State v. J. R. (In re J. R.)

• Decision Date: 02 March 2022
• Docket Number: A172243 (Control), A172324
• Parties: In the MATTER OF J. R., aka J. E. R., a Youth. State of Oregon, Respondent, v. J. R., aka J. E. R., Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

318 Or.App. 21

507 P.3d 778

In the MATTER OF J. R., aka J. E. R., a Youth.State of Oregon, Respondent,

v.J. R., aka J. E. R., Appellant.

A172243 (Control), A172324

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and submitted September 7, 2021.

March 2, 2022

Christa Obold Eshleman argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Youth, Rights & Justice.

Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and Armstrong, Presiding Judge.

TOOKEY, P. J.

This consolidated appeal of two orders in a juvenile delinquency proceeding requires us to construe ORS 419C.145, which authorizes detention of a youth "before adjudication on the merits."¹ Youth was on probation and committed to the custody of the Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) for a prior delinquency adjudication. As permitted by ORS 419C.145, the juvenile court placed youth in detention based on probable cause that he had violated the conditions of his probation. The juvenile court then determined that youth had violated the conditions of his probation and continued youth's detention pending disposition. The juvenile court subsequently terminated youth's commitment to OYA, but ordered an additional eight days of detention as a sanction for youth's probation violation.

Youth first assigns error to the juvenile court's order continuing his detention pending disposition. He argues that ORS 419C.145 authorizes detention of a youth only before adjudication of the allegations. Youth acknowledges that that issue is now moot but argues that it qualifies for review under ORS 14.175 as it is capable of repetition and likely to evade review. As explained below, we conclude that youth's first assignment is moot but satisfies the requirements of ORS 14.175, and, on the merits, we conclude that ORS 419C.145 authorizes detention of a youth only before the trial-like adjudication stage of a juvenile proceeding, not after; it does not provide for detention of a youth between adjudication and disposition.

Youth also assigns error to the juvenile court's determination that the eight days of detention imposed as a probation-violation sanction did not count toward the statutory maximum periods of "institutionalization or commitment" provided in ORS 419C.501. As explained below, we conclude that that issue is moot and does not satisfy the requirements for review under ORS 14.175.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts relevant to the issues on appeal are largely procedural and not disputed. In January 2016, youth was adjudicated delinquent for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute three Class A misdemeanors. As a result, youth was placed on probation and committed to the custody of OYA.

On August 2, 2019, a petition was filed alleging that youth had violated the conditions of his probation, and the juvenile court placed youth in detention under ORS 419C.145.

On August 9, 2019, the juvenile court held a hearing on that petition and determined that youth had violated the conditions of his probation. At that hearing, youth argued that, having adjudicated the petition, "the maximum time that [youth] can be held in detention is eight days" under ORS 419C.453,² and that "[no]thing in the Juvenile Code allow[s] detention time post adjudication beyond those eight days." The juvenile court rejected that argument and entered an order continuing youth's detention "until further court order, early release to OYA for placement OK," and set over disposition to August 29, 2019. At some point after the August 9, 2019, hearing, youth was released to OYA for placement.

On August 28, 2019—one day before the scheduled disposition hearing—another petition was filed alleging that youth had violated the conditions of his placement, and youth was again placed in detention under ORS 419C.145. The next day, the juvenile court held a hearing and determined that youth had violated the conditions of his placement. The court acknowledged and again rejected youth's argument that, after adjudication, the court may impose only eight days of detention, and it entered an order continuing youth's detention and setting over disposition of youth's probation violations to October 18, 2019.

On October 2, 2019, youth filed a motion to terminate commitment to OYA and release youth from detention, and a hearing on that motion was held the following day. At the hearing, youth again argued that the juvenile court lacked authority to continue youth's detention for more than eight days after adjudicating a probation violation petition. The court responded that

"it's been a source of tension and legal argument over the years whether the Court can hold a youth in detention beyond eight days between the time of an admission or finding of PV and disposition. And I've taken the position that there's no legal bar on that. And so I'll stand by that [position.]"

