State v. James, 03-2031.
Decision Date | 11 March 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 03-2031.,03-2031. |
Citation | 693 N.W.2d 353 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Kristen Joy JAMES, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia A. Reynolds, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, R. Steven Johnson, County Attorney, and Michael J. Jacobson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Kristen James was convicted of child endangerment in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6 (2003). We conclude the district court misinterpreted the "knowingly" element of the child endangerment statute, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for a new trial.
Jason and Kristen James lived in a second-floor apartment in Newton, Iowa, with their son, A.J., who was two years and nine months old. The following facts appear to be undisputed. On the day of this incident, Jason left for work at about 5:30 a.m. Both Kristen and A.J. were asleep, but Kristen soon awoke with a migraine headache. She got up and took a medication, and in the process, awakened A.J. Kristen intended to go back to sleep, but she was concerned that A.J., who had a penchant for opening doors, would leave his room and possibly go outside. Kristen tied his door almost shut with a telephone cord, leaving a gap of about two inches so he could call for her. Kristen went back to bed and, apparently because of the migraine medication, fell sound asleep.
Around noon Dawn Hoover, a neighbor, saw A.J. leaning out of his second-story window and attempted to persuade him to move away from it. She called Dianna Dougan, the apartment manager, for help. Dianna ran out of her office and yelled at her husband, Murry, the complex maintenance man, asking him to meet her at the James apartment. When Dianna arrived, she saw A.J. and joined Ms. Hoover in encouraging him to move away from the window. When Murry arrived, he went up the stairs to the James apartment. He rapped loudly on the door, but got no answer. He then used his maintenance key to open the door. Once inside, he saw the telephone cord tied to A.J.'s bedroom doorknob. He saw Kristen walk out of the apartment's other bedroom, looking like she just awoke from a deep sleep.
Murry told Kristen that A.J. was hanging out the window, so she should untie the cord. She attempted to untie it, but she was unsuccessful, apparently because she was too groggy. Murry rushed over, yanked the cord off the knob, and went into the bedroom to pull A.J. away from the window. Dianna called social services.
The following day, a child-protection worker and a deputy met with Kristen and her husband to conduct an interview. During the interview, they insisted that the window was shut and locked and remained that way when Kristen went back to bed early in the morning. They admitted they had seen A.J. push the screen out before, but they had never known him to open the window by himself. They assumed that he could not unlatch the lock on his window, an assumption that other witnesses confirmed. Still, the child-protection worker concluded that Kristen had subjected A.J. to a substantial risk of harm.
Kristen was charged with child endangerment under Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a), which provides:
A person who is the parent, guardian, or person having custody or control over a child ... commits child endangerment when the person ... [k]nowingly acts in a manner that creates a substantial risk to a child or minor's physical, mental or emotional health or safety.
A violation of the statute that does not result in serious injury to the child is an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 726.6(6).
The court rejected this instruction, saying it felt bound by the court of appeals decision in Dunham.1
Based on its reading of the Dunham case, the court instructed the jury that the State had to prove the following elements:
The trial court also provided this definition of knowledge:
For the defendant to know or have knowledge of something means she had a conscious awareness of her own actions.
The instructions as given did not require the jury to find the defendant had a conscious awareness that her actions created a substantial risk to the child's physical, mental, or emotional health or safety.
The jurors were confused as to the meaning of "knowingly" and sent a note to the judge asking the judge to "define knowingly." The court simply referred the jurors to the instructions as submitted to them.
The jurors were not alone in being confused about the application of the "knowingly" element of the crime. When "knowingly" appears at the beginning of a sentence, the question is whether it applies only to the first word — here "acts" — or to later words in the same sentence. One authority illustrated this inherent ambiguity by discussing a federal case interpreting a criminal statute that prohibited "knowingly" selling a security without a permit.
What, for instance, does "knowingly" modify in a sentence from a "blue sky" law criminal statute punishing one who "knowingly sells a security without a permit" from the securities commissioner? To be guilty must the seller of a security without a permit know only that what he is doing constitutes a sale, or must he also know that the thing he sells is a security, or must he also know that he has no permit to sell the security he sells? As a matter of grammar the statute is ambiguous; it is not at all clear how far down the sentence the word "knowingly" is intended to travel — whether it modifies "sells," or "sells a security," or "sells a security without a permit."
Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1(b), at 335 (2d ed. 2003). This authority concludes that "knowingly" in this sort of context refers to more than simply the defendant's acts. Id.
Gifford, 17 F.3d at 472; cf. United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 958 (1st Cir.1994)
(. )
The Gendron case provided this interesting illustration:
State v. Lambert, 280 Mont. 231, 929 P.2d 846 (1996), examined the context of a criminal-endangerment statute to discern the scope of the word "knowingly." In that case, the trial court had instructed the jury that "knowingly" referred only to the defendant's conduct — i.e., driving a car. Lambert, 929 P.2d at 848. The supreme court reversed, saying:
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