Ex parte R.P.G.P.

• Citation: 623 S.W.3d 313
• Decision Date: 14 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-1051,19-1051
• Parties: EX PARTE R.P.G.P.
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

623 S.W.3d 313

EX PARTE R.P.G.P.

No. 19-1051

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued January 6, 2021

OPINION DELIVERED: May 14, 2021

Harold James Danford, Kerrville, Jonathan O'Hara, for Petitioner.

Amanda B. Morrison, Jeanine C. Hudson, for Respondent.

Mia Gisele Settle-Vinson, Houston, Lucy Wilke, Abigail Hurt, for Other interested party.

Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Boyd, Justice Devine, and Justice Busby joined.

This expunction case presents a straightforward, but confounding, statutory-construction issue: whether an arrest involving multiple offenses is divisible for purposes of expunging arrest records under Article 55.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Most appellate courts have favored an "arrest-based" construction of the statute that treats the offenses collectively over an "offense-based" approach that considers the offenses individually for expunction purposes. Under the arrest-based approach, which the court of appeals applied here, expunction is available only if all the offenses comprising an arrest are eligible for expunction.

We recently considered a partial expunction issue in State v. T.S.N. , in which a single arrest involved multiple wholly unrelated offenses.¹ We held that partial expunction of the arrest record was required and could be achieved through redaction, leaving intact the arrest record with respect to an unrelated offense that was not eligible for expunction.² In so holding, we observed that " Article 55.01 is neither entirely arrest-based nor offense-based" and held that statutory language in Article 55.01(a)(1), which permits expunction on the basis of an acquittal or pardon, cannot be squared with an arrest-based approach.³ We noted, however, that Article 55.01(a)(2), which concerns dismissals and plea bargains, has different requirements and addresses different factual scenarios than the acquittal and pardon provisions.⁴

In T.S.N. , we declined to consider whether an arrest-based construction would comport with Article 55.01(a)(2)'s language.⁵ That open question is central to the disposition of this appeal, and we hold that under Article 55.01(a)(2)(A), misdemeanor offenses are eligible for expunction on an individual basis. Because the petitioner is entitled to partial expunction of his arrest records, we reverse the court of appeals' contrary judgment.

I. Background

R.P.G.P. was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) with a blood alcohol level of at least .15. In an inventory search of his vehicle, a small amount of marijuana was discovered. R.P.G.P. was subsequently charged with two offenses: misdemeanor DWI and misdemeanor possession. Following R.P.G.P.'s successful completion of a pretrial intervention program, the DWI charge was dismissed. The possession charge, to which R.P.G.P. pleaded no contest, was dismissed after he served nine months of deferred adjudication probation.

After both charges had been dismissed, R.P.G.P. filed a petition to expunge the DWI arrest records pursuant to Article 55.01(a)(2)(A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The State opposed the partial expunction request on the basis that arrest records cannot be expunged as to any single offense unless all charges stemming from the arrest are eligible for expunction under Article 55.01. The possession charge was ineligible for expunction because R.P.G.P. had served the equivalent of court-ordered community supervision for that charge,⁶ so the State argued that no part of the arrest records could be expunged.

While the expunction petition was pending, the trial court signed a nondisclosure order for the possession charge. A nondisclosure order limits the ability of a criminal justice agency to disclose information about criminal history that is the subject of the order.⁷ At the expunction hearing, R.P.G.P. argued the nondisclosure order shielded him from questioning about the possession charge, but the trial court overruled his objection. Based on R.P.G.P.'s testimony that he had been placed on community supervision for the possession offense, the trial court denied the expunction petition as to the DWI offense.

