understood his rights and would speak with police.
The Defendant rode with Sergeant Ridley and Deputy Lavoie to the Island County Jail. During that time, he told the officers that he had been arrested that morning by Deputies Saxerud and Heffernan, whom he shot because they were assaulting him. The officers who came into contact with the Defendant after his arrest testified he did not appear to be intoxicated. The Defendant stated he was not intoxicated.
Chief Criminal Deputy Ron Panzero of the Skagit County Sheriff's Department joined Sergeant Ridley and the Defendant in a large interrogation room. Deputy Panzero placed a tape recorder on the table in front of the Defendant, turned it on, and read him his rights again. The Defendant did not want to sign a written waiver but again stated he wanted to speak to the officers and tell them the events surrounding the murders of Deputies Saxerud and Heffernan. The Defendant initially stated he did not care whether the statement was taped. The tape recording began at 8:50 a.m. After several minutes, the Defendant told the officers that speaking with the tape recorder running made him nervous. At the Defendant's request, the tape was turned off at 8:58 a.m. The Defendant continued to speak freely about the shootings for approximately 20 minutes, then requested that the tape recorder be turned on after Deputy Panzero told him he was talking too fast for the officers to write down his statement accurately. It was not noted on the tape what time recording ensued.
Later that evening, Deputy Panzero and Sergeant Ridley visited the Defendant in the jail and read him his rights for the fourth time that day. The Defendant asked to speak with an attorney, and the officers immediately ended the interview. The Defendant had not previously asserted his right to remain silent or to have counsel present.
The Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated first degree murder. Prior to trial, he underwent intelligence quotient (IQ) testing at the Island County Jail. The test results showed he had a verbal IQ of 78, a performance IQ of 85, and a full-scale IQ of 79. The Defendant's IQ indicated he was in the range from borderline intellectual functioning to low average. His score on the comprehension subtest of the IQ examination was within the average range. The trial court denied the defense motion to exclude the statements made by the Defendant.
The Defendant also moved to appear at trial without physical restraints of any kind. After a hearing at which Island County Chief Deputy Proft testified to differing methods of restraint, the court required the Defendant to wear a leg brace under his clothing on one leg. The other leg would be chained to a device in the floor under counsel table, which was skirted, thereby rendering the restraints invisible to the jury. The Defendant's hands were not to be shackled. The court examined these proposed arrangements from the perspective of the jurors to determine whether the restraints would be visible. Following the inspection, the court stated it could see nothing which would indicate to the jurors that the Defendant was shackled.
The Defendant attempted to introduce evidence at trial of the victims' character. Specifically, the defense wished to introduce Deputy Heffernan's performance evaluation from 1980, in which a superior officer stated Deputy Heffernan "lost his composure" and was "aggressive" and "physical" with intoxicated arrestees. Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 37 (May 12, 1989). In addition, the defense made offers of proof regarding the reputation of the Island County Sheriff's Department and specific acts of violence or intimidation by Deputy Heffernan. After a hearing, the trial court allowed only the testimony of "specific witnesses if they [could] testify to the general reputation of Deputy Heffernan or Deputy Saxerud for a pertinent trait of character relevant hereto." Clerk's Papers at 344.
The trial of Defendant's case was originally set for January 25, 1988. At the omnibus hearing, held January 4, 1988, the trial court ordered the Defendant to state by no later than February 5, 1988, whether he would raise a claim of diminished capacity or voluntary intoxication. Subsequent orders from the court regarding the assertion of a diminished capacity defense went unheeded by the Defendant, and, on April 22, 1988, the State filed a motion to compel examination of the Defendant. The basis for the motion was Defendant's assertion that he might rely on the defense of diminished capacity and introduce expert psychiatric testimony in support of that defense. The Defendant's silence, therefore, would deprive the State of controverting his proof on the issue of his mental condition.
The Superior Court granted the State's motion for an order compelling the Defendant to submit to a psychiatric or psychological examination by an expert of the State's choosing. The court limited the State's use of any evidence derived from such an examination to rebuttal, and then only if the Defendant first introduced evidence of diminished capacity. The order also provided:
[T]he effect of this order is stayed until the 24th day of June, 1988, to permit the defense an opportunity to seek discretionary review of this order by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington[.]
We accepted discretionary review, and by order dated September 26, 1988, affirmed the requirement that the Defendant submit to an examination by the State's expert. The order also stated:
[N]either the interposing of a diminished capacity defense by Mr. Hutchinson nor his submission to this examination shall be deemed to waive his constitutional right against self-incrimination[.]
State v. Hutchinson, 111 Wash.2d 872, 874, 766 P.2d 447 (1989) (Hutchinson I). The order went on to say an explanatory opinion would be issued in due course.
Following issuance of the order, the State conceded clarification was needed to ascertain whether the Defendant could refuse to answer questions; the order was ambiguous as to how the Defendant's right against self-incrimination was to be protected during a compelled examination.
The trial date neared and the State was anxious to conduct the mental examination of the Defendant despite the fact this court's explanatory opinion had not been issued. Assistant Attorney General Gregory Canova stated:
We have been reasonable in this case in agreeing with defense counsel to wait for the [Supreme Court] opinion, but it has not been forthcoming, and we simply can't wait any longer.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 80-81 (Jan. 9, 1989).
The State sought clarification of their expert, Dr. Muscatel's right to examine the Defendant. Defense counsel stated she would be advising the Defendant not to answer any questions. The State noted it would ask the court to strike any evidence of a...
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