State v. V. L. (In re V. L.)

• Decision Date: 30 March 2022
• Docket Number: A172636
• Citation: 318 Or.App. 571,509 P.3d 142
• Parties: In the MATTER OF V. L., Jr., a Youth. State of Oregon, Respondent, v. V. L., Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

318 Or.App. 571

509 P.3d 142

In the MATTER OF V. L., Jr., a Youth.State of Oregon, Respondent,

v.V. L., Jr., Appellant.

A172636

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Submitted June 3, 2021.

March 30, 2022

Erica Hayne Friedman and Youth, Rights & Justice Attorneys at Law filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and Armstrong, Senior Judge.

TOOKEY, P. J.

This case requires us to determine whether, in a juvenile delinquency adjudication, facts about a youth's age are among the "facts alleged in the petition showing the youth to be within the jurisdiction of the court" that "must be established beyond a reasonable doubt" under ORS 419C.400(2).¹

Youth appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court finding him within the court's jurisdiction for acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute unlawful delivery of a marijuana item, ORS 475C.345.² On appeal, youth argues that the juvenile court erred when it determined that the state was not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that youth was under 18 years of age.

We conclude that a youth's age—though required in a petition under ORS 419C.255(1)(a) —is not a fact that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a juvenile delinquency adjudication; therefore, the juvenile court did not err, and we affirm.³

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are largely procedural and not in dispute. Youth, a high school student, was accused of selling marijuana products to middle school students. In an amended petition pursuant to ORS 419C.250, the state alleged that youth was 16 years old and was within the juvenile court's jurisdiction for acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute unlawful delivery of a marijuana item, ORS 475C.345.

At a hearing on that petition, after the close of the state's evidence, youth argued that the state had not met its burden to prove youth's age beyond a reasonable doubt. The state responded that youth's age was "not a material element" of the alleged offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; instead, the state argued, youth's age pertained to "a preliminary jurisdictional question" as to "whether [youth's] case should be heard in a juvenile court or [in] a criminal court."

The juvenile court briefly reviewed recordings from earlier proceedings, determined that youth's attorney had not previously confirmed youth's age, and declined to reopen the record for the state to introduce evidence of youth's age. Ultimately, the juvenile court concluded that youth's age was relevant to whether the juvenile court could adjudicate youth's case, but that it was not an element of the offense that the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. In reaching that conclusion, the juvenile court explained:

" [ORS] 419C.005 I think makes clear that the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction in any case involving a person who is under 18 years of age and who has committed an act that is a violation or that, if done by an adult, would constitute a violation of law ***.

"[I]t seems to me that the matter of a [youth's] age determines whether or not this court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the case[.]

"* * * * *

"I'm going to find for purposes of this proceeding that age is not a material element of the offense and, therefore, need not be proven by the state, which means that it would have to be raised by the defense or by youth's attorney if he sought to challenge whether or not this court properly had jurisdiction."

On appeal, youth argues that the juvenile court erred in reaching that conclusion, because being " ‘under 18 years of age’ is a fact necessary to establish juvenile court jurisdiction, and, therefore, that fact must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a juvenile delinquency adjudication under ORS 419C.400(2)." The state responds that the "juvenile court correctly concluded that the state did not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that youth was under 18 years of age," because "being under 18 is not a material element of" the offense alleged in the state's amended petition; instead, the state contends, youth's "age is pertinent only to determining which court has jurisdiction to hear his case—the juvenile court or the adult court."

As we understand the parties’ arguments, we must determine whether, in a juvenile delinquency adjudication, facts about a youth's age are among the "facts alleged in the petition showing the youth to be within the jurisdiction of the court" that "must be established beyond a reasonable doubt" under ORS 419C.400(2).⁴

II. ANALYSIS

The parties’ dispute "presents a matter of statutory construction, which we review for legal error." State v. J. R. , 318 Or. App. 21, 29, 507 P.3d 778 (2022). "In conducting our review, our job is to ascertain the legislature's intent, which we do by examining the statutory text, context, and any pertinent legislative history." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, we are mindful of our obligation to "identify[ ] the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by the parties." Stull v. Hoke , 326 Or. 72, 77, 948 P.2d 722 (1997).

