State v. Ireland
| Decision Date | 15 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 20050600.,20050600. |
| Citation | 2006 UT 82,150 P.3d 532 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Joseph IRELAND, Defendant and Petitioner. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Brett J. Delporto, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Joan C. Watt, Michael A. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
¶ 1 Defendant William Joseph Ireland seeks review of his conviction for aggravated robbery. Ireland argues that the concealed gesture he used when robbing a jewelry store did not justify elevating the charge against him from simple robbery to aggravated robbery. The court of appeals upheld Ireland's conviction, and we granted certiorari to determine whether a concealed gesture of a hand in a pocket is sufficient to meet the criteria for aggravated robbery under Utah Code section 76-6-302. Finding that Ireland's use of a concealed gesture falls within the express terms of the aggravated robbery statute, we affirm.
¶ 2 On December 6, 2003, Ireland entered a jewelry store located in a Salt Lake City shopping mall. When employee Jeffrey Reinkoester greeted him, Ireland responded by saying, "I want you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now." During this exchange, Ireland's hand was in his pocket, pointing toward Reinkoester in a manner Reinkoester described as "gesturing like there was a weapon, but it was more subtle." Although Ireland did not verbally indicate that he had a weapon, Reinkoester speculated that Ireland might have a gun.
¶ 3 Reinkoester then went to the desk where the cash drawer was located. Because the desk was high and blocked Reinkoester's view, Reinkoester could not see whether Ireland's hand remained inside his pocket, and Reinkoester did not see Ireland make any additional gestures. After Reinkoester filled a dark plastic bag with cash, Ireland demanded that the bag be filled with jewelry. Before Reinkoester was able to comply with this demand, however, Ireland grabbed the bag and ran out the front door.
¶ 4 The owner of the jewelry store, Nelson Fortier, unsuccessfully attempted to block Ireland's escape and then chased after him. When Ireland attempted to climb into a waiting cab, Fortier told the cab driver that Ireland had just robbed a jewelry store. Ireland then fled on foot. Fortier eventually caught up to him and demanded that he return the money. Ireland complied and then ran off. He was later arrested.
¶ 5 Ireland was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony,1 and one count of theft of services, a class B misdemeanor.2 He moved to reduce the charge of aggravated robbery to simple robbery, a second degree felony, but the district court denied his motion. Ireland pled guilty to the aggravated robbery charge, conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his motion to reduce the charge to simple robbery. Ireland appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction.3 We granted Ireland's petition for a writ of certiorari and have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(a).
¶ 6 On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district court.4 Determining whether a defendant's conduct constitutes aggravated robbery is "a legal question of statutory interpretation," which we review for correctness.5
¶ 7 Interpreting the aggravated robbery statute requires us to discern "the true intent and purpose of the Legislature."6 The best evidence of the legislature's "intent and purpose" is the plain language of the statute.7 When analyzing statutory language, "we presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."8
I. IRELAND'S USE OF A CONCEALED GESTURE CONSTITUTED AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
¶ 8 The crime of aggravated robbery is defined by section 76-6-302 of the Utah Code. It provides that "[a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601."9 Section 76-1-601(5) defines a dangerous weapon as
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item.10
¶ 9 Our analysis turns on whether Ireland used a dangerous weapon during the robbery. We first address whether Ireland used a "representation of an item" capable of causing death or serious bodily injury as defined by section 76-1-601(5)(b). If so, we must then address whether Ireland's use of such a representation led "the victim to reasonably believe the item [was] likely to cause death or serious bodily injury" or whether he represented "to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he [was] in control of such an item."11
¶ 10 Under section 76-1-601(5), a dangerous weapon can be "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury" or "a facsimile or representation of the item" used in a manner specified by subsections (i) and (ii).12 The State contends that Ireland's concealed gesture constitutes a representation of a weapon. We agree.
¶ 11 The plain meaning of the term "representation," as used by section 76-1-601(5), encompasses a gesture. Unlike a facsimile, which is "`an exact and detailed copy,'"13 a wide array of items, conduct, and statements can be considered representations.14 Black's Law Dictionary defines a "representation" as "[a] presentation of fact—either by words or by conduct—made to induce someone to act."15 A representation has also been defined as "[a]n image or likeness of something" or an "account . . . of facts."16 In context, the use of the term "representation" refers to verbal or nonverbal statements or conduct "conveying an impression for the purpose of influencing action."17 Because a concealed gun-like gesture is intended to influence a victim to act out of fear for his life or safety, it falls within the definition of representation.
¶ 12 The plain meaning of the word "representation" as used in the statute is buttressed by the available legislative history. The term "representation" was added to the statute in response to this court's decision in State v. Suniville.18 In that case, the defendant pointed his concealed hand at a bank teller and demanded that she give him all her money to prevent the robbery from turning "into a homicide."19 Under the prior version of the statute, which did not include the term "representation," this court ruled that a "[d]efendant's menacing gesture accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient evidence alone to establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm."20 The legislature responded to our ruling by adding the term "representation" to the statute, evincing its intent that gestures, at least those accompanied by verbal threats, should be covered by the aggravated robbery statute.
¶ 13 Utah precedent also supports our conclusion that the term "representation" includes concealed gestures and verbal statements. For example, in State v. Candelario, the court of appeals affirmed a firearm enhancement, reasoning that even though the defendant did not use an actual firearm, "[t]he plain meaning of the phrase `the representation of a dangerous weapon' requires that courts apply the firearm enhancement if a defendant makes a verbal or a nonverbal statement that he possesses a firearm."21 Similarly, in State v. Reyos,22 the court of appeals upheld an aggravated robbery charge, reasoning that "a representation of a dangerous weapon may include a statement conveying an impression for the purpose of influencing action."23 And in State v. Hartmann,24 we indicated that a charge can be aggravated when a defendant verbally represents that he has a dangerous weapon, reasoning that "[u]se or display of a weapon is not required; threat of such use is sufficient."25
¶ 14 The majority of courts from other jurisdictions have similarly held that statutes containing terms such as "representation" are broad enough to encompass verbal threats, menacing gestures, and the use of everyday objects in a threatening manner. For example, in Faulkner v. State,26 a defendant threatened a victim by placing a sock-covered chisel to her back. The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, reasoning that "he used an article that had the appearance of a gun to persuade [the victim] to comply with his demand and that his acts created a reasonable apprehension on her part that he was threatening her with a gun."27 Similarly, in State v. Arena,28 the Connecticut Supreme Court indicated that "[t]he state only had to prove that the defendant represented by his conduct that he had a firearm" and that he need not actually possess a real firearm.29 And in People v. Lopez,30 the New York Supreme Court held that "[w]hile the display of what appears to be a firearm test requires a display of something that could reasonably be perceived as a firearm, there is no requirement that the object need be anything other than the defendant's hand."31
¶ 15 In this case, Ireland clearly gestured in a menacing manner. Although Ireland did not have a real firearm or even a facsimile of one, he gestured with his concealed hand in order to influence Reinkoester to turn over the money. We accordingly conclude that Ireland's concealed gesture constitutes a representation within the meaning of the statute.
¶ 16 Having...
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