State v. J. K.
| Decision Date | 14 December 1977 |
| Citation | 383 A.2d 283 |
| Parties | STATE of Delaware v. J. K. and R. T. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
On certification from the Superior Court. Questions answered.
Stephen M. Walther, Edward F. Eaton and Mary C. Boudart, Deputy Attys. Gen., Wilmington, for the State.
Richard M. Baumeister, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for J. K. and R. T.
Before HERRMANN, C. J., and DUFFY and McNEILLY, JJ.
This certification proceeding arises from an appeal to the Superior Court of a Family Court order determining that the Juvenile Mandatory Commitment Act, 10 Del.C. § 937, which became effective on July 30, 1976, is unconstitutional.
The facts before us are few and undisputed. J.K., a minor, was adjudged a delinquent in the Family Court for conduct which, if engaged in by an adult, is burglary in the second degree, 11 Del.C. § 825. 1 Based on his personal history, the State contended that sentencing under the Act was prima facie required, but the Court declared the Act unconstitutional for vagueness and for violation of Equal Protection Standards.
Juvenile R.T. was also adjudged delinquent in the Family Court for committing two separate acts which violate 11 Del.C. § 825, if done by an adult. The Court again held the Act unconstitutional and, for that reason, refused to sentence him under its terms.
The Superior Court granted the State's motion to appeal from the Family Court orders and consolidated the two cases. The following questions were then certified and accepted by this Court: 2"1. Did the juvenile . . . (J.K.), have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Mandatory Commitment Act when he had been adjudicated a delinquent for committing a felonious offense only once between the Act's passage (sic) the date of the Family Court's determination?
2. Did the possibility that the juvenile . . . (J.K.) might be adjudicated a delinquent for commiting (sic) separate felonious offenses within the next three years give him standing to challenge the Act's constitutionality?
3. Did the juvenile . . . (J.K.) have standing to challenge the Act's constitutionality as representative of the taxpayers of the State of Delaware?
4. Does the Mandatory Commitment Act deny juveniles sentenced in Family Court under it equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment since juveniles found non-amenable, can receive probation in Superior Court for the same offenses?
5. Do Sections (c)(6) and (c)(8) of the Mandatory Commitment Act satisfy the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against vagueness?
6. Does the Mandatory Commitment Act deny juveniles sentenced under it their Sixth Amendment guarantee of a right to a jury trial in capital (sic) cases because of the possibility of being incarcerated for longer than six months?"
The Act mandates certain fixed terms of commitment to the Department of Corrections of a "delinquent child" aged 14 years or older, who commits two or more specified offenses, not in the same transaction, within specified time periods. 10 Del.C. § 937(c)(1)-(5). The mandatory commitment is subject to the Court's discretionary power to suspend all commitment in excess of six months. Section 937(c)(6).
Before examining the substantive and significant constitutional questions, we must first test the right of the minors to raise them.
The first three questions certified concern J.K.'s standing to challenge the Act's constitutionality.
As we have indicated, the provisions of the Act are not triggered unless a juvenile is adjudged delinquent for committing more than one act constituting an enumerated felony within a certain time period. In particular, as it pertains to J.K., the Act specifies a one-year commitment for a juvenile adjudged delinquent for committing two or more burglaries involving a dwelling house within a one-year period. 3
J.K. had been adjudicated delinquent for committing only one burglary after the Act became law and, for that reason, we conclude that his rights are not affected by it. It follows that he lacks standing to question the Act's constitutionality. Mills v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., Del.Supr., 272 A.2d 702 (1970).
As to R.T., however, it is conceded that he has the requisite standing, that is, he has been adjudged delinquent for committing the required number of offenses within the specified time period provided in § 937(c) and, under the Statute, commitment is mandatory. Thus there is before us in this case a party with standing to test the constitutionality of the Act.
The fourth question certified is whether the Act denies equal protection to juveniles sentenced under its terms since non-amenable juveniles may receive probation in Superior Court for the same conduct.
On this issue the Family Court held that the Act denies equal protection of the laws to juveniles adjudged delinquent in Family Court.
The Court found that although the designation of juveniles as a classification (as distinguished from adults) is reasonable, the Act results in treating unequally persons within that classification. In more specific terms, the Court found determinative the fact that the Act mandates fixed terms of commitment for juveniles adjudged delinquent in Family Court, while juveniles declared non-amenable to the Family Court processes and bound over to Superior Court may be accorded probation for virtually all offenses included in the Act.
In testing the equal protection guarantees, as they apply to a child under the Statute, we must examine State policy and place the issue in the juridical context in which it arises, and that requires some review of the Family Court's history.
The Family Court, from its creation in 1945, 45 Del.L. ch. 241, § 2, 4 has had (with some exceptions) exclusive jurisdiction over a child charged with a violation of State law. 5 See 10 Del.C. § 921 and its predecessors. The proceedings against a child are not criminal in concept or in practice. Indeed, the child is not even charged with a "crime," no matter what the conduct. See 10 Del.C. § 931. In the Family Court the charge is a general one of "delinquency." 6 § 921(1), (2)a. Although the term " delinquency" is not defined by the Code, its meaning is made clear by the statutory definition of "delinquent child" which appears at § 901(7):
" 'Delinquent child' means a child who commits an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime or, who is uncontrolled by his custodian or school authorities or who habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others."
See also § 921(2)a which reads:
"Any child charged in this State with delinquency by having committed any act or violation of any laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, except: . . ."
State policy in a proceeding against a child in the Family Court is to make it entirely a part of the Court's "civil jurisdiction," § 921, governed by a purpose stated as follows in § 902:
Since 1947, State policy has also included a "non-amenability" concept in the Family Court proceedings. 46 Del.L. ch. 209, § 1. Under the present Statute, a child is held to be "non-amenable," and therefore not subject to Family Court jurisdiction, when the Family Court determines that the child will not benefit from the "rehabilitative processes of the Court," after considering the following six nonexclusive criteria:
If the Court determines that the child is amenable, it proceeds to hear the case. If the Court decides that he is not amenable, the child is referred for trial as an adult to the Superior Court or to any other Court with jurisdiction over the offense. § 938(c).
From the statutory history, we conclude that Delaware public policy in dealing with minors charged with violations of State law is to divide them into two classes on the basis of the offenses charged. First, those charged with first degree murder, rape, kidnapping or certain motor vehicle offenses are, in effect, prosecuted as adults; second, those charged with any other offense are proceeded against, civilly, in the Family Court. After that Court has taken jurisdiction of an alleged offense of the second category, it is processed, no matter what the conduct, under the general charge of "delinquency." The...
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