Youth also argued for the first time that, because youth's commitment to OYA had, by that time, exceeded the three-year period of commitment provided in ORS 419C.501 for youth's 2016 misconduct, the court also lacked authority to impose any additional days of detention as a sanction for youth's probation violation.³ After the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order terminating youth's commitment to OYA, stating that "the maximum period of commitment of [youth] to OYA allowed under ORS 419C.501 has been exceeded." The order also imposed eight days of detention as a sanction for youth's August 28, 2019, probation violation and stated, in part,

"The court rejects the youth's argument that continuing a youth in detention between a finding of probation violation and disposition, or [that] the imposition of 8 days of detention as a PV sanction under the circumstances presented here, is barred by [the Juvenile Code]."

On appeal, youth seeks in his first assignment of error a reversal of the juvenile court's determination that it could continue holding youth in detention under ORS 419C.145 after his probation violation allegations had already been adjudicated. Both parties assert that that issue became moot when youth's probation was terminated, but they agree that it nevertheless qualifies for review under ORS 14.175 because the issue is capable of repetition and likely to evade review.

In his second assignment of error, youth argues that the juvenile court erred when it determined that the eight days of detention imposed as a probation violation sanction did not count toward the statutory maximum periods of "institutionalization or commitment" provided in ORS 419C.501. Youth acknowledges that that issue is moot but contends that it, too, qualifies for review under ORS 14.175. The state responds that the issue is moot and does not meet the requirements for review under ORS 14.175.

II. ANALYSIS

We begin our analysis by addressing the issue of mootness, concluding that youth's first assignment is moot and does qualify for review under ORS 14.175, but his second assignment error, which also is moot, does not. We then turn to the merits of youth's first assignment of error, concluding that ORS 419C.145 authorizes detention of a youth only before the adjudication stage of a juvenile proceeding; it does not authorize detention of a youth between adjudication and disposition.

A. Mootness and Review under ORS 14.175

As to youth's first assignment of error, we conclude that it is moot but satisfies the requirements of ORS 14.175.

Both parties acknowledge—and we agree—that the issue raised in youth's first assignment of error is moot; youth's detention, probation, and commitment to OYA have terminated, and our decision will no longer "have a practical effect on the rights of the parties." Dept. of Human Services v. G. D. W. , 353 Or. 25, 32, 292 P.3d 548 (2012) ("As a general rule, a case becomes moot when the court's decision no longer will have a practical effect on the rights of the parties.").

A moot issue may, however, be reviewed when it satisfies the requirements of ORS 14.175 and the court exercises its discretion to consider the moot issue. Penn v. Board of Parole , 365 Or. 607, 613, 451 P.3d 589 (2019). There are three requirements under ORS 14.175 : (1) the party had standing to commence the action; (2) the act challenged by the party is "capable of repetition"; and (3) the challenged act is "likely to evade judicial review." ORS 14.175.

Here, both youth and the state assert—and we agree—that youth's first assignment of error satisfies all three requirements. In particular, the challenged act (i.e. , placement in detention "before adjudication on the merits" under ORS 419C.145 ) is likely to evade review, because any detention period imposed will be for a relatively short period—a number of days or a few weeks—and will, it seems, have ended during the very early stages of any appeal. We exercise our discretion to review the moot issue raised in youth's first assignment of error.

As to youth's second assignment of error, we conclude that it is moot and does not satisfy the requirements of ORS 14.175 ; specifically, we are not persuaded that a juvenile court's decision to not count periods of detention imposed as a probation violation sanction toward the maximum periods of "institutionalization or commitment" provided in ORS 419C.501 is likely to evade review. Youth argues that "all of the statutory maximums for misdemeanor offenses under ORS 419C.501 are under one year," but "appeals from delinquency dispositions go on for years before issuance of a written opinion." The state responds that youth's argument overlooks cases "where a youth has committed multiple offenses and the aggregate dispositional maximum is, as a result, many years," and "it overlooks all felony cases, where the statutory maximum is five years or greater." In such cases, the state continues, "this court can review a challenge to a juvenile court's...