State v. Smith, No. 6-635/05-2072 (Iowa App. 10/25/2006), 6-635/05-2072
| Decision Date | 25 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 6-635/05-2072,6-635/05-2072 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER BARRON SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Jeffrey L. Larson, Judge.
Christopher Smith appeals from his convictions of willful injury causing serious injury, assault on a peace officer using or displaying a dangerous weapon, assault while participating in a felony, and theft in the first degree. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew D. Wilber, County Attorney, and Jon Jacobmeier, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran, J., and Robinson, S.J.*
In November of 2004, defendant, Christopher Barron Smith, was a passenger in a stolen Lincoln Navigator driven by Colton Dineen. The vehicle was stopped for a traffic violation by a Pottawattamie County deputy sheriff. During the course of the stop Dineen shot the deputy four times and seriously injured him. As a result of the incident a jury returned a general verdict finding defendant guilty of willful injury causing serious injury, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(1) (2003); assault of a peace officer using or displaying a dangerous weapon, in violation of section 708.3A(2); assault while participating in a felony, in violation of section 708.3(a); and theft in the first degree, in violation of section 714.2(1).
On appeal defendant contends (1) there was not substantial evidence to support the verdict, (2) the district court erred in instructing the jury, and (3) his trial counsel was not effective. We reverse the conviction of willful injury and remand for new trial on this count. We affirm the convictions on the other counts.
The jury could have found the following facts. The stolen Navigator was stopped on Interstate 80 at 3 a.m. on November 10, 2004, by Pottawattamie County Deputy Sheriff Brain Loomis after Loomis clocked the Navigator going eighty-six miles an hour. Dineen was driving. Defendant was in the passenger seat and a third man, Jeremy Clark, was in the backseat. All three men were using methamphetamine. The deputy approached the Navigator on the passenger side and asked Dineen to roll down all four windows. He then ascertained Dineen's name and social security number and got the registration for the Navigator. The deputy returned to his car to check the information he had collected.
Meanwhile in the Navigator1 Dineen told the others, who apparently were on their way to Illinois to steal cars, that the Navigator was stolen and there were firearms in the back. Dineen testified he offered to take responsibility but defendant, who was on probation, and Clark, who was in drug court, rejected the offer and suggested that Dineen back up and smash the deputy and his car. They also discussed shooting the passenger side window out if Loomis returned and approached the Navigator on that side. At some point defendant and Dineen had been looking for a Glock pistol in the area where Clark was seated. Dineen and Clark were unsure how the Glock got on the console between the two front bucket seats in the car. Neither was sure whether or not defendant had a part in making the Glock available to Dineen. Clark could not say whether the Glock went from Clark to the console or from Clark to defendant to the console.
Loomis returned on the driver's side of the Navigator asking Dineen to get out and come with him to the sheriff's car. Dineen took the Glock pistol, opened the driver's door, and shot Loomis four times. Before approaching the car for the second time Loomis had called for backup. Backup arrived shortly thereafter to find Loomis severely injured and assisted in getting him medical care.
Loomis suffered life-threatening injuries to his upper chest and left arm. He suffered long-term weakness and a loss of sensation in his left hand and arm.
After shooting Loomis, Dineen drove off, and the men stopped away from the scene of the shooting to ingest methamphetamine. Later, defendant drove the Navigator. Eventually the Navigator crashed. Defendant was not in it at the time.
Defendant contends his convictions of causing serious injury, assault on a police officer while using or displaying a dangerous weapon, and assault while participating in a felony are not supported by substantial evidence and should be dismissed. He argues there was not substantial evidence to find that he shot Loomis, that he aided or abetted Dineen in shooting Loomis, or that he was engaged in joint criminal conduct at the time Loomis was shot.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is for correction of errors at law. State v. Petithory, 702 N.W.2d 854, 856 (Iowa 2005). Inherent in our standard of review of jury verdicts in criminal cases is the recognition that the jury was free to reject certain evidence, and credit other evidence. State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2001). Consequently, where the record contains substantial evidence to support the finding, we are bound by the jury's finding of guilt. State v. Hickman, 623 N.W.2d 847, 849 (Iowa 2001). In determining whether there was substantial evidence, we view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the State and make all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn from it. Id. Substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2001).
A reviewing court cannot make a substantial evidence determination if it considers only the evidence supporting guilt. State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993). This is so because a rational fact finder cannot render a verdict without taking into consideration all the record evidence. Id. So in determining whether there is substantial evidence, we must consider all the record evidence, not just the evidence supporting guilt. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 110; Torres, 495 N.W.2d at 681.
The instructions allowed the jury to convict defendant as a principal, as an aider and abettor, or under a theory of joint criminal conduct. The State concedes that defendant could not be convicted as a principal on the challenged charges, but argues the evidence is sufficient to convict him as an aider and abettor or under the theory of joint criminal conduct. The State concedes the defendant did not shoot Loomis.2
The first question is whether there was substantial evidence defendant aided and abetted the shooting and assault on Loomis.
In order to sustain a conviction on an aiding and abetting theory, there must be substantial evidence defendant assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act either by active participation or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission. See State v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111,116-117 (Iowa 2004); State v. Jefferson, 574 N.W.2d 268, 277 (Iowa 1997). The State must prove the accused knew of the crime at the time of or before its commission. However, such proof need not be established by direct proof, it may be either direct or circumstantial. State v. Lewis, 514 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Iowa 1994).
Neither knowledge of the crime nor proximity to the crime scene are enough to prove aiding and abetting. State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 574 (Iowa 2000). However, there are factors, which with circumstantial evidence such as "presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed," may be enough to infer a defendant's participation in the crime. Id.; State v. Miles, 346 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Iowa 1984). If intent is an element of the crime charged, a person may be convicted on a theory of aiding and abetting if he participates with either the requisite intent, or with knowledge the principal possesses the required intent. Lewis, 514 N.W.2d at 66; State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Iowa 1977); State v. Speaks, 576 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we think a rational juror could have found defendant actively participated or by some manner encouraged the shooting and assault on Loomis. See Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 112. Even though defendant did not shoot or assault Loomis there was evidence from which the jury could have believed that before Loomis returned to the Navigator defendant had verbalized his wish to get away from Loomis and was part of the agreement to shoot out the passenger side window if Loomis came there and of the discussion as to who would do the shooting. See Dalton, 674 N.W.2d at 117.
There was substantial evidence to prove that defendant aided and abetted in the commission of the challenged charges and we affirm on this issue.
We next address the defendant's claim that he did not engage in joint criminal conduct.3
Defendant argues there is no evidence suggesting he knowingly participated in a public offense prior to the shooting. He argues he had no control over the Navigator to suggest he was participating in a theft. He contends that, while he knew there were five guns in the back of the Navigator, there was no evidence showing he knew the guns were stolen until Dineen told him so after Loomis had pulled them over. Therefore, defendant contends that because he did not knowingly participate in a pubic offense it does not follow that Dineen's shooting Loomis was in furtherance of this offense.
There is substantial evidence that defendant was made aware the Navigator and guns were stolen prior to Loomis being shot. There was also evidence that the men were carrying and using methamphetamine in the Navigator.
We agree with the district court that the evidence supported the charge of...
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