State v. Iduarte
| Decision Date | 29 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. PD-1341-07.,PD-1341-07. |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas v. Jorge R. IDUARTE, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Scott T. Williams, Dallas, for Appellant.
C. James Gibson, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Fort Worth, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.
Appellee, Jorge R. Iduarte, appeals the ruling of the Second Court of Appeals that reversed the trial court's decision to suppress all evidence of an alleged aggravated assault on a peace officer.1 State v. Iduarte, 232 S.W.3d 133 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007). We affirm the ruling of the court of appeals.
On November 22, 2001, at approximately 3:15 a.m., a call to 911 reported gunshots and a man and a woman arguing in a Fort Worth neighborhood. Police officers Travis Eddleman and David De Leon were dispatched to the Fossil Ridge Apartments. When they arrived, they saw what appeared to be two men and a woman arguing. One man was identified as appellee, and the other as appellee's coworker, Bacilio Leyva. The woman was identified as Yasamin Iduarte, appellee's wife. Both officers testified that appellee appeared to be agitated and angry, while Mr. Leyva was calm, and Ms. Iduarte was crying and screaming.
Because the 911 call reported gunshots and possible domestic violence, Officer Eddleman drew his weapon and held it at his side. Officer De Leon conducted a patdown search of the two men. Officer De Leon instructed the two men to get on their knees and to hold their hands on top of their heads; Leyva complied immediately, but appellee had to be told several times before he complied. Officer De Leon determined that neither man had a weapon. At that point, he began to question them, while Officer Eddleman questioned Ms. Iduarte.
Officer Eddleman testified that Ms. Iduarte had several red marks around her neck and chest area and that she had a hard time speaking because of her upset state. Ms. Iduarte reported that she had been assaulted, but said that she did not want to talk about it. Officer Eddleman then asked her if she knew anything about the gunshots. She quickly glanced at appellee and then told Officer Eddleman that she "was not going to talk about that."
Ms. Iduarte did tell Officer Eddleman that she wanted the keys to a truck parked at the apartment complex so that she could leave.2 She told the officers that there were two sets of keys to the pickup truck and she needed both sets.3 Officer Eddleman instructed her to wait in her personal vehicle while they retrieved the keys. When Officer Eddleman asked appellee about the keys, appellee said that he had one set on his person, but the second set might be upstairs.4 Officer Eddleman suggested that he and appellee go up to the apartment to retrieve the second set of keys. Appellee stated that there was no electricity in the apartment. Officer Eddleman responded that he had a flashlight.
Midway up the stairs, appellee began to run. Because there had been a report of shots being fired, Officer Eddleman pursued him. By the time he caught up to appellee, appellee was already inside the apartment, standing at the dining-room table with his back to the door. Officer Eddleman shined his flashlight on appellee, and appellee turned and began to walk towards him. Appellee then stopped and reached with his right hand to grab a board used to hang keys. He showed the officer the key holder and stated that he did not have the other keys after all.5 They both went back outside.
As he was leaving the apartment, Officer Eddleman noticed an empty holster and a gun case on the stairway landing.6 Officer Eddleman said to appellee, "I thought you didn't have a gun," and appellee replied, "I don't." Appellee attempted to open the case, but Officer Eddleman stopped him and opened the case himself. It was empty. At some point while on the stairway landing, Officer Eddleman told appellee that he was under arrest for public intoxication.7 Officer Eddleman asked appellee repeatedly about the gun, and appellee started clenching his fists. Officer De Leon noticed that appellee was becoming agitated, so he started walking up the stairs. Officer Eddleman testified that appellee shouted, 8 Appellee then turned and ran back into the apartment towards the dining-room table. Officer Eddleman followed him inside.
Officer Eddleman testified that he shone the flashlight on appellee, saw appellee reach over a chair and straighten with a revolver in his hand, heard the hammer cock, saw appellee turn towards him with the gun pointed at Eddleman's face, and "could see directly down the barrel." Officer Eddleman testified that he then dropped to one knee and shot appellee twice in the abdomen.9 In contrast, Officer De Leon, who was then in the doorway, testified that appellee cocked the gun while pointing it at his own head and threatened to shoot himself.
Following the shooting, Officer De Leon rushed to restrain appellee. He testified that appellee continued to struggle with him, and that he had to strike appellee in the ribs to control him. Officer De Leon testified that, while he was on top of appellee, appellee continuously stated, "I'm sorry, I forgive you." Appellee was transported to the hospital and treated for gunshot wounds. The state charged him with aggravated assault on a peace officer for pointing the gun at Officer Eddleman.10
Before trial, appellee filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the Fort Worth police department had violated his federal and state constitutional rights and Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because the officers lacked probable cause to enter his apartment. After a hearing, the trial court held that appellee's constitutional and statutory rights were violated. The court concluded that appellee did not consent to Officer Eddleman's entry into the apartment on the first entry, but merely acquiesced to the officer's display of authority. The court further held that the second entry into appellee's dwelling was not based on exigent circumstances or for a community care-taking function. In its findings, the trial court stated that Officer Eddleman's second entry circumvented the law and the Constitution by creating his own exigent circumstances. Consequently, based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court granted appellee's motion to suppress the evidence of the assault on Officer Eddleman. The state appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, and that court reversed the trial court's ruling. Iduarte, 232 S.W.3d at 140. Appellee petitioned for discretionary review in this Court.
When reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those findings. Id. at 818-19. We review the trial court's legal ruling de novo. We uphold the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. See St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (quoting Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim.App.2003)); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
We afford a great deal of deference to a trial judge's rulings on questions of historical fact, and also on rulings that both apply the law to facts and turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856. Nonetheless, mixed questions of law and fact may be reviewed de novo when they do not depend on credibility or disputed facts. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 Tex. Crim.App. 1997). This case presents mixed questions of law and fact, and we will therefore review the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo.
The trial court entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its conclusions of law, the trial court stated,
Keep in mind Officer Eddleman stated the Defendant pointed a weapon directly at him; Officer De Leon testified the Defendant was threatening to shoot himself.... The State points out that case law holds that if evidence of the Defendant's new crime was not obtained by the officer's unlawful conduct, then it cannot be suppressed. The motion points out the absurdity of a policy that bars the prosecution of one who shot and killed a police officer following an arguably improper traffic stop. Just as absurd is allowing police officers to circumvent the law and the Constitution by creating their own exigent circumstances, resulting in the shooting of a person in his own home. This case below boils down to the credibility of Officer Eddleman.... It defies common sense that if you have probable cause to arrest an individual for public intoxication, you allow that individual, knowing there has been a report of assault and gunshots fired, to roam, unhand cuffed, back into a unlighted, dark apartment where you suspect a weapon is located....
This Court has recognized the trial court's role during a suppression hearing and has repeatedly emphasized the deference that the trial court is due. Id. The trial court has provided a detailed analysis as to why the motion to suppress was granted. If in this case we had been asked to determine whether an unlawful search and seizure occurred, then the trial court's ruling would stand. However, this is not such a case. Here we are asked to determine whether evidence of an offense alleged to have occurred after an unlawful search should be suppressed.
Appellee argues that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of...
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