State v. Iseley
| Decision Date | 26 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. SC04-485.,SC04-485. |
| Citation | 944 So.2d 227 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Steven Eugene ISELEY, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Timothy D. Wilson and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorney Generals, Daytona Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
Nathan G. Dinitz, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review Iseley v. State, 865 So.2d 580 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), which expressly and directly conflicts with Tucker v. State, 726 So.2d 768 (Fla.1999), and State v. Overfelt, 457 So.2d 1385 (Fla.1984). The conflict concerns the jury findings necessary to authorize the mandatory minimum punishments authorized for using firearms to commit specified crimes. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We hold that when a charging document alleges that the defendant used a firearm in committing an offense enumerated in section 775.087(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), and the jury specifically finds the defendant guilty of the offense "with a firearm" as charged in the information, the three-year mandatory minimum term authorized by that provision may be imposed.
Steven Eugene Iseley was charged by information with one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.1 This information alleged that, in committing the assault, Iseley "did exhibit a firearm, ready it for firing by charging it (placing a round in the chamber) . . . and further did commit the assault with semi-automatic handgun or pistol, a deadly weapon." At trial, the jury was given the standard jury instruction for aggravated assault; however, the trial court referred to the crime of aggravated assault with a firearm. Specifically, the jury was instructed:
Before you can find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault with a firearm, the state must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the first three elements defined in assault:
One: Steven Eugene Iseley intentionally and unlawfully threatened, either by word or act, to do violence to Kevin Squire.
Two: At the time, Steven Eugene Iseley appeared to have the ability to carry out the threat.
Three: The act of Steven Eugene Iseley created in the mind of Kevin Squire a well-founded fear that the violence was about to take place.
Four: The assault was made with a deadly weapon; to wit, a firearm.
A weapon is a deadly weapon if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily harm. A firearm means any weapon, including a starter gun, which will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive, the frame or receiver of any such weapon. It is not necessary for the state to prove the defendant had an intent to kill.
This instruction was followed by the standard instruction on the lesser included offense of assault.
Iseley objected to the instruction on aggravated assault with a firearm. He argued that aggravated assault with a firearm was not the crime charged in the information and that the instruction approved by the trial court was for a crime that exceeded the crime for which he was charged. The trial judge acknowledged that the correct nomenclature for the crime charged was aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, but reasoned that under Florida case law, a verdict choice of aggravated assault with a firearm was the only device by which the allegations in the information could be presented to the jury without using an interrogatory verdict. Significantly, Iseley never requested an interrogatory verdict form separating the determination whether he possessed a firearm from the finding of guilt on the substantive offense. Iseley also did not respond to the trial court's request for proposed instructions calling for the jury to determine whether the deadly weapon used was a firearm. He argued that the information did not charge aggravated assault with a firearm, and therefore the word "firearm" should not be used in the verdict form. In the alternative, Iseley requested instructions and verdict choices on aggravated assault with a firearm as a greater offense and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a lesser included offense. The trial court overruled Iseley's objection and denied his requested alternative instruction.
The verdict form gave the jury the choice of finding Iseley (1) guilty of aggravated assault with a firearm, as charged in the information; (2) guilty of the lesser included offense of assault; or (3) not guilty. The jury returned a verdict of "Guilty of the offense of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WITH A FIREARM, as charged in the Information." Iseley filed a motion for arrest of judgment, again arguing that the trial court erred in giving instructions and a verdict that referred to the crime as aggravated assault with a firearm instead of assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court denied the motion. The court adjudicated Iseley guilty and, as required by section 775.087(2)(a)(1), sentenced him to the mandatory minimum sentence of three years' imprisonment because Iseley possessed a firearm during the commission of the aggravated assault.
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed Iseley's conviction and remanded for a new trial. Iseley, 865 So.2d at 583. The district court held that "[t]he jury . . . should have been instructed on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and then been asked to make a special finding . . . as to whether that weapon was a firearm." Id. at 582. The district court's rationale was two-fold. First, the court observed that "[t]he effect of the instructions given and the verdict form was to bypass the `deadly weapon' aspect and go directly to the firearm aspect." Id. at 582. Relying on dicta in Fernandez v. State, 570 So.2d 1008, 1010 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1990), the Fifth District noted that "the offenses here, while both third degree felonies, do not carry the `same penalty' because aggravated assault with a firearm, unlike with a deadly weapon, carries an enhanced sanction." 865 So.2d at 582. Second, the district court stated that failing to require a separate finding that the offense was committed with a firearm "deprived the jury of a fair opportunity to exercise its inherent `pardon' power by returning a verdict of guilt as to the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon." Id. at 582-83.
