State v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.

• Decision Date: 13 December 1899
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LAMAR, Atty. Gen., et al. v. JACKSONVILLE TERMINAL CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

27 So. 221

41 Fla. 363

STATE ex rel. LAMAR, Atty. Gen., et al. v. JACKSONVILLE TERMINAL CO.

Florida Supreme Court

December 13, 1899

Error to circuit court, Duval county; Rhydon M. Call, Judge.

Application by the state, on the relation of William B. Lamar, attorney general, and Benjamin S. Liddom and another, special counsel for the railroad commissioners of the state of Florida against the Jacksonville Terminal Company, for a writ of mandamus. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring error. Motion to dismiss denied.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. The word 'appeals' is used in section 23, c. 4700, Laws 1899, in its popular, broadest, and most comprehensive sense and therein signifies any and all appropriate appellate proceedings provided by law for reviewing judgments at law orders and decrees in equity, and other reviewable orders judgments, or decrees, whether by writ of error, or by an appeal proper, in its strictest technical sense. The purpose of the section, in the class of cases it provides for, was not to add to, modify, or change any of the recognized and differentiated modes of procedure by which cases at law and in equity are respectively transferred for review from inferior to superior courts, except in the one particular of the return day of such appellate proceedings, whether by writ of error or by technical appeal, when applied to cases falling within the provisions of the act, but left all such modes of procedure to be respectively followed in cases arising under the act, with their differentiating applicability, writs of error to be applied to cases at law, and technical appeals to causes in chancery, but making all of them, when utilized for the review of causes 'brought under the provisions of the act,' returnable to the appellate courts within 30 days from the date they are taken or issued.

2. Section 23, c. 4700, Laws 1899, does not violate section 20, art. 3, Const. Fla. 1885, that prohibits the legislature from passing special or local laws regulating the practice in courts of justice. The constitutional limitation mentioned does not prohibit legislation reasonably classifying persons and things, and, when such legislation equally affects all the persons or things of the class it creates, it is a general, and not a special, law. The said section 23 of said act, for the purpose of appellate review, groups together, as a class, all cases 'brought under the provisions of the act,' and makes the appellate proceedings therein, whether they be writs of error or technical appeals, in all of such cases, returnable within 30 days, irrespective of the kind or nature of the case. The distinguishing feature of the calss of cases thus provided for is that they must have been 'brought under the provisions of said act' (chapter 4700).

3. A mandamus, issued by the circuit court on the relation of the attorney general by the order of the state railroad commissioners, to enforce an order made by such commissioners under the provisions of chapter 4700, Laws 1899, is a case 'brought under the provisions' of such act, and, when carried for review to the appellate court by writ of error, is such a case as section 23 of said act requires the writ of error to be made returnable within 30 days from the date of its issuance, and is such a case as said section of said act requires the hearing and determination of by the appellate court in advance of other causes on its dockets.

4. The provisions of section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, forbidding state legislation that denies to any person the equal protection of the laws, does not preclude legislation reasonably classifying persons and things, and, generally, it only requires the same means and methods to be applied impartially to all the constituents of a class, so that the law shall operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances. The test of the reasonableness of a classification is that it must be based upon some difference that bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, and is not a mere arbitrary selection. Section 23, c. 4700, Laws 1899, does not violate the mentioned provision of the federal constitution.

5. The amplification of the title of an act, so as to make it expressly mention matters germane to and properly connected with, its general subject, does not vitiate such title, or subject it to the criticism of having dealt with two distinct or incongruous subjects. The provisions of section 23, c. 4700, Laws 1899, do not deal with a subject not connected with, or germane to, the general subject of the act as expressed in its title, nor does said act embrace more than one subject and matter properly connected therewith.

COUNSEL John E. Hartridge and John A. Henderson, for the motion.

Geo. P. Raney, E. J. L'Engle, and Alex. W. Smith, opposed.

OPINION

TAYLOR C.J.

The railroad commissioners of Florida, under the provisions of chapter 4700, Laws approved June 3, 1899, made an order requiring the Jacksonville Terminal Company, a corporation, to admit the Atlantic, Valdosta & Western Railway Company, with its engines, cars, and trains, to the use and benefit of its terminal facilities and union depot, in the city of Jacksonville, to the like extent accorded by it to other railway companies, upon the payment by said railway company to it of the sum of $1,275 quarter annually for the use of such terminal facilities, besides its equitable proportion of the expenses of maintenance, operation, taxes, and repairs of said terminal property, and commanding the said railway company to join its tracks to those of said terminal company, and to operate its trains in and out of said terminal station and union depot. Upon the alleged refusal of said terminal company to comply with such order of the railroad commissioners, the attorney general and the special counsel for the railroad commissioners, by special order of such commissioners, sued out an alternative writ of mandamus from the circuit court of Duval county, directed to said terminal company, commanding it, in effect, to obey the said order of the commissioners or show cause why it should not do so. The respondent terminal company met the alternative writ of mandamus with a motion to quash same upon various grounds which motion was granted by the circuit judge and the respondent dismissed without day. From this judgment the relators have sued out a writ of error from this court, the same being issued on the 11th day of October, 1899, and made returnable to the 6th day of November, 1899, on which return day the record and writ of error were filed in this court.

The defendant in error now moves this court to quash the writ of error upon the following grounds:

(1) Because the writ of error was issued and made returnable during a term of this court, and without warrant of law, and shows on its face that it is made returnable within a less period of time than 30 days.

(2) Because there is no provision in chapter 4700 for suing out a writ of error, nor authority under said chapter 4700, under which said writ of error is sued out, to take a writ of error from any judgment, order, or decree, nor is there any method provided in said chapter 4700 for either writs of error or appeal.

(3) Because there is no method provided in chapter 4700, under which said writ of error is sued out, for a return to be made, either where the writ of error is sued out or where appeal is taken.

(4) Because there is no law authorizing writs of error or appeals to be returned to a day in a term that has already commenced at the entry of the appeal or the issuance of the writ of error.

(5) Because this is not such an action or suit as is contemplated by chapter 4700, Laws Fla., neither the railroad commissioners nor the state of Florida being the real party in interest, but said litigation is between two private corporations without obligation from one to the other.

(6) Because the writ of error, as it has been issued, served, and returned, is not 'due process of law.'

(7) Because it denies the defendant in error 'the equal protection of the laws' guarantied by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.

(8) Because the provision of chapter 4700, Laws Fla., under which the writ was issued, is inoperative and void, as it is a distinct subject, not connected with, related or germane to, the subject expressed in the title of the act.

(9) Because the act embraces more than one subject and matter properly connected therewith.

The first, second, third, and fourth grounds of this motion will be discussed together, as they all involve a construction of that part of section 23, c. 4700, Laws approved June 3, 1899 which is as follows: 'Appeals by either party shall be from judgments, orders and decrees of inferior courts in all suits and cases brought under the provisions of this act ot the same extent that appeals lie in similar suits and cases brought under any other law in this state, and not otherwise; but all such appeals shall be taken to the appellate court, returnable within thirty days, and shall be advanced to the head of the docket and given precedence over all other appeals except habeas corpus proceedings, and shall be heard and determined as soon as practicable after the filing of the appeal in the said court, and appellate courts are hereby authorized and required to establish such reasonable special rules and regulations for the speedy trial and disposition of such appeals as may be necessary or advisable to secure the prompt hearing and disposition of such appeals.' The contention hinges upon the determination of the true sense in which the word 'appeals' was intended to be used by the...