State v. Jamison

Decision Date25 January 1900
PartiesSTATE OF IOWA v. G. C. JAMISON and W. C. CRONE, Appellants
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Franklin District Court.--HON. J. R. WHITAKER, Judge.

INDICTMENT for using false weights. There was a trial to jury, and verdict of guilty. From a judgment rendered thereon defendants appeal.

Reversed.

Taylor & Evans for appellants.

Milton Remley, Attorney General, and Charles A. Van Vleck, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

WATERMAN J. GRANGER, C. J., not sitting.

OPINION

WATERMAN, J.

The defendant Jamison is a member of a firm located in the town of Dows, and which is engaged in the purchase and sale of live stock. He was also serving as cashier of a bank at that place, and employed the defendant Crone to buy and weigh the stock purchased. The firm owned stock scales upon which their weighing was done. The scales were in a small building without windows, and consequently quite dark within. On one occasion, when stock about to be purchased by Jamison's firm from one Iverson was weighed on these scales, it was discovered that an iron weight, called in the evidence a "bur," was secretly attached to the beam with a string, so as to falsify the weight as against the seller. This fact may be said to be undisputed. But it is urged the evidence does not warrant a conviction, because the scale house was not always kept locked, and the scales were used by others at times; that it is probable the bur may have been placed without defendant's knowledge; and, in any event, it is thought Jamison's knowledge of its use is not shown. In response we have to say that there is evidence of these scales having shown short weight on other occasions, and of similar burs being found in the scale pan before, and there is no conceivable motive for Crone, who was but an employe, using the false weight without his co-defendant's knowledge and assent. There is also testimony to show that Crone confessed the use of false weights to a co-employe. The credibility of all this evidence is questioned. But, aside from this, some confirmation of the criminal intent and knowledge of defendants is to be found in their own testimony as to the Iverson transaction. Iverson discovered the false weight, and at once made it known, and took his stock from the scales. Crone, who alone was present, doing the weighing, went immediately to the bank to see his co-defendant. When he saw him he simply said, according to his own testimony, that Iverson was dissatisfied with the weights, but said nothing of the finding of the bur attached to the scale beam. Jamison testifies that he was told of the finding of the bur and went out to see about it. He saw Crone and Iverson together, but did not go to the latter to speak of the matter. He never talked to any person about the false weight save to Crone and Smith, his co-partner, who is jointly indicted with him. This conduct is inconsistent with the claim of innocence. Only persons with guilty knowledge would probably have so acted. We do not regard it as necessary to go further into the details of the testimony to show the reasons for our conclusion that the verdict has sufficient support in the facts.

II. Evidence was introduced by the state tending to show that the weight was short on these scales at other times than in the instance with Iverson. This is complained of, but, as we think, without reason. The state was not confined to proof of any single transaction. The testimony disclosed that the scales did not show as great weight in certain cases as other correct scales did. Certainly, evidence that the scales were inaccurate at other times was admissible, as tending somewhat to show guilty knowledge at a time when a false weight was indisputably used. State v. Reno, 67 Iowa 587, 25 N.W. 818; State v. Stice, 88 Iowa 27, 55 N.W. 17. The question is not whether a bur was used only, but rather whether defendants were knowingly giving out false weights. The fact that the scales had long been inaccurate would have a tendency to show this. It was one element of the state's case to establish this inaccuracy. State v. Mecum, 95 Iowa 433, 64 N.W. 286; State v. Brady, 100 Iowa 191, 69 N.W. 290. The case of State v. Saunders, 68 Iowa 370, 27 N.W. 455, does not go the length claimed for it by defendants.

III. A motion to compel the state to elect on which transaction it would rely was overruled, and the correctness of the ruling is questioned. The majority of the court think the offense here charged is not a continuing one; that each act is a distinct offense, unless it is but one of a series of acts forming a part of a single transaction. Nor does the manner in which the offense is charged have the effect to change this principle. Not being a continuing offense, the defendants had a right to require an election on the part of the state, and the overruling of their motion was erroneous. See State v. Hurd, 101 Iowa 391 at...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT