State v. Jackson, 53563
| Decision Date | 16 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 53563,53563 |
| Citation | 756 S.W.2d 620 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas E. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Timothy J. Walk, Asst. Public Defender, Clayton, for defendant-appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Levin Ziegler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in violation of Section 565.023, RSMo 1986, and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. We affirm.
In the early morning hours of November 14, 1986, Jennings police were dispatched to the scene of a reported shooting. Officer Morton was the first to arrive on the scene. He discovered a distraught woman standing in front of the residence near the body of a man. When Morton questioned the woman regarding the identity of the person who had shot the victim, she replied only, "Inside."
A second officer arrived and informed Morton that the dispatcher had the suspect on the telephone. The second officer tended to the victim and the woman; Morton went after the suspect. Before entering the residence, Morton peered inside. Seeing no weapons, Morton entered. The defendant began a rambling discourse about his shooting of the victim. While the defendant rambled on, Morton attempted to get "the gist of what he was saying" 1 and visually searched for the weapon. He wanted to ensure that the suspect was no longer armed for his own safety; therefore, when he was unable to locate the weapon, he asked the defendant, "Where's the gun?" Defendant replied that it was in the bedroom. After a second police officer entered the residence, the gun was secured and the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights, and confessed to the shooting.
The police officers immediately transferred him to the station. Upon arrival, defendant was reread his rights and signed an acknowledgement card. He confessed to the homicide and agreed to videotape his statement. Once again, he was read his Miranda rights. After indicating that he understood, he gave the same incriminating statement on videotape.
Defendant filed pre-trial motions to suppress evidence and statements which the trial court denied. Defendant vaguely contends this was error because the statements and the subsequent seizure of evidence occurred prior to Miranda warnings in violation of defendant's right to due process and equal protection.
In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984), the Court announced a public safety exception to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The police were chasing an armed rape suspect through a supermarket. The officer who reached the suspect first did not see the weapon. He frisked and handcuffed the suspect, and asked him where the gun was. The suspect answered and the officer located the gun in an empty carton. At this point, the suspect was read his Miranda rights. The court held "that on these facts there is a 'public safety' exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence and that the availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved." Quarles, 104 S.Ct. at 2631.
The court added, "We think police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect." Id. at 2633. Our research has found no Missouri case in which the question concerning the location of the weapon was asked solely to protect the police officer on the scene. As a general rule, these situations occur on public streets or in the presence of bystanders. We do not believe, however, that Quarles is limited to those situations since the Quarles opinion refers to "[the police officers] own safety or the safety of the public...." Id. (Emphasis added); accord People v. Waiters, 121 A.D.2d 414, 502 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1986). The officer was merely trying to determine whether the suspect was unarmed. The...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Flippo
...v. State, 327 Md. 628, 612 A.2d 258, 271 (1992); People v. Brzezinski, 243 Mich.App. 431, 622 N.W.2d 528, 532 (2001); State v. Jackson, 756 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); State v. Soukharith, 253 Neb. 310, 570 N.W.2d 344, 358 (1997); Proferes v. State, 116 Nev. 1136, 13 P.3d 955, 958 (20......
-
State v. Trenter
...discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984); State v. Jackson, 756 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Mo.App.1988). The inevitable discovery rule permits the introduction of illegally obtained evidence if that evidence would have inevita......
-
State v. McCullum
...have been seized inevitably through lawful means by either a search warrant or consent to search given by Victim. See State v. Jackson, 756 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Mo.App. 1988); State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.App. 1987). Any alleged error regarding this evidence is without The second prong of ......
-
State v. Rutter
...only hours after the initial search. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2510, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984); State v. Jackson, 756 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Mo.App. 1988); see also State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Mo.App. 1987). Point In his second point, Defendant posits trial court erro......