The court of appeals affirmed in a split decision.⁸ Although the majority held that R.P.G.P. was properly questioned about the marijuana charge, the court's stated rationale is somewhat opaque.⁹ The court did not agree with the State that the nondisclosure statute permits disclosure in connection with expunction proceedings.¹⁰ Instead, the court construed the expunction statute as requiring "the trial court to review the entire criminal transaction surrounding the arrest," which necessarily included making inquiry about "any and all offenses or charges stemming from the same transaction from which an individual seeks an expunction."¹¹ Viewing Article 55.01(a)(2)(A) as mandating consideration of the arrest transaction in its entirety, the court explained that a nondisclosure order could not be used to circumvent the transactional inquiry.¹²

On the expunction petition's merits, the court rejected R.P.G.P.'s argument that State v. T.S.N. categorically precludes an arrest-based construction of the expunction statute.¹³ Following the court of appeals' pre- T.S.N. precedent, the court held that arrest records for the DWI charge are not expungable under Article 55.01(a)(2) because R.P.G.P. received community supervision for the possession charge and that charge was related to and arose out of the "same transaction" as the DWI offense.¹⁴

The dissent disagreed on both counts, asserting that (1) Article 55.01(a)(2) permits expunction of individual offenses and (2) R.P.G.P. was not required to disclose the possession charge because expunction proceedings are not excepted from the nondisclosure statute's constraints.¹⁵ For those reasons, the dissent concluded that R.P.G.P. is entitled to expunction of the DWI arrest records.¹⁶

R.P.G.P.'s petition for review presents challenges to the appellate court's disposition of both issues. We agree with R.P.G.P. that Article 55.01(a)(2) is an offense-based expunction provision and, with respect to misdemeanor offenses, the proviso in Article 55.01(a)(2)(A) is also offense-based. Accordingly, we do not reach his alternative argument that the trial court erred in compelling his testimony regarding a nondisclosed offense.

II. Discussion

A. Expunction

Expunction is a civil remedy governed by Article 55.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.¹⁷ An expunction order allows the person arrested to "deny the occurrence of the arrest and [deny] the existence of the expunction order [except in a criminal proceeding]" and prohibits governmental and private entities named in the order from releasing, maintaining, disseminating, or using the expunged records and files "for any purpose."¹⁸ Because the remedy is a privilege defined by the Legislature, and not a constitutional or common-law right, the statutory requirements are mandatory and exclusive and cannot be equitably expanded by the courts.¹⁹

At issue here is R.P.G.P.'s asserted entitlement to an order expunging his DWI arrest records under Article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(c), which allows a person arrested for commission of a felony or misdemeanor to expunge "all records and files relating to the arrest" if:

(1) the person has been released;

(2) "the charge, if any, has not resulted in a final conviction";

(3) "the charge, if any ... is no longer pending";

(4) "there was no court ordered community supervision under Chapter 42A for the offense"²⁰ ; and (5) "provided that " certain disjunctively stated conditions are satisfied.²¹

As applicable here, expunction is available on satisfaction of the foregoing prerequisites "provided that":

(A) regardless of whether any statute of limitations exists for the offense and whether any limitations period for the offense has expired, an indictment or information [1] charging the person with the commission of a misdemeanor offense based on the person's arrest or [2] charging the person with the commission of any felony offense arising out of the same transaction for which the person was arrested:

....

(ii) if presented at any time following the arrest, was dismissed or quashed, and the court finds that the indictment or information was dismissed or quashed because :

....

(c) the person completed a pretrial intervention program ...[.]²²

The parties agree that R.P.G.P.'s arrest records for the misdemeanor DWI charge would be eligible for expunction if the arrest had been only for that offense, because on an individual basis, both the prerequisites and the conditions in the proviso are satisfied as to that offense. But because the arrest involved multiple misdemeanor offenses, the point of dissension between the parties is whether the language setting out the prerequisites in subarticle (a)(2) and the language in the applicable proviso—subarticle (a)(2)(A)(ii)(c)—require the offenses to be viewed collectively for expunction purposes, precluding partial expunction of the arrest records. If the relevant provisions are arrest-based, R.P.G.P.'s DWI arrest records would not be expungable under the all-or-nothing approach the court of appeals applied because the possession offense is concededly ineligible for expunction under any provision in Article 55.01.

B. Standard of Review

A trial court's expunction order is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but the meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo.²³ Statutes are analyzed " ‘as a cohesive, contextual whole’ with the goal of effectuating the Legislature's intent," which we presume is a "just and reasonable result."²⁴ Unless the context or the statute instructs otherwise, our analysis begins with the plain language of the statute read in context, not in isolation.²⁵ Past versions of a statute may also be consulted to discern intent with respect to language that has been amended to its current form.²⁶

C. Split of Authority

Our courts of appeals are not aligned in their...