Guinyard v. State, 19585

• Decision Date: 14 March 1973
• Docket Number: No. 19585,19585
• Citation: 195 S.E.2d 392,260 S.C. 220
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Robert Clyde GUINYARD, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina et al., Respondents.

Page 392

195 S.E.2d 392

260 S.C. 220

Robert Clyde GUINYARD, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina et al., Respondents.

No. 19585.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 14, 1973.

Jasper M. Cureton, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. Emmet H. Clair and Robert M. Ariail, Columbia, for respondents.

LEWIS, Justice:

This is an appeal from an order of the lower court denying appellant's petition for relief from a guilty plea entered to a violation of Section 32--1030 of the 1962 Code of Laws.

Appellant was indicted at the April 1971 term of the General Sessions Court for Richland County for rape and the violation of Code Section 32--1030. This statute makes it unlawful for any person to have sexual intercourse with a patient or trainee of any State mental health facility, and is as follows:

'Any person having sexual intercourse with a patient or trainee of any State mental health facility, whether the patient or trainee is within the facility or unlawfully away from the facility, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by hard labor on the county chain gang or in the State Penitentiary for a period not exceeding twenty years, within the discretion of the court.'

Appellant, represented by retained counsel, entered a plea of guilty to the violation of Section 32--1030 and received a sentence of three (3) years. He thereafter, on October 13, 1971 filed, pro se, a petition for relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act (Section 17--601 et seq., Supplement to 1962 Code), alleging that he was being illegally confined because, at the time he committed the act, he had no knowledge that the lady molested was a patient of the State Hospital and that his sentence was illegal because influenced by prejudice against black people.

On April 19, 1972, the respondent, State of South Carolina, filed a return and a motion to summarily dismiss appellant's petition, since under the trial record no useful purpose could be served by a hearing. This was followed by a reply by appellant to the return and motion of respondent, in which appellant interpreted his petition for relief as asserting that Section 32--1030, under which his plea was entered, was unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Thereafter, the lower court dismissed appellant's petition, holding that his plea of guilty was knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he had, by entering such plea, waived his right to assert the present grounds for relief. At the request of appellant, counsel was appointed to represent him and this appeal followed.

Appellant presents two questions for decision in this appeal: (1) whether his application for relief should have been granted because of the failure of the State to timely respond thereto; and (2) whether the statute under which his plea of guilty was entered is unconstitutional.

At the outset, appellant contends that his application for relief should have been granted by the lower court because of the failure of the State to respond thereto within thirty days after the application was docketed, as provided in Code Section 17--606. The record shows that the application of appellant was filed on October 13, 1971 and response by the State was not filed until April 19, 1972.

Section 17--606 provides that '(a) Within thirty days after the docketing of the application, or within any further time the court may fix, the State shall respond by answer or by motion which may be supported by affidavits.' In addition, this section specifically grants to the trial court authority to extend the time for the filing of any pleading. Compliance with the thirty day time limit prescribed by the statute is, therefore, not mandatory, as contended by appellant, but discretionary with the trial court.

In any event, the question now raised cannot be considered, since the record fails to disclose that objection was made in the lower court to the failure of the State to file its response within the statutory time limit. Such objection cannot be made for the first time on appeal.

The remaining issue for determination concerns the constitutionality of the statute under which appellant was indicted. He contends that Section 32--1030 is so vague, indefinite and ambiguous as to afford insufficient notice of the charge to be met by an accused and, therefore, deprives him of the constitutional guaranty of due process.

The test for determining whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague was set forth in State v. Albert, 257 S.C. 131, 184 S.E.2d 605:

'The concept of vagueness or indefiniteness rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication. The primary issues involved are whether the provisions of a penal statute are sufficiently definite to give reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct to those who wish to avoid its penalties and to apprise judge and jury of standards for the determination of guilt. If the statute is so obscure that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applicability, it is unconstitutional.'

The statute is neither vague nor ambiguous. It clearly defines the offense in language which gives notice of the prohibited conduct. The prohibited conduct consists of 'having sexual intercourse with a patient or trainee of any State mental health facility.' The language is plain and unambiguous, and men of common intelligence would have no difficulty in determining its meaning. All that a person need do to avoid the penalties of the statute is simply to refrain from sexual intercourse with a patient of a State mental...