A. Text

The text of ORS 419C.400(2) provides:

"The facts alleged in the petition showing the youth to be within the jurisdiction of the court as provided in ORS 419C.005, unless admitted, must be established beyond a reasonable doubt."

That text requires that a certain set of facts in a petition must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt—namely, the set of facts "showing the youth to be within the jurisdiction of the court." But nothing in the text of ORS 419C.400(2) explicitly provides whether that set of facts includes facts about a youth's age. Consequently, we must turn to the context of ORS 419C.400(2).

B. Context

A statute's context includes "other provisions of the same statute and related statutes." Dalbeck v. Bi-Mart Corp. , 315 Or. App. 129, 135, 500 P.3d 711 (2021).

1. ORS 419C.005(1)

One related statute specifically referenced in ORS 419C.400(2) is ORS 419C.005, which concerns the juvenile court's "exclusive original jurisdiction." Youth contends that the text of ORS 419C.400(2) must be "read together" with ORS 419C.005(1), which provides:

"The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in any case involving a person who is under 18 years of age and who has committed an act that *** if done by an adult would constitute a violation, of a law or ordinance ***."

"Read together," youth contends, " ORS 419C.005(1) and ORS 419C.400(2) plainly support a conclusion [that] being ‘under 18 years of age’ is one of the facts to which 419C.400(2) is referring." We disagree.

The text of ORS 419C.005(1) plainly refers to a person's age. But, as we explain, "[t]here are, generally speaking, two uses of the term jurisdiction" in the juvenile context, and the reference to age in ORS 419C.005(1) concerns whether a case is within the juvenile court's "exclusive original jurisdiction"—i.e. , its "subject matter jurisdiction"; it does not refer to a fact showing that a youth is "within the jurisdiction of the court"—i.e. , the "factual determination that the child is *** delinquent" for having violated a particular law. Dept. of Human Services v. C. M. H. , 301 Or. App. 487, 494-96, 455 P.3d 576 (2019), aff'd , 368 Or. 96, 486 P.3d 772 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As noted, ORS 419C.005(1) provides that the juvenile court has "exclusive original jurisdiction" in "any case" involving "a person who is under 18 years of age." We have previously observed that that "jurisdictional wording" in ORS 419C.005(1) relating to delinquency matters "is identical to that used in juvenile dependency matters under ORS 419B.100(1)."⁵ State v. L. P. L. O. , 280 Or. App. 292, 299, 381 P.3d 846 (2016). That identical wording reflects the fact that the "grant of ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ to the juvenile court dates to 1959, when the legislature enacted a comprehensive juvenile code comprising a single set of statutes to govern both dependency and delinquency proceedings." Dept. of Human Services v. C. M. H. , 368 Or. 96, 105, 486 P.3d 772 (2021) (citing Or. Laws 1959, ch. 432).

In 1959, the legislature enacted the predecessor to current ORS 419C.005(1) —former ORS 419.476(1) (1959), repealed by Or. Laws 1993, ch. 33, § 373. In a report prepared by the legislative committee tasked with revising the juvenile code, the committee explained that the "juvenile court should have original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving criminal offenses by persons under 18." Report of the Legislative Interim Committee on Judicial Administration, Part II Juvenile Law, 8 (Jan 1959) (emphasis added). That report further explained the problem that former ORS 419.476 was intended to solve:

"Although the present juvenile law was probably intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction over children on the juvenile court, see ORS 419.544, its provisions are not clear on the point, and the Supreme Court concluded that the criminal courts retained concurrent jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. See In re Loundagin , 129 Or. 652 (1929). The consequence is that under present law, the decision whether a child should be proceeded against in criminal court or circuit court is vested, at least in the first instance, in the district attorney. We believe this decision should be made by the juvenile court and, accordingly, specify that it has exclusive original jurisdiction."

Report of the Legislative Interim Committee on Judicial Administration, Part II Juvenile Law at 13.

The committee's explanations indicate that a person's age in former ORS 419.476(1) was relevant to determining which court should hear that person's case; nothing in that legislative history suggests that the matter of age in former ORS 419.476(1), the predecessor to ORS 419C.005(1), concerned what facts in...