State v. Jefferson

• Decision Date: 12 July 1965
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 50843,50843,2
• Citation: 391 S.W.2d 885
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Paul Earvin JEFFERSON, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 885

391 S.W.2d 885

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Paul Earvin JEFFERSON, Appellant.

No. 50843.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

July 12, 1965.

Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, John H. Denman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

James V. Gallen, St. Louis, for appellant.

STORCKMAN, Judge.

The defendant Paul Earvin Jefferson was charged, tried, and convicted of the illegal possession of amphetamine, a stimulant drug. Section 195.270, RSMo 1963, Cum.Supp., V.A.M.S. The court also found that he had been previously convicted on four occasions as charged pursuant to the Habitual Criminal Act. Section 556.280, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. The defendant's motion for new trial was overruled and he was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment.

The defendant was represented at the trial by able court-appointed counsel and drug. Section 195.270, RSMo 1963, Cum.Supp., Defendant's brief presents three points: (1) that the court erred in refusing to sustain the defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence alleged to have been illegally seized in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights; (2) that the state failed to prove that the defendant had possession of the drug within the meaning of the law; and (3) that the state failed to prove that the defendant had in his possession a drug which had an exciting effect on the central nervous system of a human or an animal as alleged in the information.

On December 29, 1963, at about 10 p.m., four police officers went to a house located at 4144 Fairfax in the City of St. Louis accompanied by Cleveland Owens who had been arrested on a charge of stealing three items valued at less than $50. In the course of questionining, Cleveland Owens had told the police that he had sold one of the stolen articles to a Russell Yates at the Fairfax address for a $5 package of amphetamine. In response to a knock by Owens, the defendant came to the door and upon seeing the police officers retreated into the house followed by the officers. The defendant was arrested along with Russell Yates and two other persons. The police seized a syringe and hypodermic needle seen in the right hand of the defendant and a rag or piece of cloth tied around the upper part of defendant's left arm. The defendant's motion to suppress these articles and exclude them from evidence was overruled. The fluid in the syringe was analyzed by a chemist employed by the Metropolitan Police Department and was found to contain amphetamine.

The defendant's first assignment is that the court erred in refusing to sustain his motion to suppress the syringe, needle, and armband ad evidence because the articles were obtained by an 'unlawful arrest, search and seizure in that no reasonable and probable cause existed for such arrest, search and seizure and no search warrant had issued' contrary to Secs. 15 and 19 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of Missouri 1945, V.A.M.S., and the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

The legality of the seizure of the articles sought to be suppressed depends largely on the testimony of Detective Richard A. Miller. When Officer Miller and the others reached 4144 Fairfax, Patrolman Robert Beeks was detailed to guard the front door and the others went to a door on the east side next to which was a porch about ten by twelve feet. Cleveland Owens was directed to a position in front of the door and Officer Miller stood to his right. Detective James A. Whealan was behind them standing on the porch steps and Sergeant Gay Carraway was behind Whealan.

Cleveland Owens knocked on the door and one of three small apertures or windows in the door was opened by the defendant. The door was then opened. The door led into a small hallway or area from which there was a door leading south into a middle room of the house. Detective Miller testified that when the defendant opened the outside door, he was wearing a vest and his left shirt sleeve was rolled up and a rag or armband was tied around the muscle of his upper left arm. In his right hand the defendant held a syringe with a hypodermic needle attached. When the defendant saw that Owens was accompanied by others, he attempted to close the outside door. Detective Miller tried to identify those present as police officers, but all he was able to call out was 'Police' before he had to push against the outside door to prevent its being closed. The defendant went through another door into the middle room and attempted to slam that door behind him, but Detective Miller followed him closely and also prevented the inner door from being closed. In the middle room Detective Miller struggled with the defendant who put his hands behind him and Officer Miller saw the defendant drop the syringe and hypodermic needle to the floor. After Detective Miller subdued and handcuffed the defendant, he took possession of the syringe, hypodermic needle and armband which were introduced into evidence.

The other police officers followed Officer Miller into the house and corroborated the testimony of Detective Miller except they were not in a position to see the syringe, nypodermic needle and armband while they were in the defendant's possession. The defendant questions whether there was sufficient light at the outside door where the defendant was standing for Officer Miller to see the rag on the defendant's arm and the syringe and hypodermic needle in his hand. Officer Miller testified that when the defendant opened the door the light from the inside and from the streetlights outside were sufficient to enable him to see the defendant clearly. It is a reasonable inference from all the evidence that the outside lighting was sufficient for the defendant to recognize Cleveland Owens standing directly in front of the door when he looked through the peephole in the door and sufficient to see the accompanying officers when he opened the door, and that this unexpected sight caused him to hurry back into the middle room and attempt to close the doors behind him. The positive evidence of Officer Miller and other reasonable inferences constitute substantial evidence that the defendant did appear at the door with the band on his left arm and the syringe and hypodermic needle in his right hand and was seen by Officer Miller in this condition. The essential question for determination is whether the arrest of the defendant was lawful in these particular circumstances.

An arrest by a police officer of the City of St. Louis without a warrant is authorized by law when the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an offense against the law has been committed by the person arrested. Section 84.090, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.; State v. Edmonson, Mo., 371 S.W.2d 273, 276; State v. Vollmar, Mo., 389 S.W.2d 20, 24; City of St. Louis v. Washington, Mo.App., 223 S.W.2d 858, 862. It is further well settled that when a person has been lawfully arrested, a search without a warrant may be made of the person and of the premises where he was arrested. State v. Vollmar, Mo., 389 S.W.2d 20, 25; State v. Berstein, Mo., 372 S.W.2d 57, 59.

Where the articles sought to be suppressed were in plain sight of the arresting officer, were dropped or thrown away by the person arrested, and were picked up by the officers, the articles are admissible in evidence over an objection that they were seized as the result of an unlawful search. State v. Owens, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 248 (No. 50,686, decided June 14, 1965); State v. Humphrey, 358 Mo. 904, 217 S.W.2d 551, 553; State v. Harris, Mo.App., 325 S.W.2d 352, 356. See also State v. Engberg, Mo., 377 S.W.2d 282, 285[5, 6]. As previously stated, the essential question is whether the arrest was lawful. In this connection, both sides have referred us to numerous federal decisions bearing on the question. We have examined all of them but find it unnecessary to review them in the opinion since the Missouri and federal constitutional standards are not inconsistent. State v. Owens, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 248 (No. 50,686, decided June 14, 1965).

What constitutes reasonable grounds to believe that an offense has been committed by the person arrested is incapable of an exact definition beyond saying that the officer must not act arbitrarily, must exercise his discretion in a legal manner, must use all reasonable means to prevent mistakes and must be actuated by such motives as would influence a reasonable man acting in...