State v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 08 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 35179-6-,35208-3-I,s. 35179-6- |
| Citation | 944 P.2d 403,87 Wn.App. 801 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Michael A. JACKSON, and Laurinda J. Jackson and each of them, Appellants. |
Parents have a duty to care for and protect their children. 1 They can be held criminally liable as principals when, for example, they harm their child by failing to seek necessary medical care. 2 In this appeal, we address a parent's duty to protect in the context of accomplice liability. Instead of utilizing the pattern accomplice instruction, the trial court instructed the jury that it could find a parent to be an accomplice to a crime against the child, if, although physically capable, the parent failed to come to her aid. So instructed, the jury found both defendants guilty of felony murder for the death of their foster daughter.
We find no support in the accomplice statute's plain language for the trial court's modification to the pattern accomplice instruction. Further, the legislative history of the statute evidences an intent to reject accomplice liability for omissions. Under our statute, mere presence, in conjunction with an omission that breaches a duty to act, does not constitute aid to the perpetrator, or encouragement for, the commission of a crime. Because the trial court's accomplice instruction misstated an essential element of criminal liability, the error cannot be harmless. As a result, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
I.
FACTS
Honking incessantly as he approached, Michael Jackson drove his unconscious three-year-old foster daughter to Valley General Hospital's emergency room. An emergency medical technician came to the car, and Michael told him that Breighonna fell from a swing, hit her head, and was Doctors and nurses responded, calling a "code" because Breighonna was unable to breathe. They undressed her, and summoned respiratory care, laboratory and x-ray technicians. They observed an array of bruises on her forehead, ears, arm, abdomen, thighs, crotch, and buttocks. When a technician started to catheterize her, she discovered a fresh labial abrasion. Breighonna's pupils were differently sized, neither responded to light, thus being indicative of serious brain injury. A CT scan showed massive, inoperable bleeding in her head. Her left forehead bruise enlarged during the two plus hours before Valley General transferred Breighonna to Harborview Medical Center by helicopter. After a CT scan there, the Harborview team determined that surgical intervention was futile. Breighonna died early the next evening.
having difficulty breathing. She wasn't breathing well, so the technician ran with her in his arms into the emergency room, seeking aggressive treatment.
Four medical professionals catalogued Breighonna's extensive injuries. Using a process known as iron staining, two of those professionals, the medical examiner, and Dr. Kenneth Feldman (the prosecution's expert) gave opinions as to when they occurred. During the last three weeks of her life, Breighonna suffered bruises on her left arm, abdomen, the left side of her crotch, her buttocks, right forearm, and right scalp. Furthermore, a host of other inflicted injuries were less than three days old (or less than one and a half, depending on the expert's interpretation): two brain injuries (one of which was fatal and probably occurred the morning of the day Michael brought Breighonna to the hospital) evidenced by subdural hematomas (caused by blunt impact), a labial abrasion (extremely painful because young girls are not estrogenized), retinal hemorrhaging (likely caused by shaking), tin ear syndrome on both sides (an injury common to boxers, caused by blows to the head), lacerations and abrasions inside her mouth on skin other than her lips, and some buttocks bruises so deep that they hemorrhaged into In the days that followed, the Jacksons continued to maintain that Breighonna's injury occurred when she fell from a swing. But other points also emerged. Breighonna was incontinent of urine and bowel movements, and Laurinda spanked her 12-15 times for it on Wednesday (three days before Breighonna died). That night, when Breighonna had a bowel movement in her pants, Laurinda and Michael fought over who would help her change into her pajamas. It turned into a tug of war, with each of them tugging one of her arms. Then Michael eventually pushed Laurinda and they fell down, one of them on top of Breighonna. In a later interview, Michael also admitted that he once spanked Breighonna.
the gluteus maximus muscle. Every medical professional who testified considered the injuries to be completely inconsistent with the two explanations offered by the Jacksons: that Breighonna had fallen while having her hair cut two weeks before her death, and that she had fallen from a swing [944 P.2d 407] in the park on the morning of the day before she died. Dr. Newman testified that she has seen injuries this significant only in auto accident victims. The medical examiner and the prosecution's expert agreed that the cause of death was blunt impact to the head causing massive brain damage, marked by a subdural hematoma, and hemorrhaging inside the head, with swelling eventually impinging the spine and brain stem.
