State v. Jackson
Decision Date | 15 December 1982 |
Docket Number | No. C80-08-32889,C80-08-32889 |
Citation | 60 Or.App. 681,655 P.2d 592 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. William Perry JACKSON, Appellant. ; CA A20371. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
John Daugirda, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Stephen F. Peifer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and William F. Gary, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before RICHARDSON, P.J., and THORNTON and VAN HOOMISSEN, JJ.
Defendant appeals his convictions for murder, felony murder and burglary. He challenges the admission of his statements made to police while in custody, the denial of his motion for change of venue, the admission of certain photographs and the sentence imposed. We affirm his convictions and remand for resentencing on the murder conviction. The facts of the crimes need not be set out in addressing the assignments of error.
In his first assignment, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to police officers while he was in custody. The trial court made findings of fact respecting interviews defendant had with several police officers. The findings, which are all supported by evidence in the record, are as follows:
The inculpatory statement made to the Portland police officers on August 22, 1980, subsequent to defendant's arraignment, is the subject of his motion to suppress.
Defendant contends that the statement was inadmissible, "because it was the result of police initiated interrogation made after defendant had requested counsel at his arraignment, and before he had the opportunity to consult with counsel." Defendant's argument relies on Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
There is no question but that an accused has the right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to the assistance of counsel. The United States Supreme Court described that right in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977):
" * * * Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him--'whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' * * * " 430 U.S. at 398, 97 S.Ct. at 1239.
That a defendant has obtained counsel does not, by that fact alone, render inadmissible all subsequent confessions made when counsel is not present. Having counsel present during an interrogation is only one aspect of the right to assistance of counsel. Assistance of counsel in defending the charge or in responding to interrogation can be waived. There is no per se rule as suggested in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), that once counsel is appointed or retained no interrogation of the accused is proper. 1 In Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35, 37 (8th Cir.1974), the court said:
"If an accused can voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to counsel before one has been appointed, there seems no compelling reason to hold that he may not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to have counsel present at an interrogation after counsel has been appointed. * * * "
That principle was reiterated in Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir.1974), by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court in Brewer v. Williams, supra. See also State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 399, 623 P.2d 630 (1981).
The issue then is whether defendant, having had counsel appointed to assist him, waived the presence of his attorney during the subsequent interrogation. Defendant argues that his requesting counsel at the time of his arraignment was tantamount to an assertion of the right to assistance of counsel at the subsequent interrogation and that, consistent with Edwards, the police could not initiate the questioning. In Edwards, the Supreme Court said:
451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-1885. (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Defendant acknowledges that the Oregon Supreme Court has expressly rejected "a more protective rule which absolutely bars any questioning once a lawyer is appointed or retained." See State v. Quinn, supra. However, he argues that Edwards "modifies" Quinn, i.e., that now a defendant who has appointed or retained counsel may waive the right to assistance of counsel only by his own initiation of communication with the police.
Edwards cannot be read so broadly as defendant urges. It interprets the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at 486-87, 101 S.Ct. at 1885-1886. Nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that the appointment of counsel, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, automatically triggers the application of the rule announced in Edwards. Indeed, Edwards concerned a defendant who had specifically invoked his right to have counsel present at the custodial interrogation. Our cases applying Edwards similarly concern defendants who had requested the presence of counsel before speaking to the police. See State v. Taylor, 56 Or.App. 703, 643 P.2d 379 (1982); State v. Bradshaw, 54 Or.App. 949, 636 P.2d 1011 (1981), rev. den. 292 Or. 568 (1982); State v. Fuller, 54 Or.App. 815, 636 P.2d 447 (1981), rev. den. 292 Or. 356 (1982). Thus, Edwards furnishes no basis for deviating from State v. Quinn, supra, which expressly rejected defendant's argument.
This case is factually distinguishable from State v. Taylor, supra, where the defendant was charged with attempted murder, assault and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The victim had been beaten, and his vehicle and a wallet containing his credit cards had been taken. The defendant was subsequently arrested for forgery when he attempted to use the credit cards. Following his arrest, he was advised of his rights. He refused to answer any questions and demanded to speak to an attorney. Subsequently, officers from another police department contacted him in jail and, after advising him of his rights, asked if he would answer questions regarding the assault of the victim. The defendant asked "Do you guys think I should talk to an attorney about this?" The officer replied that it was entirely up to the defendant. The defendant then gave an incriminating...
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