State v. Jensen
Decision Date | 27 March 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 56464,56464 |
Citation | 216 N.W.2d 369 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Nick Hans JENSEN, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Clark D. Mantz, Audubon, and C. M. Manly, Grinnell, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., David Dryer, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert D. Nelson, County Atty., for appellee.
Heard before MOORE, C.J., and RAWLINGS, REES, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ.
Defendant appeals his conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage in violation of section 321.281, The Code. We reverse and remand.
Taking, as we must, the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, defendant was driving a pickup truck on an Audubon street when it struck a parked car. Various witnesses who observed defendant at the scene and immediatrely after the accident offered testimony sufficient to raise a jury question on the State's claim defendant was intoxicated. Defendant's nine assignments center around four complaints. He challenges evidence of blood and breath test, instructions, the denial of his request for a standing objection, and a claimed failure to identify him at trial.
I. We do not believe the record sufficient to show defendant was first offered a blood test. An arresting officer merely stated: 'I asked him if he would rather have a blood test or a breath test, and he indicated he would not want the blood test.'
The procedure required under section 321B.3, The Code (implied consent law) has become carefully defined. The standards for the procedure are as follows: (1) There must be a Written request by the officer to the arrested driver for permission to take a blood test. (2) If the request for a blood test is refused the officer must then make a written request for a breath or urine test. (3) There must be a showing the officer is properly qualified under the statute to administer the test. (4) There must be proof the test was given by the use of devices and methods approved by the commissioner of public safety as provided by section 321B.4, The Code. Rodriguez v. Fulton, 190 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1971); State v. Hraha, 193 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1972); State v. Williams, 201 N.W.2d 710 (Iowa 1972); State v. Rowland, 202 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1972).
Where the results of a breath test are offered it is mandatory to show the driver's prior refusal to take the blood test. State v. Tiernan, 206 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1973). Evidence of a refusal to submit to a test is inadmissible where the results would be inadmissible. State v. Hall, 203 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1973). Where the proper procedure is followed, the test results are admissible in either a civil or criminal action. Section 321B.10, The Code. Where the proper procedure is followed, a refusal to submit to the test is likewise admissible. Section 321B.11, The Code.
II. The first question presented in this appeal extends somewhat beyond these established rules. In this case the evidence of defendant's remarks about a blood test and evidence of taking the breath test were admitted. This was at a point in the trial when the State claims it was attempting to lay the foundation for offering the results of the breath test. However the results of the breath test were not thereafter offered or received.
It is difficult, in view of the rules outlined in Division I, to imagine how the State could ever have hoped to place the results of the breath test in evidence. There had been an obvious and wholesale failure to comply with the standards we have reviewed in Division I. A blood test was not first offered in writing. Any evidence indicating the defendant refused to submit to a blood test undoubtedly damaged him at trial. Yet it was clearly not a refusal sufficient to allow the officer's demand for either a breath or urine test. And we gather from the record the officer conducting the test was not qualified to do so under the statute.
It is of controlling importance defendant filed a pretrial motion in limine seeking to exclude all evidence relating to the breath test. That motion asserted the State failed to comply with the procedures required under the implied consent law. Attached to the motion as an exhibit was the uncompleted from used by the officer when the test was taken. It indicated no blood test had been offered or refused. The court overruled the motion. At trial defendant preserved his position with regard to the inadmissibility of the evidence by timely objections while the testimony was offered. The same position was maintained in defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of evidence.
We have discussed motions in limine many times. Lewis v. Buena Vista Mutual Insurance Association, 183 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1971); State v. Johnson, 183 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa 1971); State v. Garrett, 183 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 1971); State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1972). See also Sullins, Preservation of Error; Providing a Basis for Appellate Review, 22 Drake L.Rev. 435, 445. An explanation we have previously quoted appears in State v. Johnson, supra:
These authorities aptly describe an overruled motion in limine as a 'red flag.' Under the circumstances the State cannot claim to have routinely tried and failed to place the results of the breath test in evidence. With the red flag waving the trial court should have prohibited disclosure, not only of the results of the breath test, but also the fact one had been taken. Defendant was entitled under the circumstances to some showing, out of the jury's presence, the State could meet the obvious objections defendant had made and preserved. The trial court was alerted to the fatal weakness in the evidence by the motion in limine. Defendant preserved his position by timely objections at trial and should have been spared the prejudice attending disclosure of the test to the jury. Neither should defendant have been required to object to the test in the presence of the jury. See Lessenhop v. Norton, 261 Iowa 44, 153 N.W.2d 107. The failure of the trial court in this regard constitutes reversible error.
III. The State argues the evidence of defendant's awkwardness in attempting to take the breath test tended to show his intoxicated condition. It is claimed the evidence is independently admissible on the same theory observations of so-called balance tests are admitted. The suggestion is the independent value of the evidence should not be lost because it was in connection with a test which would otherwise be inadmissible.
The general rules governing multiple admissibility of evidence are not disputed. See 1 Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., section 13, pages 299--303. The same rules were also defined in McCormick on Evidence, Section Ed., section 59, pages 135--136 as follows:
(Emphasis added)
Here the judge's power to exclude became an obligation to exclude. Noting again the motion in limine and the timely objections by defendant we reject the argument defendant's awkwardness in attempting to take the breath test was admissible for another purpose. The argument overlooks the fundamental principle upon which the implied consent law is grounded. An accused waives basic rights in his implied contract to submit to a test for the privilege of using the highways. See generally 7 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles & Highway, Traffic, section 333, pages 876--878. We have long held the implied consent law constitutional. State v. Johnson, 257 Iowa 1052, 135 N.W.2d 518. But we have consistently held the statute must be explicitly followed and evidence flowing from its application can be received only as expressly...
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...contract whereby an individual waives his right to be free from unreasonable searches in exchange for a privilege. See State v. Jensen, 216 N.W.2d 369, 373 (Iowa 1974). Though this alone constitutes a sufficient basis for rejecting this argument, we reject it on additional grounds as well.F......
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...certain exceptions, a defendant may defer objections until the filing of a post-verdict new trial motion. See generally State v. Jensen, 216 N.W.2d 369, 375 (Iowa 1974); State v. Shockey, 214 N.W.2d 146, 151 (Iowa 1974); State v. Buchanan, 207 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Iowa 1973); State v. Hraha, 19......
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