State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 04 February 1902
• Citation: 66 S.W. 938,167 Mo. 291
• Parties: STATE v. JACKSON.<SMALL><SUP>†</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

66 S.W. 938

167 Mo. 291

STATE v. JACKSON.^†

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

February 4, 1902.

CRIMINAL LAW — MURDER — JURIES — INSUFFICIENT PANEL — POWER OF THE COURT — STATUTORY METHOD OF IMPANELING — TRIAL — INSTRUCTIONS — DEFINITION OF DELIBERATION — HARMLESS INSTRUCTIONS.

1. Rev. St. 1899, art. 2, § 3795, provided for the manner of drawing juries in felony cases in the courts having jurisdiction thereof in counties containing cities of 50,000 and less than 300,000 inhabitants; and section 3801 of the same chapter expressly conferred upon such courts power to direct the number of jurors to be summoned, and to make such rules and orders as they might deem proper touching the jury service. Held, that where it appeared that a regular panel, made up according to section 3795, was incomplete, the court had authority to complete it by a proper order placing thereon the names of a requisite number of citizens not regularly summoned, but otherwise qualified.

2. The method of summoning and impaneling juries provided for by statute is merely directory, and hence it is no objection to a panel that the court completes it by making an order placing thereon the names of citizens who were not summoned according to the statutory method.

3. Where the trial court passes upon the question as to whether jurors were disqualified under Rev. St. 1899, § 3799, prescribing what persons shall not serve on juries, its finding will not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous.

4. On a prosecution for murder, wherein it appeared that the killing was unprovoked, the court instructed that the word "deliberation" meant "in a cool state of blood, not in the heat of passion caused by some just or lawful provocation." Held that, though the definition of "deliberation" was inaccurate, in that it omitted the essential element of time necessary to show that the homicide was committed with design to accomplish some unlawful purpose, yet, inasmuch as there was no lawful provocation which could reduce the offense from murder in the first degree to some other grade of homicide, the instruction was not prejudicial to defendant.

5. An instruction for the state on a prosecution for murder, which conflicted with another instruction given for the state with respect to murder in the second degree, was not prejudicial to defendant where he was not convicted of murder in the second degree.

6. Defendant and deceased were playing cards in a saloon, and had some dispute, whereupon deceased said, "I don't want to fuss with you," and went across the room. Defendant soon thereafter stepped up to deceased, and said, "I will have something to do with you," and deceased left the room, and went to another saloon near by. Defendant borrowed a pistol, saying he needed it, and followed deceased to the other saloon, stepped up behind him, and, after standing thus for a few minutes, without any warning to deceased, shot him in the back of the head. Held, that the homicide was without any justification or mitigating circumstances which could reduce it from murder in the first degree to any lesser offense.

Appeal from criminal court, Jackson county; Jno. W. Wofford, Judge.

James Jackson was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

English & English, for appellant. The Attorney General and Jerry M. Jeffries, for the State.

BURGESS, J.

The defendant was indicted for the murder of one Prophet Everett. He was convicted in the criminal court of Jackson county at its April term, 1901, of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to be hanged. From the sentence and judgment he appeals.

Both the defendant and deceased were negroes. They were but slightly acquainted. On Saturday night, December 22, 1900, they met in a saloon in Kansas City, and engaged in a game of cards. They had some disagreement over the game, whereupon deceased arose from the table at which they were playing, and remarked to defendant, "I don't want to bother and fuss with you," and walked to another part of the room. Shortly thereafter defendant stepped up to deceased, and said to him, "I will have something to do with you." Deceased then left that saloon, and went to another, which was about two blocks away. Shortly after deceased left the saloon where he and the defendant had been engaged at cards, defendant took from George Washington, another negro, a pistol which Washington had in his pocket, at the same time remarking to him, "I am going to keep it; I need it," and put it in his pocket. He then went to the saloon to which deceased had gone, and found him watching a game of cards. Defendant, after entering the saloon, stepped up behind deceased, and, after standing there a few minutes, and without any warning to him, held the pistol which he had taken from Washington within about three feet of the back of the head of deceased, and fired, when deceased at once fell forward upon the floor dead, the ball having entered his head at the back part, passing through the brain, and producing instant death. Deceased was unarmed. Just at the time of the shooting two Kansas City police officers entered the front door of the saloon. They were just in time to witness the killing. Immediately after firing the shot, and seeing his victim fall to the floor, the defendant rushed out of the back door of the saloon. One of the officers followed. The other officer, leaving the...