State v. Hutt, 68153
| Citation | 330 N.W.2d 788 |
| Decision Date | 16 March 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 68153,68153 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William Madison HUTT, Appellant. |
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Steven M. Foritano, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
James B. Smith, of Shirley, Smith, Shirley & Powell, Perry, for appellant.
Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McCORMICK, and CARTER, JJ.
The defendant appeals from his conviction following bench trial of the offense of theft in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code section 714.1(4) (1981). He contends on appeal that (1) the State's evidence was insufficient to prove a necessary element of the crime charged; (2) the trial court, acting as finder of fact, found that he had not possessed criminal intent, a finding which should have precluded the court from making a determination that defendant was guilty; and (3) Iowa Code section 714.1(4) is unconstitutionally vague in its definition of the phrase "to exercise control over" property. Because we find the second issue to be dispositive of the result, we do not consider the other issues raised.
The record in the instant case shows that on July 17, 1981, defendant, William Madison Hutt, was working at a rental property he owns in Des Moines. He was approached by two men, one of whom he knew as "JJ." "JJ" wanted to rent an apartment. "JJ" allegedly did not have enough money to rent the defendant's apartment, but nevertheless sought defendant's assistance in moving a stove and refrigerator from his present apartment. The defendant did not have time to help move the appliances, but he allowed his friend, Henry Crawford, to use defendant's truck to assist "JJ." Defendant testified that he believed that if this stove and refrigerator were removed, a rental deposit would be returned to "JJ" which would assist him in making a rental deposit on defendant's apartment.
Crawford drove to the Laurel Village apartment complex where he waited by the truck while the two men got the refrigerator and loaded it onto defendant's truck. At this time, the Laurel Village apartment manager, Katherine Sanders, drove in and saw what was happening. The two men tried to drive away in their car but she blocked the driveway with her car. At this time, the two men fled. Katherine Sanders testified that she told Crawford that his friends had gotten him in trouble and that she had the license plate number of the pickup truck.
Crawford then apparently returned alone with the refrigerator to the apartments where defendant was working. Crawford testified at trial that he told defendant that a lady had taken the license number of the truck and that the two men who had discussed renting defendant's apartment had fled when they were stopped by this woman. Defendant had another use for the truck, and the refrigerator was unloaded in the parking lot of defendant's apartment building. A few hours later, defendant and Crawford were arrested by police. Crawford was charged with the theft of the refrigerator, in violation of section 714.1(1), while defendant was charged with exercising control over stolen property in violation of section 714.1(4). In a trial to the court, Crawford was acquitted and defendant was convicted.
Defendant contends that because the trial court, acting as the finder-of-fact, made a specific finding that defendant had no intent to commit a criminal act, such finding precludes the court's ultimate determination that defendant was guilty of theft. We set forth relevant excerpts from the trial court's findings which bear upon this claim:
The Court doesn't take the notion in this matter that Mr. Hutt had any intent to break the law, but his acts did break the law. The Court has even less feeling that Mr. Crawford intended to break the law. But his acts did break the law.
As soon as Mr. Crawford returned to the Oakland Street address and confronted Mr. Hutt, Mr. Hutt at that time reasonably became aware beyond any reasonable doubt that the property on the back of his truck driven by Mr. Crawford was no longer being shepherded by the claimed owner, JJ; was no longer being cared for by a supposed owner; had been informed that JJ and his friend had split on Mr. Crawford, that somebody had taken his license number, and a reference to the police being involved. And in spite of all those facts that certainly give rise to a reasonable cause to believe that the property had been stolen, Mr. Hutt simply has the truck driven to the back of the lot, and after waiting some period of time drops off the refrigerator, makes no effort to determine from Mr. Crawford where he got it, makes no effort to correct the situation by turning the truck around and driving back to Ninth Street and determining the facts of the situation.
The issue which we must decide is whether proof that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. McVey
...unless the person's purpose is to promptly restore it to the owner or to deliver it to an appropriate public officer." In State v. Hutt, 330 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Iowa 1983), we held that the mens rea of this offense requires proof that the accused actually believe the property is stolen. We hav......
-
State v. Hensley
...had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt "that [Hensley] actually did believe that the [motorcycle] was stolen." See State v. Hutt, 330 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Iowa 1983); Robinson, 288 N.W.2d at Besides defendant's statements to deputy Lettington, the State presented circumstantial evidence showing......
-
State v. Smith, No. 6-635/05-2072 (Iowa App. 10/25/2006), 6-635/05-2072
...unless the person's purpose is to promptly restore it to the owner or to deliver it to an appropriate public officer. In State v. Hutt, 330 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Iowa 1983), the court held that the mens rea of this offense requires proof that the accused actually believe the property was stolen.......
-
State v. Winders, 83-1529
...exercise control over stolen property; and (2) the accused must do so with the knowledge that the property is stolen. See State v. Hutt, 330 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Iowa 1983). While Winder denied she knew the sleigh and buggy were stolen, there is substantial evidence in the record to indicate ot......