We must decide whether the jury instructions and verdict form meet the requirements of Tucker and Overfelt for application of section 775.087. Our review of the proceedings below, as governed by the applicable law, demonstrate that the requirements of Tucker and Overfelt were met. Thus, the trial court properly imposed the three-year mandatory minimum sentence authorized by section 775.087(2)(a)(1). In reaching this conclusion, we hold that where there is undisputed evidence that the deadly weapon used by the defendant was a firearm, an instruction on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault with a firearm is not required in order to enable the jury to exercise its pardon power.2 Therefore, we reject the Fifth District's ruling that the verdict form in this case denied Iseley an opportunity for a jury pardon.
Because the conflict issue involves the interpretation of a statute, section 775.087(2)(a)(1), the standard of review is de novo. See B.Y. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 887 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Fla.2004).
Chapter 784, Florida Statutes (2002), defines the crimes of assault and aggravated assault. Section 784.021(1) defines aggravated assault as an assault with (a) a deadly weapon without intent to kill; or (b) an intent to commit a felony. Section 784.021(2) provides that an aggravated assault is a third-degree felony punishable as provided in chapter 775. Chapter 775 prescribes the penalties for substantive crimes. Section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that a person convicted of a third-degree felony may be punished by a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years. Additionally, section 775.087 requires enhanced penalties when a firearm is used in the commission of certain felony crimes. Section 775.087(2)(a)(1) mandates a minimum three-year sentence of imprisonment if a person possesses a firearm during the commission of an aggravated assault. Specifically, section 775.087(2)(a)(1) states:
[A] person who is convicted for aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a felon, or burglary of a conveyance shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years if such person possessed a "firearm" or "destructive device" during the commission of the offense.
In four cases over a fifteen-year period, beginning with Overfelt and concluding with Tucker, this Court has considered the sufficiency of a jury verdict to support application of the penalty enhancement mandated by section 775.087(2)(a)(1). See also State v. Hargrove, 694 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1997); State v. Tripp, 642 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1994). In Tucker, the Court acknowledged that the discussion of the issue in earlier cases was somewhat confusing. However, the Court concluded that in each of these decisions, "the essential holding is the same: that the verdict form itself contain an express reference to the use of a firearm." Tucker, 726 So.2d at 772. Though we stated that the better practice is to include a specific question or special verdict addressed to the firearm issue, we reiterated our prior holdings in Hargrove and Overfelt that "an enhanced sentence should be upheld if based on a jury verdict which specifically refers to the use of a firearm, either as a separate finding or by the inclusion of a reference to a firearm in identifying the specific crime for which the defendant is found guilty." Id. at 772.
In each of the cases, we required that the application of the mandatory minimum sentence penalty in section 775.087(2)(a)(1) be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Robinson v. State
...finding in an interrogatory on the verdict form is preferable, what is ultimately required is a "clear jury finding." State v. Iseley , 944 So.2d 227, 231 (Fla. 2006). The Court emphasized:[A]ll that is required for the application of a reclassification or enhancement statute to an offense ......
-
MAYERS v. State of Miss.
...elements of the firearm enhancement. While this second method has been approved by the Florida Supreme Court, see State v. Iseley, 944 So.2d 227, 230-31 (Fla.2006), there are questions whether it meets the notice requirements set forth in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n. 6, 119 ......
-
Lee v. State
...to address section 775.087. However, the supreme court has clarified that such an interrogatory is not essential. State v. Iseley, 944 So.2d 227, 230–31 (Fla.2006). In Gentile v. State, 87 So.3d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), a “clear jury finding” was established by a verdict and information very......
-
Rivera v. Sec'y
...as to the use of a firearm to support reclassification of a felony under Florida Statutes § 775.087(1). See, e.g., State v. Iseley, 944 So. 2d 227, 228, 231 (Fla. 2006) (concluding, in aggravated assault context, that jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty "as charged" satisfied "clear......
-
The trial (conduct of trial, jury instructions, verdict)
...shown by the evidence was a firearm, the jury was not deprived of its pardon power by the instructions and verdict form. State v. Iseley, 944 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 2006) First District Court of Appeal Defendant was charged with simple robbery, and the court gave petit theft and assault as lesser......
-
Judgment and sentence
...shown by the evidence was a firearm, the jury was not deprived of its pardon power by the instructions and verdict form. State v. Iseley, 944 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 2006) Under the 10-20-Life Act, shooting multiple victims during a single criminal act allows the court to impose consecutive mandat......