State v. Jenkins
Decision Date | 21 July 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 21764,21764 |
Citation | 278 S.C. 219,294 S.E.2d 44 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Amy JENKINS, Appellant. |
Appellate Defender John L. Sweeny of S. C. Com'n of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Brian P. Gibbes, and Asst. Attys. Gen. Lindy P. Funkhouser and Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Columbia, and Sol. Randolph Murdaugh, Jr., of Hampton, for respondent.
Appellant was convicted of unlawful neglect of a child in violation of S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-1030 (1976), repealed by 1981 Act No. 71, Section 3, 1 and sentenced to eighteen (18) months. We affirm.
At midnight on June 12, 1980, appellant left two of her children, ages eight and five, sleeping alone in her house while she went for a ride with a friend. When she returned home approximately one hour later, the house was burning. Both children died in the fire.
Section 16-3-1030 provides:
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless person, who shall, without lawful excuse, refuse or neglect to provide the proper care and attention for such child or helpless person, so that the life, health or comfort of such child or helpless person is endangered or is likely to be endangered, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished within the discretion of the court.
Appellant argues the trial judge erred in charging the jury that the requisite standard of proof under the statute is simple negligence, rather than criminal negligence. Criminal negligence is defined in § 16-3-60 of the Code as "the reckless disregard of the safety of others." Appellant contends this is the standard of proof for conviction under § 16-3-1030 of the Code. We disagree.
State v. American Agr. Chemical Co., 118 S.C. 333, 110 S.E. 800, 802 (1922).
Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 195 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1973) [quoting State v. Manos, 179 S.C. 45, 183 S.E. 582 (1936) ].
"... Whether knowledge and intent are necessary elements of a statutory crime must be determined from the language of the statute, construed in the light of its purpose and design." Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 195 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1973). Obviously, § 16-3-1030 was enacted to provide protection for those persons whose tender years or helplessness renders them incapable of self-protection. By failing to include "knowingly" or other apt words to indicate criminal intent or motive, we think the legislature intended that one who simply, without knowledge or intent that his act is criminal, fails to provide proper care...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
MFRS. AND MERCHANTS MUT. INS. v. Harvey
...South Carolina Supreme Court has held that violation of this section is proven without proof of knowledge or intent. State v. Jenkins, 278 S.C. 219, 294 S.E.2d 44 (1982). Because intent is not an element of the crime to which Joyce Harvey plead guilty, the trial court erred in holding that ......
-
Ibarra v. Holder
...Neb. 939, 573 N.W.2d 453 (1998); South Carolina:S.C.Code Ann. § 20–7–50 (Westlaw through 1996 legislation), State v. Jenkins, 278 S.C. 219, 294 S.E.2d 44, 45–46 (1982). One state criminalized no-injury endangerment or neglect of children (if committed by parents or those with a duty of care......
-
Ibarra v. Holder
...Neb. 939, 573 N.W.2d 453 (1998); South Carolina:S.C.Code Ann. § 20–7–50 (Westlaw through 1996 legislation), State v. Jenkins, 278 S.C. 219, 294 S.E.2d 44, 45–46 (1982). One state criminalized no-injury endangerment or neglect of children (if committed by parents or those with a duty of care......
-
Whitner v. State
...committing sexual offenses against the child, and depriving her of adequate food, clothing, shelter or education.3 State v. Jenkins, 278 S.C. 219, 294 S.E.2d 44 (1982) (construing § 16-3-1030, recodified as § 20-7-50).1 A woman may have a legal abortion of a viable fetus if necessary to pre......