State v. Jinkerson, ED 106583

• Decision Date: 21 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. ED 106583,ED 106583
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Paul E. JINKERSON, Defendant/Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

554 S.W.3d 559

STATE of Missouri, Appellant,

v.Paul E. JINKERSON, Defendant/Respondent.

No. ED 106583

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION TWO.

FILED: August 21, 2018

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Patrick L. King, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 3^rd Floor, One North Washington, Farmington, MO 63640.

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: Eric Barnhart, 7755 Carondelet Ave., Suite 202, Clayton, MO 63105.

Before Philip M. Hess, P.J., Robert G. Dowd, Jr., J., and Mary K. Hoff, J.

OPINION

PER CURIAM

The State of Missouri ("State") filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Section 547.200 RSMo 2000¹ challenging the trial court’s Order granting Paul E. Jinkerson’s ("Defendant") motion to suppress statements ("Motion"). We reverse and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 13, 2017, Defendant was charged by complaint with first degree murder in violation of Section 565.020, armed criminal action in violation of Section 571.015, tampering with physical evidence in violation of Section 575.100, and abandonment of a corpse in violation of Section 194.425 following the shooting death of Frank J. Ancona ("Ancona"). Defendant was held in the St. Francois County jail on the warrant issued on the complaint. Defendant retained an attorney ("Counsel"), and on February 15, 2017, Counsel entered his appearance. On February 21, 2017, Defendant was arraigned, and a plea of not guilty was entered.

On February 27, 2017, Detective Sergeant Matthew Wampler ("Detective Wampler") received a search warrant to collect a buccal swab from Defendant for evidentiary purposes, and when Detective Wampler met with Defendant at the designated interview room, he identified himself as the detective handling the homicide investigation. While collecting the sample, Detective Wampler told Defendant that he would like to speak with him about the events surrounding Ancona’s death. Detective Wampler read Defendant his Miranda ² rights, and after Defendant signed a form waiving those rights, Detective Wampler began to question Defendant, throughout which time Defendant made several "relevant statements" pertaining to the homicide investigation.

On November 1, 2017, Counsel filed a Motion seeking to suppress Defendant’s interview statements as well as the DNA evidence obtained from the buccal swab. Therein, Counsel granted that "Detective Wampler read the Defendant his Miranda Rights [and that] Defendant waived his Miranda Rights in writing," but argued that he "never gave permission to allow Detective Wampler to interview the Defendant" and that he "did not even know this interview was happening."

A hearing on the Motion was held on November 16, 2017. Detective Wampler, the sole witness to testify, explained that he did not seek permission from Counsel to interview Defendant because he was unaware that Defendant had obtained an attorney. Detective Wampler acknowledged that he had access to and knew how to use Case.net at the time of the interview, but noted that he does not use the service "to figure out things of the court." Detective Wampler testified that, even so, Defendant did not indicate at the outset of the interview that he did not want to speak with him, and Defendant never informed him that he retained Counsel. Detective Wampler testified that, moreover, he read Defendant his Miranda rights from a St. Francois County designated form which, in addition to a recitation of the rights, stated above a signature line that Defendant "fully understood his rights" and waived them. Detective Wampler testified that Defendant indicated he understood his rights, acknowledged the waiver, and signed the form after initialing every page. Detective Wampler testified that, thereafter, he asked Defendant "questions about where he was, what he did, [and] all of his connections with the case," and Defendant "just continue[d] to speak with [him] about anything [he] was asking."

Detective Wampler testified that, eventually, Defendant "indicated that he didn't want to answer any more questions," and at that point, Detective Wampler terminated the interview. Detective Wampler testified that beyond Defendant’s failure to inform him that he had retained Counsel, Defendant never requested an attorney during the interview. Detective Wampler testified that he did not promise Defendant anything or coerce him into answering his questions, noted that Defendant did not appear to be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, and explained that Defendant appeared to understand the waiver form and the questions he was asked.

On April 6, 2018, the trial court entered its order granting Defendant’s Motion only as to his interview statements. In granting the Motion, the trial court noted, without elaboration, that Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009), a case relied upon by the State in arguing against the suppression of Defendant’s statements, "is factually distinguishable from the case at bar." The State’s interlocutory appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is limited to a determination of whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling. State v. Terry, 501 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). We will reverse the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress only if we find it to be clearly erroneous. State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. banc 2012), aff'd, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). A ruling is clearly erroneous only if we are left with a "definite and firm belief that a mistake has been made." Terry, 501 S.W.3d at 461 (quoting State v. Wilson, 169 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005) ). Thus, we will not reverse the ruling if it was plausible in light of the record when viewed in its entirety even if we would have weighed the evidence differently. Id. However, if "the issue to be decided involves the constitutional protection against forced self-incrimination, our review of the trial court’s ruling is a two-part inquiry: we defer to the trial court’s determinations of witness credibility and findings of fact, but consider the court’s conclusions of law de novo." State v. O'Neal, 392 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (quoting State v. Sardeson, 220 S.W.3d 458, 464-65 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007) ).

Discussion

In the State’s sole point on appeal, it argues that the trial court erred in sustaining Defendant’s Motion suppressing his statements because Defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during his interview with Detective Wampler. We agree.

"Criminal defendants ... have the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, which attaches at the time adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against them." State v. Beasley, 416 S.W.3d 357, 365 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972) ). The initiation of adversary judicial proceedings can occur "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." State v. Umphfrey, 242 S.W.3d 437, 441-42 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007) (quoting State v. Washington, 9 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999) ). Upon initiation of the adversary judicial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantees to a defendant the right to have counsel present during all critical stages of the criminal proceedings. Williams v. State, 367 S.W.3d 652, 654 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) ; Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786, 129 S.Ct. 2079. Interrogation by the State is considered a "critical stage" of the criminal proceedings." Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786, 129 S.Ct. 2079. Thus, the right "is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent." Beasley, 416 S.W.3d at 365 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ). Such incriminating statements obtained in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel are inadmissible. Id. at 366 (citing Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180, 106 S.Ct. 477 ).

However, the United States Supreme Court has explained that it is "beyond doubt that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, so long as relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786, 129 S.Ct. 2079 ; Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290-91, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988). "The defendant may waive the right whether or not he is already represented by counsel; the decision to waive need not itself be counseled." Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786, 129 S.Ct. 2079 (citing Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 352-53, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990) ); see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-23, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (while defendant was unaware that he had an attorney, he validly waived his right to counsel before police questioning where he comprehended his Miranda rights). "And when a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that typically does the trick, even though the Miranda rights purportedly have their source in the Fifth Amendment" because the Miranda warnings sufficiently apprise the defendant of his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 786, 129 S.Ct. 2079 (emphasis in original).

Here, the State argues that because the United States Supreme Court, in Montejo, overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), which held that a defendant’s waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is presumptively invalid if made after having previously asserted the right at an arraignment, the Jackson presumption could not have applied to Defendant. Thus, the State argues that Defendant validly waived his right to an attorney during his interview with Detective Wampler despite having previously retained Counsel. Defe...