State v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 22 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 20849.,20849.
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Robert JENKINS.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

807 A.2d 485

73 Conn.App. 150

STATE of Connecticut v. Robert JENKINS.

No. 20849.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 12, 2002.

Decided October 22, 2002.

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SCHALLER, MIHALAKOS and DUPONT, Js.

Adele V. Patterson, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Rosita M. Creamer, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

DUPONT, J.

The defendant, Robert Jenkins, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a)(1)¹ and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21.² The defendant did not deny that he had inflicted the injuries that caused the child's death. The principal contested issue at trial was the intent of the defendant when he struck the child. On appeal, the defendant seeks a new trial, claiming that the trial court improperly (1) allowed the state access to and use of his privileged mental health records and (2) denied him a fair trial by giving the jury an instruction to disregard any evidence of the defendant's alleged intoxication if it did not negate the element of intent.³

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant lived with his girlfriend, Lisa Pettiford, and her three children, including the victim, in an apartment in Hartford. The victim was the youngest of the three children and was twenty-three months old at the time of his death. On February 9, 1996, the defendant arrived home in the morning after consuming heroin, cocaine and marijuana the previous evening and earlier that morning. The defendant continued to consume narcotics and fell asleep on the couch. At some point in the late morning, Pettiford placed the victim in the defendant's care and went to a bake sale at the community center near the apartment complex.

Shortly before 2 p.m., the defendant came running into the community center screaming for help with the victim in his arms. Blood was observed coming from the victim's nose and mouth, and the defendant's shirt was full of blood. The defendant told Pettiford that the victim had fallen down the stairs. The director of the community center called for emergency assistance, and police, paramedics and fire personnel responded to the scene. The paramedics observed that the victim was not breathing, had no blood pressure, but appeared to have a pulse, and they observed that there "was quite a bit of trauma to the [victim's] head and face." The defendant told the emergency personnel that the victim had suffered the injuries when he fell down stairs.

The victim was transferred to Hartford Hospital and was in full cardiac arrest when he arrived at approximately 2:20 p.m. Medical personnel were successful in resuscitating his heartbeat at the hospital, but the victim exhibited no brain function. On February 10, 1996, at approximately 6 p.m., the victim was declared to be brain dead.

On February 12, 1996, Detective James Rovella of the Hartford police department advised the defendant that he was going to be arrested on charges of murder and tampering with evidence. The defendant agreed to talk to Rovella concerning the incident and waived his Miranda⁴ rights. In a written statement the defendant gave to the police, he admitted that he had hit the victim.

The defendant's written statement included the following. The defendant had consumed two bags of heroin in the morning and was sleepy. He was sitting on the couch and expected the victim to fall asleep. On two occasions, the defendant fell asleep and woke up startled because the victim was not around. On both occasions, the defendant found the victim and "popped [the victim] on his hand." On the second occasion, the defendant also "popped [the victim] in the head twice with the belt.⁵ [The victim] cried a lot more this time. I grabbed him by his hand and walked him back to the living room. When we got back to the living room I hit him twice in the head with the remote control for the [television] and told him he better sit down and stay down. [The victim] was crying. I laid back on the couch. I faked like I was going to sleep to see if he was going to move again. I closed my eyes just so I could see a little. [The victim] got up like he was going to get something. I got up and grabbed him and punched him [in] the chest and told him he better sit down. After I punched him in the chest it seemed like all the air went out of him because he made this noise. [The victim] fell backwards and he hit his head on the shelving unit where the [television] is. [The victim] just laid there and he wasn't crying or doing anything." The defendant then described how he took the victim to the bathroom and tried to revive him. He then grabbed their coats and went to the community center where the victim's mother was located.

The victim's treating physician, Betty Spivack, testified that the injuries "were typical of multiple blows to the head coming from different directions striking different parts of the head. That is not typical of accidental injury such as a fall down stairs. This is, however, very typical of assaultive injuries."

On February 11, 1996, the chief medical examiner for the state of Connecticut, Harold Wayne Carver, conducted an autopsy on the victim's body. Carver concluded that the victim "died as a result of blunt traumatic head injury" and classified "the manner of death as homicide."

During the trial, the state introduced the defendant's written statement into evidence during its case-in-chief. Part of that statement read: "I have a heroin problem. Usually I would get a stack of bundles of heroin fronted to me. I would sell 55 bags for $500.00 and then pay back the guy who fronted me. That would leave me with 45 bags profit. I would spend the money I made for the 45 bags on myself and the stuff for the house. Lisa [Pettiford] knew about my habit. I sniffed 2 to 3 bundles of heroin a day but I know what I was doing when I sniffed the heroin. A bundle is ten bags. Sometimes I would fall asleep but I knew what was going on."

When the state rested its case-in-chief, the defendant informed the court that he would be requesting an instruction on intoxication on the basis of his illegal drug use. Subsequently, the state's attorney advised the court that she had subpoenaed some department of correction records, which the state claimed were relevant to determine whether the defendant suffered from withdrawal symptoms. The absence of withdrawal symptoms would presumably rebut the defense that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the injuries to the child. The state also cited as a reason for requesting the records that the defendant's attorney had indicated that the defendant would be testifying and that, therefore, the issue of drug use was relevant.

Later that day, the court asked the defendant if it could view the records in camera to address the state's concerns and stated that "anything I read will be in confidence." The defendant gave the court permission to review the records, including the mental health records, in camera to determine "what the state may receive."

The defendant was scheduled to take the witness stand to testify on the next court date. Before the defendant took the witness stand, the court noted that it had reviewed the prison records in camera and stated: "The court has examined them and finds at this point, with the exception of a reference to one or two matters that are probably privileged, finds nothing that would preclude the state from examining the records. Now, having said that, however, the court is going to request of the prosecutor that if the medical records are to be used, portions of them, in cross-examination, that we have a recess between the direct examination and the cross-examination so that the court can hear in limine which matters the prosecution wants to address." The state's attorney then asked that the portions of the file that are privileged be redacted. The court reiterated its ruling that the state review with the court those portions it would like to use on cross-examination before the state would be allowed to proceed. The court did not order any portion of the record to be redacted and did not specify what "one or two matters" were "probably privileged." Immediately thereafter, the state and the defendant were both provided a full copy of the records.

That same day, the defendant testified that he had used heroin, cocaine and marijuana in the months before the victim's death. He further testified that he had used approximately twenty to thirty bags of heroin a day on average, which was consistent with his written statement. The defendant testified that on the night of February 8, 1996, he had used approximately fifteen bags of heroin along with cocaine and marijuana, and that on the morning of February 9, 1996, he had used an additional three bags of heroin.

After reviewing the department of correction records that had been disclosed and given to the parties that morning, the defendant sought to seal the records concerning his mental health. The defendant asserted that approximately fifteen of the pages were privileged mental health records "for the purpose of counseling and treatment," and objected to the use of any portion of the fifteen pages, which were marked as "exhibit M" for identification. The exhibit is the defendant's entire mental health record received from the department of correction.

The cover sheet of exhibit M is labeled "Mental Health Initial Assessment" and is dated July 30, 1996. It contains basic statistics about the defendant, a summary of the defendant's mental health history, psychoactive medication history, marital status and other biographical information. The fifteenth sheet...