State v. J.E.J.
| Decision Date | 28 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 09-21-00024-CV |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas, Appellant v. J.E.J., Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Bob Wortham, District Attorney, Quentin D. Price, Assistant District Attorney, Beaumont, for Appellant.
Layne Walker Jr., Walker Law Firm, Beaumont, for Appellee.
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger, and Johnson, JJ.
W. SCOTT GOLEMON, Chief Justice
In one issue, appellant the State of Texas challenges the trial court's order expunging J.E.J.’s record. The State contends the trial court erred by granting J.E.J.’s petition for a complete expunction rather than granting a partial expunction. We affirm the trial court's expunction order.
The Texas Department of Public Safety ("DPS") arrested J.E.J. on two separate occasions for one perjury offense that allegedly occurred on October 27, 2015.1 On March 2, 2016, the State charged J.E.J. via Information alleging that J.E.J. lied under oath about whether another individual worked an extra pipeline job. A jury tried J.E.J., and after it failed to reach a verdict, the trial court granted a mistrial. The trial court then dismissed the perjury charge. At the time of the perjury charge, J.E.J. was a Liberty County Constable and is a licensed peace officer.
J.E.J. subsequently filed a Petition for Expunction and asserted that "prosecution of the person for the offense for which the person was arrested is no longer possible because the limitations period has expired." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(2)(B). J.E.J. further alleged that he had been released, the charge did not result in a final conviction, and there was no court-ordered community supervision under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.12 nor a conditional discharge under Texas Health and Safety Code Section 481.109. See id. The Petition for Expunction contained the requisite information from Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 55.02, section 2(b), and J.E.J. verified his petition. See id. art. 55.02 § 2(b).
In its Response to J.E.J.’s Petition for Expunction, the State noted that as a licensed peace officer, J.E.J. could potentially act in his law enforcement capacity and bring criminal charges against others. The State sought to retain J.E.J.’s records, because "he is a certified peace officer in the State of Texas, and the State may be required to produce such documents to criminal defendants and their attorney." The State noted its disclosure obligation under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 39.14(h). The State argued that it "has an obligation to disclose [J.E.J.]’s criminal records and files to defendants in all pending and future cases where he was, is, or becomes an investigating officer in such case." The State also contended that it was in the "untenable position" of either committing a criminal offense by violating article 55.04 of the expunction statute or committing professional misconduct under Texas Disciplinary Rule 3.09(d).
The State asserted:
[I]f the Court does not allow that the prosecuting attorneys to retain the records and files in this case but orders that all records be expunged, then, based on their memory of the [J.E.J.] case they are obligated to disclose such information under art. 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to a criminal defendant relative to a case that [J.E.J.] was/is involved as an investigation officer. At that point in time, the prosecutor has committed a Class "B" misdemeanor for violating the expunction statute. Tex. Code Crim. Pro[c]. art. 55.04. Conversely, if the prosecutor does not disclose the information because the Court ordered that the records be expunged, and the prosecutor does not want to go to jail, then the prosecutor has violated their ethical obligation of disclosure under the Rule 3.09(d) of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. At that point, the prosecutor is subject to disbarment for an ethical violation. Fortunately, art 55.02, section 4 (a-2)(2)(A) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides a solution for this untenable position by authorizing this Court to allow the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Jefferson County District Attorney's Office to retain the relevant records and files.
The State then requested the Court deny the Petition for Expunction, or in the alternative, order that the DPS and the Jefferson County District Attorney's Office retain all records and files.
The trial court held a hearing on the Petition for Expunction, during which J.E.J. argued that he is entitled to an expunction per the statute and asked the trial court to follow the law as written. J.E.J. countered that the State's arguments dealt with possibilities, the information was not exculpatory, and once the trial court signs the order, the State is prohibited from disclosing information, and its duty no longer exists. J.E.J. further argued that he should not be treated differently because he is a constable, and if questioned about his arrest during a criminal case, the statute requires J.E.J. to say he was arrested and it was expunged.
At the hearing, the State claimed that it was in a "no-win situation" between Brady , the Michael Morton Act, and the expunction statute.2 ,3 The State also contended that Brady and the Michael Morton Act do not give prosecutors discretion to determine whether information is material or exculpatory. The State requested a partial expunction that allowed the District Attorney's office and investigating agency to retain the records, because the State may need them in a future criminal prosecution.
The trial court granted a complete expunction and did not allow any agency to retain J.E.J.’s arrest records. The trial court's order noted J.E.J.’s entitlement to expunction under article 55.01(a)(2). See id. art. 55.01(a)(2).
We review a trial court's ruling on a petition for expunction for an abuse of discretion. State v. T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we afford no deference to the trial court's legal determinations since a court has no discretion in deciding what the law is or applying the law to the facts. See id. Therefore, we review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo. See id. Because the trial court's ruling on the expunction request involved a question of law requiring statutory construction and interpretation, we review it de novo. See id.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 55.01 contains the requirements for expunctions of criminal records. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01 ; T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d at 620. An individual must meet all statutory requirements before being entitled to an expunction. T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d at 620. Because expunction is a privilege defined by the Legislature, not a common-law or constitutional right, "the statutory requirements are mandatory and exclusive and may not be equitably expanded by the courts." Ex parte R.P.G.P. , 623 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Tex. 2021).
J.E.J. sought expunction pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(B), which provides:
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(2)(B).4
Id. art. 55.03. Finally, a State officer or employee "who knows of an order expunging the records and files relating to that arrest commits an offense if he knowingly releases, disseminates, or otherwise uses the records or files." Id. art. 55.04 § 1. Violating an expunction order is a Class B misdemeanor. Id. art. 55.04 § 3.
The State argues that its various prosecutorial disclosure obligations require it to turn over potentially exculpatory information pertaining to J.E.J.’s arrest in future cases where he is involved as a law...
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