State v. Jeffreys

• Decision Date: 12 August 2003
• Docket Number: (AC 21542)
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL JEFFREYS

78 Conn. App. 659

828 A.2d 659

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL JEFFREYS

(AC 21542)

Appellate Court of Connecticut

Argued March 25, 2003.

Officially released August 12, 2003

Dranginis, Flynn and West, Js. Kent Drager, senior assistant public defender, with whom were Jessica Grossarth and Elisa Heffernan, certified legal interns, for the appellant (defendant).

Judith Rossi, executive assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, and Joseph J. Harry, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

WEST, J.

The defendant, Michael Jeffreys, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a), possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (a) and possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public housing project in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278a (b). The defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence, (2) the court improperly denied his motion for a speedy trial and his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, (3) there was insufficient evidence that he possessed narcotics with the intent to sell, (4) there was insufficient evidence that he was within 1500 feet of a public housing project, and (5) his rights against double jeopardy were violated when he was convicted and sentenced separately for possession of narcotics and possession of narcotics with intent to sell.¹ We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.

The jury could have found the following facts. On the morning of August 19, 1999, a tactical narcotics team of the Bridgeport police department was conducting a drug surveillance operation in the vicinity of Trumbull Gardens, a public housing project.² Two members of that tactical team, Officers Gregory Iamartino and Luis Batista, were conducting surveillance from the upper floor of a building in the area. The officers were equipped with binoculars and police radios, and they maintained radio contact with other officers constituting arrest teams. Those arrest teams were positioned outside the housing project and were poised to move into the project to effectuate the arrest of suspected drug dealers at the direction of the surveillance team.

Iamartino observed the defendant loitering within the apartment complex, near what appeared to be an abandoned building, and counting money. While the defendant was so engaged, a car entered the lot next to building, and the defendant approached the car and talked briefly with the driver. The defendant and the driver then walked to a relatively secluded area between two buildings where the driver handed the defendant some money. In exchange, the defendant gave the driver some small items that he retrieved from his pocket. The driver then returned to her car and departed while the defendant resumed his previous station and returned to counting his money.

A short while later, a second female approached the defendant and pointed out the presence of two nearby police cars. At the sight of an officer, the defendant began to leave the scene. At that point, Iamartino radioed his arrest team, which moved in and arrested the defendant. The arrest team searched the defendant's person and discovered $55 in cash and two small plastic bags containing a white powder that subsequently tested positive for cocaine.

I

We first consider the defendant's claim that the court improperly failed to suppress evidence. The defendant argues that the evidence seized from him at the time of his arrest should have been suppressed because that arrest was made without probable cause. "Whether the trial court properly found that the facts submitted were enough to support a finding of probable cause is a question of law. . . . The trial court's determination on the issue, therefore, is subject to plenary review on appeal." (Citation omitted.) State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 279, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001).

"We note at the outset that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions. . . . It is the state's burden at trial to establish the exception. . . . If evidence obtained without a warrant was obtained as a result of a valid search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, such evidence was not illegally obtained and is admissible." (Citations omitted.) State v. Lizotte, 11 Conn. App. 11, 17, 525 A.2d 971, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 806, 528 A.2d 1154 (1987). The issue before us, then, is whether the search of the defendant was incident to a lawful, warrantless arrest.

A police officer is authorized to arrest, without a warrant, "any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony." General Statutes § 54-1f (b); State v. Dennis, 189 Conn. 429, 431, 456 A.2d 333 (1983). The term "reasonable grounds" as used in the statute is synonymous with probable cause. State v. Dennis, supra, 431.

"[T]o establish probable cause, it is not necessary to produce a quantum of evidence necessary to convict.. . . Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a felony has been committed." (Citations omitted.) State v. Cobuzzi, 161 Conn. 371, 376, 288 A.2d 439 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017, 92 S. Ct. 677, 30 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1972). "In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949). "Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard. It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, [742] 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)." Three S. Development Co. v. Santore, 193 Conn. 174, 175, 474 A.2d 795 (1984).

In reviewing whether the court properly concluded that the search and seizure was valid under the exception to the warrant requirement for a search incident to a lawful arrest, it is first necessary to evaluate the validity of the arrest. General Statutes § 54-1f (b) authorizes a police officer to make a warrantless arrest based on probable cause.³ Under the federal and Connecticut constitutions, the court uses a totality of the circumstances test in determining whether probable cause existed. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); State v. Velasco, 248 Conn. 183, 191-92, 728 A.2d 493 (1999).

"In reviewing a trial court's determination that probable cause to arrest existed, we consider whether [it is] legally and logically correct and whether [it] find[s] support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . . Because a trial court's determination of the existence of probable cause implicates a constitutional claim, we must review the record carefully to ensure that its determination [is] supported by substantial evidence." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, supra, 255 Conn. 293-94. "In evaluating probable cause for a warrantless search, the court may consider all of the legally obtained facts available to a police officer, and all of the reasonable inferences that might be drawn therefrom in light of the officer's training and experience." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Austin, 74 Conn. App. 802, 807-808, 813 A.2d 1060, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 910, 821 A.2d 766 (2003).

At the probable cause hearing, Iamartino testified that on the morning of August 19, 1999, he was working as a surveillance officer assigned to Trumbull Gardens. Iamartino testified that once an area has been targeted for narcotics surveillance, the surveillance officer's job is to find a location where he can view individuals involved in illegal activities, identify them and call in the identification to the arrest team, which would then apprehend the suspect. Iamartino further testified that while conducting surveillance at the housing complex, he observed the defendant counting cash while standing in front of an abandoned building. While the defendant was counting the money, a Mazda automobile entered the parking lot of the building and parked. The defendant ran to the car and spoke to the driver. The driver exited the vehicle, and the two individuals walked to an area between two buildings where the driver handed the defendant some cash. The defendant then removed some small items from his pocket and handed them to the female driver. Iamartino was unable to make out the color or any distinguishing characteristics of those items, other than that they were small. On the basis of his past experience as a narcotics officer and having been involved in previous surveillances, however, Iamartino believed that the small items that the defendant handed to the female were narcotics.

Once the female began to return to her car, Iamartino radioed the arrest team and provided a description of the female, her car and the direction in which she was traveling.⁴ Thereafter, the defendant resumed his position in front of the abandoned building and returned to counting his cash. Shortly after the defendant returned to his station in front of the building, an unidentified female approached him, spoke with him briefly and pointed to where a marked Bridgeport police cruiser and an unmarked police vehicle were parked on the street. Neither of those vehicles was part of Iamartino's surveillance operation. When he saw the police vehicles, the...