State v. Jefferies
| Decision Date | 06 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. COA15–137.,COA15–137. |
| Citation | 776 S.E.2d 872,243 N.C.App. 455 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Nicholas Stanrick JEFFERIES, Defendant. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General, Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General, Matthew L. Liles, for the State.
Appellate Defender, Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender, Jillian C. Katz, for the Defendant.
Nicholas Stanrick Jefferies ("Defendant") appeals from a judgment entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of burning personal property and attaining the status of an habitual felon. We find no error in part, reverse in part, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The evidence at trial tended to show the following: On 5 April 2011, Defendant attended a cookout with the victim and two of her children. After consuming a considerable amount of alcohol, Defendant disciplined the victim's son in a manner the victim considered inappropriate. She confronted him about it, whereupon a heated argument broke out between them. As the victim took her children to leave the cookout, Defendant beat on the windows of the vehicle she was driving and yelled threats at her. The victim and her children spent the evening at her sister's home.
Later that evening, police responded to a call reporting a break-in at the victim's home. Upon arriving, the officers approached the house and knocked on the front door. Eventually, Defendant emerged from the house and shut the door behind himself.
As soon as Defendant exited the house, an officer noticed a strong smell of smoke coming from inside. The officer immediately dispatched the fire department. The officer then investigated to determine the origin of the smoke and whether there were other occupants. He found thick black smoke emanating from a back room, but no other occupants.
Firefighters arrived, discovering and extinguishing a fire in the rear bedroom. The fire had consumed the top of the bed and some other items of personal property.
Defendant was indicted for burning personal property and for attaining the status of an habitual felon. The matter came on for trial and the jury found Defendant guilty of both charges. The trial judge entered a judgment, sentencing Defendant to prison for 96 to 125 months. Defendant entered notice of appeal in open court.
Defendant makes five arguments on appeal, which we address in turn.
Defendant first argues that the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State's expert in fire investigation, Fire Marshal Raymond Beck, to testify that the fire had been intentionally set. Specifically, Defendant contends that Fire Marshal Beck's expert opinion was inadmissible because he merely deduced that the fire had been intentionally set rather than reaching this conclusion based on his expertise in the field of fire investigation. We disagree.
"Unpreserved error ... is reviewed only for plain error." State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 512, 723 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2012). "For error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred ... [that] had a probable impact on the jury's finding [.]" Id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (internal marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
In the present case, after being accepted as an expert in the field of fire investigation, Fire Marshal Beck testified that he had concluded that the fire was caused by "the application of an open flame to ... combustible material," and that the fire had been "ruled as incendiary." When asked to clarify what he meant by "incendiary," Fire Marshal Beck explained that he meant that the fire was not accidental in nature but rather had been intentionally set.
Generally, the admission of expert opinion testimony is only allowed where "the opinion expressed is ... based on the special expertise of the expert[.]" State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 569, 247 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1978). However, our Supreme Court has held that, with a proper foundation laid as to his expertise, a fire marshal may offer his expert opinion as to whether a fire was intentionally set. State v. Hales, 344 N.C. 419, 424–25, 474 S.E.2d 328, 330–31 (1996). Therefore, we hold that the trial court in the present case did not err, much less plainly err, in allowing this testimony. Accordingly, this argument is overruled.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding his presence at the scene of the crime. Specifically, Defendant contends that his presence was a material feature of the crime with which he was charged; that there was evidence that he was present at the scene of the crime; and that the trial court was required to instruct the jury regarding his presence at the scene of the crime. Notwithstanding Defendant's casting of this issue as an instructional error, we do not agree that the trial court erred in this regard.
"The prime purpose of a court's charge to the jury is the clarification of issues, the elimination of extraneous matters, and a declaration and an application of the law arising on the evidence." State v. Cameron, 284 N.C. 165, 171, 200 S.E.2d 186, 191 (1973). Where there is evidence of a lesser-included offense of a crime with which a defendant stands accused, the trial court must instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense. See, e.g., State v. Leazer, 353 N.C. 234, 237, 539 S.E.2d 922, 924 (2000). However, where no such lesser-included offense exists, neither does the requirement that the jury be given a corresponding instruction. Id. Furthermore, the mere denial of guilt by a defendant does not, by itself, controvert any material fact required for proof of that defendant's guilt, nor does it require the trial court to instruct the jury on any lesser-included offense. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 351 N.C. 251, 267–68, 524 S.E.2d 28, 40 (2000).
The crime of burning personal property is codified at N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–66, which defines the offense in relevant part as follows:
If any person shall wantonly and willfully set fire to or burn, or cause to be burned, or aid, counsel or procure the burning of ... personal property of any kind, ... with intent to injure or prejudice ... any [ ] person, ... he shall be punished as a Class H felon.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–66 (2011). Thus, the elements of burning personal property are (1) an intentional burning (2) of personal property of another (3) with the intent thereby to injure or to prejudice another's rights with respect to that property. See id.; State v. Jordan, 59 N.C.App. 527, 529, 296 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1982).
In the present case, the evidence of Defendant's presence at the scene of the crime was not required to prove a fact necessary to establish any element of the crime of burning personal property, nor was it evidence of any lesser-included offense thereof. Indeed, proof of the commission of this offense is possible where the defendant is never present at the scene of the intentional burning, but instead "cause[s]" "aid[s]," "counsel[s]," or "procure[s]" the burning from afar. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–66 (2011). Furthermore, rather than present any evidence of a lesser-included offense of burning personal property at trial, which, if believed by the jury, "would permit [ ] [it] rationally to find him guilty of [a] lesser offense and acquit him of the greater," see Leazer, 353 N.C. at 237, 539 S.E.2d at 924, Defendant simply denied all wrongdoing. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury regarding Defendant's presence at the scene of the crime.
We rejected a similar argument in State v. Chapman, 154 N.C.App. 441, 572 S.E.2d 243 (2002). In Chapman, we held that where there was no evidence of aiding and abetting or acting in concert—modes of criminal liability where the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime does bear on the defendant's participation in the commission of the offense—the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on mere presence, even though such an instruction was requested. Id. at 446, 572 S.E.2d at 247. In that case, there was no material evidence—i.e., evidence probative of any fact necessary to prove an element of a crime with which the defendant was charged, or any lesser-included offense thereof—to support the requested instruction. Id. Therefore, as in Chapman, it would not have been error for the trial judge to refuse to give the instruction, had it been requested, because there was no material evidence to support it. See id. Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, it would have been error, it would not have been plain error, as it is not probable that the jury's ultimate finding of guilt would have differed if the trial court had given an unrequested instruction unsupported by the evidence. See Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334. Accordingly, this argument is overruled.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to intervene and strike certain portions of the State's closing argument. Specifically, Defendant contends that the court erred in failing to strike comments by the prosecutor relating to the credibility of certain witness testimony. Although some of these statements may have been objectionable, we do not believe they so contaminated the proceedings as to require a new trial.
Generally, "[t]he control of the argument of the district attorney and counsel must be left largely to the discretion of the trial judge and his rulings thereon will not be disturbed in the absence of gross abuse of discretion." State v. Hunter, 297 N.C. 272, 278, 254 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1979). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1230(a) states that a prosecutor may not express his "personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence [.]" N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1230(a) (2014). He may, however, comment on the strength of the evidence. State v. Best, 342 N.C....
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