State v. J.E.
| Decision Date | 14 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 16–0677,Nos. 16–0723,s. 16–0677,s. 16–0723 |
| Citation | 796 S.E.2d 880 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia, Respondent v. J.E., Petitioner State of West Virginia, Respondent v. Z.M., Petitioner |
Daniel R. Grindo, Esq., Law Office of Daniel R. Grindo, PLLC, Gassaway, West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner in Nos. 16–0677.
Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Erica N. Peterson, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Patrick Morrisey, in his official Capacity as Attorney General of West Virginia in Nos. 16–0677 and Nos. 16–0723.
Dwayne C. Vandevender, Esq., Webster County Prosecuting Attorney, Webster Springs, West Virginia, Counsel for the Respondent in Nos. 16–0677 and Nos. 16–0723.
Timothy V. Gentilozzi, Esq., Gentilozzi & Associates, Clarksburg, West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner in Nos. 16–0723.
In these consolidated juvenile matters we consider two certified questions submitted to this Court from the circuit court of Webster County. The certified questions are as follows:
After thorough review, we answer the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative.
The sex offender statutes we are asked to consider are clear, expressed in plain language, and unambiguous. This Court does not sit as a superlegislature, commissioned to pass upon the social, political, or scientific merits of statutes pertaining to proper subjects of legislation. It is the duty of the Legislature to consider facts, establish policy, and embody that policy in legislation. It is the duty of this Court to enforce legislation according to the plain language of the statutes enacted by the Legislature unless it runs afoul of the State or Federal Constitutions. It is not the duty of this Court to interpret a statute contrary to its plain language or to read into it that which it does not say.
We begin by presenting the facts of the two juvenile matters consolidated herein.1
On April 27, 2009, J.E. was charged by juvenile petition with attempted sexual assault in the second degree in violation of W.Va. Code § 61–11–8 [2002] and § 61–8B–4 [1991] ; and sexual abuse in the first degree in violation of W.Va. Code § 61–8B–7 [2006]. The petition alleged that J.E. rubbed "his penis against the vagina of [the victim] who was eighteen months old." J.E. was thirteen years old when this incident occurred.
On December 9, 2009, J.E. entered into an admission agreement wherein he admitted to the charge of first degree sexual abuse and pled no contest to the charge of attempted second degree sexual assault. The circuit court held a disposition hearing on April 2, 2010, and ruled that J.E. "was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for the criminal act of Attempted Sexual Assault in the 2nd Degree and Sexual Abuse in the 1st Degree." The circuit court ordered J.E. to be placed within the Department of Juvenile Services until his twenty-first birthday or until further order of the court. On March 4, 2013, J.E. was placed on probation until his twenty-first birthday.
The circuit court held a review hearing on February 1, 2016. Counsel for J.E. sought dismissal of the case once J.E. reached the age of twenty-one, the maximum age upon which the court could maintain jurisdiction. The issue was then raised whether "based on the nature of the offenses for which the juvenile stands adjudicated as a delinquent child, the juvenile should be required to register as a lifetime sexual offender upon reaching the age twenty-one." The circuit court instructed the parties to file briefs on this issue. By order entered on July 8, 2016, the circuit court certified two questions to this Court. See pages 881–82, infra . The circuit court explained its reason for certification as follows:
On July 30, 2014, Z.M. was charged by juvenile petition with two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of W.Va. Code § 61–8B–3(a)(2) [2006], and one count of sexual abuse in the first degree in violation of W.Va. Code § 61–8B–7(a)(3). The petition alleged that Z.M., who was fifteen-years old, assaulted M.B., a nine-year old. The juvenile petition was amended on August 22, 2014. In the amended petition, Z.M. was charged with five additional counts: four counts of sexual abuse in the first degree in violation of W.Va. Code § 61–8B–7(a)(3), and one count of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of W.Va. Code § 61–8B–4(a)(1). These additional counts resulted from an incident that occurred when Z.M. was fifteen and assaulted J.N., a nine-year old.
On April 3, 2015, Z.M. entered into an admissions agreement wherein he pled no contest to the charge of 1) sexual assault in the first degree of M.B., and 2) sexual assault in the second degree of J.N. Thereafter, the circuit court entered an admissions hearing order in which it ruled that Z.M. was "ADJUDICATED a delinquent child under the meaning of the law." (Emphasis in original).
The circuit court held a disposition hearing on September 16, 2015, and noted that Z.M. "was adjudicated by pleading no contest to sexual assault in the 1st and 2nd degree." The circuit court's order following the disposition hearing provides, "[t]he Court is limited in what it can do because it takes a motion of the State to try the juvenile as an adult, which the State could have done in this case, but which the State elected not to do." The circuit court ordered Z.M. to be placed within the Department of Juvenile Services until his twenty-first birthday.
The circuit court took the issue of juvenile sexual offender registration under advisement at the disposition hearing and ordered the parties to file briefs on this issue. On July 27, 2016, the circuit court certified two questions to this Court. See pages 881–82, infra . Thereafter, this Court accepted the two certified questions.
When this Court is called upon to resolve a certified question, we employ a plenary review. "A de novo standard is applied by this Court in addressing the legal issues presented by a certified question from a federal district or appellate court." Syllabus Point 1, Light v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 203 W.Va. 27, 506 S.E.2d 64 (1998) ; accord Syllabus Point 1, Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp ., 206 W.Va. 133, 522 S.E.2d 424 (1999) (). With this standard in mind, we proceed to examine the parties' arguments.
The circuit court has certified two questions to this Court. Before addressing the individual questions, we note that the questions address two separate issues. The first question concerns whether a juvenile adjudicated of certain acts of delinquency is required to register under our sex offender registration statute, W.Va. Code § 15–12–2(b) [2012]. The second question asks whether the nature of the crimes underlying the two juvenile delinquency petitions, first and second degree sexual assault, allows for the public disclosure of the names of the juveniles pursuant to W.Va. Code § 49–5–101(g). With this background in mind, we proceed to consider the two certified questions.
The first certified question is as follows:
Does the phrase "any person" within the meaning of W.Va. Code § 15–12–2(b) of the "Sex Offender Registration Act," W.Va. Code § 15–12–1, et seq ., include a juvenile who has been adjudicated for having committed acts of delinquency which would require said person, once having reached the age of eighteen, to register as a sexual offender as required by law?
Answering this question requires us to analyze W.Va. Code § 15–12–2(b) contained in the Sex Offender Registration Act, W.Va. Code § 15–12–1 [1999], et seq . W.Va. Code § 15–12–2(b) provides:
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...in a statute what it says there." 234 W.Va. at 444, 766 S.E.2d at 391 (internal citations omitted); see also State v. J.E. , 238 W.Va. 543, ––––, 796 S.E.2d 880, 886 (2017) (explaining that Court was guided by "the precept that ‘courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what ......