State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 08 October 1973
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 56714,56714,2
• Citation: 499 S.W.2d 467
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ransom McNeil JACKSON, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 467

499 S.W.2d 467

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ransom McNeil JACKSON, Appellant.

No. 56714.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

Oct. 8, 1973.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Karen I. Harper, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Bell Wilson, Fullwood & Harris by James A. Bell, St. Louis, for appellant.

HENRY I. EAGER, Special Commissioner.

This is an appeal from a conviction for first degree murder and a life sentence. The notice of appeal was filed prior to January 1, 1972, and we have jurisdiction. No point is made concerning the sufficiency of the evidence for submission, and we need not state the facts in great detail.

On May 1, 1970, at about 10:30 p.m., several Negro youths were seen dragging a young Negro female up (or down) an alley in the vicinity of St. Vincent and Nebraska Streets in the City of St. Louis. She was ultimately dragged out of that branch of the alley, across Nebraska Street and into the alley on the other side. There were at least three of these youths. Two of them held the girl's arms and pulled her and, for at least part of the time, one, identified as this defendant, walked near her feet and kept a lookout, peering from side to side. The girl was beaten about the face and head, her clothing was torn into pieces and scattered, and she was almost naked; she struggled constantly to free herself, and screamed. Several of the witnesses heard her scream 'Andre, leave me alone. I won't tell.' Various witnesses testified that this defendant was generally known as 'Andre' and was called and spoken to by that name. All of the girl's possessions were taken from her and stolen or scattered in the alley. Defendant was identified as a participant by at least five of the witnesses; two saw him beat the girl with his fists. In the final stages of the assault the girl 'almost' got away, but defendant grabbed her and pulled her back; he then drew a pistol, held it close to the back of her head and shot her. Two of the witnesses saw this and testified specifically to it; one of them was only a few feet away. Various others heard the shot. Defendant then ran away down the alley. The girl died very shortly from the gunshot wound. The girl was one Dorothy Lashly. The cause of death was confirmed by autopsy. Defendant did not testify at the trial. Two of his relatives testified that he was at home on the evening in question, supposedly at the time of the crime. Most of the State's witnesses lived in the neighborhood and knew and defendant, either personally or by sight, from rather frequent observations.

A pre-trial hearing was held on defendant's motion to suppress his oral confession. The substance of defendant's testimony there was: that he was 18 years old, 17 on May 1, 1970; that he was first arrested on May 6, and that without any explanation of his rights, but with the advice that if he could not afford a lawyer 'they' would provide one for him, he was interrogated that night for three hours and again the next morning for an extended period, and released a little later; (his testimony did not show specifically what that interrogation concerned but he did testify he was told that if he told what happened on the night of May 1 he would be 'set free'; no statements made by the defendant at that time are involved here). He was arrested again on the evening of May 11 at his home, taken to police headquarters, and booked. He testified: that his 'rights' were not explained to him then nor was the Miranda card read; that he was told he had a right to a lawyer, but he 'didn't think he needed one,' and did not request one; (after some minor contradiction on this point the above was substantially confirmed); that he asked to see his aunt; that he was interrogated that night for two and one-half hours and again the next morning for an extended period; that he was threatened with beating 'in a way * * * the usual things'; that he had been arrested before and had 'heard these warnings,' and that he has had his 'rights' explained to him; that on a previous conviction he had served 90 days; that on this occasion he answered questions but did not say that he shot the girl.

The police detective who wrote the statements of defendant on May 11, 1970, testified at the pre-trial hearing that defendant was then advised of his constitutional rights by Sgt. Dwyer who read each one from the official card and asked defendant, after each separate one, if he understood it; that as to each, defendant answered that he did; that he was asked if he wanted an attorney to which he answered he did not; that no one threatened him in any way, mentally or physically, and no one promised him he could go free if he answered the questions; that the interrogation took perhaps 45 minutes and that there was none the next morning; that on the next morning defendant was placed in a showup at which time he declined to make further statements. The only statements offered in evidence were those taken on the evening of May 11.

After hearing the evidence the Court ruled the matter in an oral opinion, as follows: 'Let the record in this case show that the Court has been presented with a motion to suppress an alleged oral confession. In support of that motion the defendant himself took the stand and testified. This Court heard this defendant admit that he is a ninth grade graduate, that he went as far as the ninth grade in school. This Court interprets that to be one year of high school. This Court further understood this defendant and felt that he was quite articulate in his manner of testimony, that he had currently a background of confrontation with the police where on prior occasions he was given the alleged constitutional warnings, that he had so indicated his knowledge of his constitutional rights by indicating that on prior occasions he was advised that he had a right to have an attorney, that on a prior occasion he was advised of his right to remain silent. These are words and expressions that come from the defendant himself. The Court feels that he is knowledgeable as to police activity because he knew where he was; he knew that he was in the homicide Division, and so testified. On the other hand, the officer has indicated that while this oral confession was being obtained the so-called Miranda warnings or constitutional rights were given in his presence. The Court finds as a matter of fact that the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights, and as a conclusion of law the Court finds that the Miranda warnings were given in compliance with the constitutional rights, and the motion to strike the alleged oral confession will be overruled. * * * I want the record to show that the Court wants to add to his findings of fact and conclusions of law that the defendant had an intelligent and actual understanding of his warning rights and that he knew what he was doing and the fact that he may or may not remain--the fact he may remain moot and silent. The Court finds that he did affirmatively and knowledgeably waive his rights and he understood his rights.'

At the trial two of the officers who were present at the interrogation on May 11 (there being others also) testified: that defendant was advised of his rights by reading from the official Miranda card (read again at the trial) and asked after each statement if he understood it; that he to each part he said that he did; that he further stated, after the advice, that he did not want a lawyer; that he said he would make a statement; that defendant stated, in answer to questions, that he and others had been drinking wine, that he and three others saw this girl walking on the street, that one of his companions went over and talked to her and then began struggling with her; that the other three, including defendant, ran over and began hitting the girl with their fists; that the struggle continued in the alley and across Nebraska to the other alley; that he, the defendant, drew a .22 caliber automatic pistol from his pocket and shot the girl one time in the head, holding the gun about six inches from her head; that he then ran and threw the gun into some 'unknown location.' The officers further testified that Officer Riley wrote the statement in longhand and read it back to the defendant; that there were no promises, threats or coercion.

This evidence was heard by the jury and one of the instructions submitted to the jury the issue of the voluntariness of the confession. There was no evidence at the trial to contradict the testimony of the officers.

The defendant raises three points here: (1), and we quote: 'That the court erred when it held a hearing on the confession and without ruling whether or not said confession was voluntarily given or not and ruled said confession to be admissible.' (2) that a mistrial should have been granted when the Circuit Attorney, in argument, referred to the defendant as a 'Dirty Murderer'; and (3) that it was prejudicial error to admit in evidence a photograph of the deceased girl lying in the morgue.

On the first point we note that the only contention is that the Court did not make a sufficient finding that the confession was voluntary before admitting it. Reliance is upon Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948 (1961), and Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 83 S.Ct. 448, 9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1963). Escobedo and Shotwell are of no real relevance here. The teaching of Miranda is well known,--that a person in custody must be informed of his constitutional rights as there stated before he can be interrogated, if his statements are to have any validity. The holdings in Denno and Sims are to the effect that the trial...