State v. JM
| Decision Date | 07 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 44831-5-I.,44831-5-I. |
| Citation | 101 Wash.App. 716,6 P.3d 607 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. J.M., B.D. 8/2/85, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
James Dixon, Nielson Broman, Seattle, for Appellant.
Maureen Howard, Seattle, for Respondent.
The juvenile court adjudicated J.M. guilty of felony harassment in violation of RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i) and he appeals, contending that reversal is required because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that J.M. knew or reasonably should have known that his threat to kill his school principal would be communicated to the principal, and also failed to prove that J.M. knowingly engaged in words or conduct that placed the school principal in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out. We conclude that the only mens rea intended by the Legislature is as stated in the plain language of section (1)(a)(i) of the harassment statute: The perpetrator must knowingly communicate a threat to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person. The State need not prove, in addition, that the perpetrator knew or should have known that the person threatened would learn of the threat, but only that the person threatened did learn of it and, based on words or conduct of the perpetrator, was placed in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out. The State also need not prove the perpetrator's state of mind with respect to the words or conduct that placed the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out. Accordingly, we affirm the adjudication.
On April 28, 1999, approximately one week after the highly-publicized school shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, two Denny Middle School students, fourteen-year-old S.B. and thirteen-year-old J.T., were walking home from school. Thirteen-year-old J.M., who had recently been suspended from Denny Middle School, joined S.B. and J.T. and began to complain about the punishment he received at school. According to J.T., J.M. was angry at Wayne Hashiguchi, the principal of Denny Middle School; John Boyd, a Denny Middle School administrator; and Kevin Sharper, a Denny Middle School security person. The three students began talking about the Columbine shootings and J.M. said, "[T]hat's like something I would do[but] I'll only kill Mr. Hashiguchi, Mr. Boyd and Mr. Sharper." Clerk's Papers at 43. J.M. stated that he and his neighbor had a plan to enter the school, kill these men, and then move out of state. According to J.T., J.M. seemed excited and was "socking" his own hand as he spoke. Report of Proceedings at 39. S.B. also observed that J.M. was excited and anxious.
At first, S.B. did not take J.M.'s statements seriously. But "[a]s he thought about it that night he started to think that it was possible [J.M.] would do something like that." Clerk's Papers at 43. The next day at school, S.B. told a friend what J.M. had said and asked that friend if he thought J.M. "would carry through on his threat." Id. A Denny Middle School teacher overheard this conversation and reported it to a school counselor. The counselor brought S.B. to Hashiguchi, and S.B. told Hashiguchi what J.M. had said the previous day. Hashiguchi—who was aware of J.M.'s disciplinary problems at school and had observed J.M. "cry and be emotional, angry and loud"—was "shocked, surprised and concerned" and "afraid for his personal safety[.]" Id. at 44.
Hashiguchi reported the incident to the Seattle Police Department, and the State charged J.M. with felony harassment. At J.M.'s adjudicatory hearing at the close of the State's case, J.M. moved for dismissal, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence that J.M. knew his threat would be communicated to the school principal. The juvenile court disagreed that it was necessary for the State to prove such knowledge, and denied the motion. Subsequently, the court found that J.M. made threats that were communicated to Hashiguchi, that J.M. made these threats knowingly, and that Hashiguchi's fear for his safety was reasonable, in light of the recent shootings at Columbine High School, J.M.'s disciplinary record, and Hashiguchi's personal experience with J.M.'s emotional reaction to disciplinary measures that had previously been imposed. The court adjudicated J.M. guilty of felony harassment. J.M. appeals.
J.M. contends that the harassment statute, RCW 9A.46.020, requires the State to prove that he knew or reasonably should have known that the threat he communicated to two school chums to kill the school principal would be further communicated to the school principal, and that he also knowingly engaged in words or conduct that placed the principal in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out. Insofar as here pertinent, the harassment statute reads as follows:
RCW 9A.46.020(1). "Threat" means, inter alia, "to communicate directly or indirectly the intent ... [t]o cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person[.]" RCW 9A.04.110(25)(a). Harassment in violation of RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i) by threatening to kill the person threatened or any other person is a class C felony. RCW 9A.46.020(2).
J.M. contends that the adverb "knowingly" found in section (1)(a) of RCW 9A.46.020 modifies not only "threatens to cause bodily injury" under subsection (a)(i) but also modifies "by words or conduct places the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out" under subsection (b). J.M reasons that threats, particularly threats to kill or otherwise inflict bodily injury, are seldom communicated in any other manner than knowingly or intentionally; therefore, the Legislature must have intended to criminalize something more than merely consciously uttering a threat—and the "something more" can only be knowingly engaging in conduct that places the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out. Because a perpetrator who communicates a threat indirectly, e.g., by means of a third person, cannot "knowingly by words or conduct place the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out" unless the perpetrator knows or intends that the threat will be further communicated to that person, J.M. contends that the "words or conduct" element must contemplate some sort of harassing acts knowingly or intentionally directed toward the victim. Otherwise, J.M. concludes, the "words or conduct" element would not have been included, and the Legislature would have written subsection (b) of the statute to read: "[T]he person threatened was in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out." Appellant's Supp. Br. At 6.
In response, the State maintains that in accord with the plain meaning of the statute, the adverb "knowingly" modifies only the verb that it immediately precedes, so that insofar as the perpetrator's mens rea is concerned, the State need only prove that the accused knowingly threatened to cause bodily injury. By the State's proposed interpretation, the focus under subsection (b) of the statute is the reasonableness of the fear of the person threatened that the threat will be carried out, which reasonableness must be measured objectively in light of words or conduct of the perpetrator that the perpetrator may but need not have known or intended would place the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out.
The State reasons further that the Legislature must have recognized that words or conduct of a perpetrator not previously thought to be particularly significant could reasonably be viewed as highly significant when placed in context with a threat made by that perpetrator. Applying the State's reasoning to the facts of this case, it would follow that a rational trier of fact could find that the school principal was placed in reasonable fear that J.M. would carry out his threat to kill him based on the following words or conduct of J.M.: (1) J.M. made the threat only a few days after the killings at Columbine High School during a conversation about that atrocity in which J.M. stated that he planned to do the same thing, limiting the killing, however, to the school principal and two other administrators at the school; (2) J.M., who had been suspended from school, was excited and angry when he made the threat, pounding his fist into his hand; (3) J.M. had responded to previous disciplinary measures imposed at the school with loud, angry outbursts of a highly emotional nature, and the school principal knew this to be so because he had seen it happen.
As the State points out, the statutory definition of "`threat' does not contain a mental element—it merely reads (insofar as here pertinent): "Threat" means to communicate directly or indirectly the intent: (a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person[.]" RCW 9A.04.110(25)(a). The State reasons that the adverb "knowingly" modifies the verb "threaten" in order to protect free speech, so that within the context of RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a) and subsection (i), a "knowing threat" means a "true threat" as that term has been used by the appellate courts, as distinguished from an idle threat. A "true threat" is a statement made in a context or under such circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to foresee that the statement would be interpreted as a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm or to take the life of another person. State v. Knowles, 91 Wash.App. 367, 373, 957...
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...relevant federal statute does not include the word "intentionally." See supra text accompanying notes 45-63. [335]. See also State v. J.M., 6 P.3d 607 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (construing knowledge requirement in harassment statute to apply to element of making a threat but not to element of e......