After consenting to a search and some interviews with police, the Jacksons fled to Florida. They were arrested and returned to Washington. The State charged each of them with felony murder, predicated on second degree assault and first degree criminal mistreatment. The State also charged Michael with one count of first degree rape of a child. The jury acquitted Michael on the first degree rape charge, but found both defendants guilty of felony murder. By special interrogatory, they unanimously
agreed that the State had proven both predicate crimes against both defendants.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Criminal Mistreatment
Both defendants argue that insufficient evidence supported the predicate felony of criminal mistreatment.
A person commits the crime of criminal mistreatment in the first degree when he recklessly causes great bodily harm to a child by withholding any of the basic necessities of life. 3 The "basic necessities of life" are "food, water, shelter, clothing, and health care." 4 The prosecution argues that the statute uses the term "shelter" to mean protection from a criminal act of a third person. We disagree. First, the most common meaning of "shelter" is something that affords protection from the elements. 5 Second, the prosecution's interpretation of "shelter" is difficult to reconcile with the rest of the phrase defining "basic necessities of life." Taken in context, "shelter," as used in "food, water, shelter, clothing, and health care," means protection from the elements. Furthermore, the prosecution's interpretation would create an open-ended, unmanageable standard. If "shelter" means protection from harm, would accidental harm trigger liability? Did the legislature intend that every parent, regardless of their ability or stature, must intervene when a criminal act is perpetrated by a stranger or a sibling against their child? In conclusion, given its common meaning, the context in which it is used, and the uncontrollable breadth of defining it as protection from others, we hold that "shelter" means housing or protection from the elements. Thus, the alleged mistreatment relevant to this case is only the withholding of health care, not the withholding of shelter.
Strong evidence demonstrates that someone withheld medical care. The prosecution's expert witness, Dr. Kenneth Feldman, concluded that Breighonna died from a head injury inflicted with blunt trauma impact. Based on a high serum sodium, a low blood count, and CT scan, Dr. Feldman opined that Breighonna's injury occurred several hours before she was brought to the hospital. Therefore, the evidence supports the element of withholding medical care.
Another element of first degree criminal mistreatment is that the parent "recklessly causes great bodily harm to a child ... by withholding." 6 Michael did delay taking Breighonna to Valley General hospital. She was unconscious when she arrived, but a person suffering significant brain injury is generally rendered unconscious. Based on a CT scan, Dr. Yang, the neurosurgeon, determined that the injury was inoperable due to massive bleeding. When Valley General discharged Breighonna (just under three hours after arrival), a nurse reluctantly categorized her condition as improved. Faced with a form that included only "stable, improved, unchanged, or deteriorated," the nurse chose "improved" because Breighonna's condition (according to a particular coma scale used) had changed, but had not deteriorated. Breighonna flew by helicopter to Harborview Medical Center. A CT scan there showed surgical intervention to be futile.
Yet, after reviewing the testimony of an emergency medical technician, two nurses, three treating doctors, the medical examiner, a neurologist asked by the medical examiner to examine Breighonna's brain, and the prosecution's expert witness, 7 we find no evidence that the withholding caused great bodily harm. 8 Consequently, the evidence does not support the predicate felony of first degree criminal mistreatment, and we dismiss that charge.
B.
Jury Instruction: Accomplice Liability
This case involves a heinous crime against a defenseless child. The State's theme highlighted the Jacksons' contractual and legal obligations as parents. In becoming foster parents, they promised in writing to "not use...
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