State v. Johnson, A16-1887
| Decision Date | 11 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16-1887 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Chakotay Bobbie Johnson, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed
St. Louis County District Court
Lori Swanson, State Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Jessica J. Fralich, Assistant County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Reyes, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On appeal from his conviction of first-degree sale of a controlled substance, appellant argues that the district court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during an unlawful seizure. We affirm.
In November and December 2015, law enforcement received information from two confidential reliable informants (CRIs) that an apartment located on Grand Avenue in Duluth was being used to sell heroin. The CRIs informed the officers that two residents of the apartment were working with a group of black males from Chicago, Illinois, and selling heroin in an area behind the apartment. The CRIs did not know the apartment residents by name. The investigating officers conducted surveillance of the apartment and observed the two residents, A.C. and A.R., engage in hand-to-hand drug transactions. The officers also learned that the group from Chicago was in Duluth at that time and typically brought substantial quantities of heroin. On December 6, 2015, the officers obtained a warrant to search the apartment.
The next morning, the officers surveilled the apartment prior to executing the search warrant. At approximately 10:43 a.m., the officers observed A.C., A.R., and an unknown black male, later identified as appellant Chakotay Bobbie Johnson, arrive in a white Toyota Corolla registered to A.C. and park near the apartment. They exited the vehicle and walked toward the front door of the apartment. The officers observed appellant carrying a bulky object, later determined to be a black bag, concealed underneath a blanket.
After they walked past the front of the apartment building, two officers in plain clothes drew their guns and ordered all three to lie face down on the ground. Three additional officers joined to secure and handcuff them. One officer approached appellant to place handcuffs on him, and a second officer knelt by appellant to move the black bag from his reach. From their vantage points, both officers could see inside appellant's unzipped right jacket pocket and observed a baggie containing numerous smaller baggies and what appeared to be heroin in plain view.
The officers placed appellant under arrest and searched him. They discovered 61 individually wrapped baggies of suspected heroin, weighing 32.4 grams, on his person. The suspected heroin field-tested positive for heroin. The officers also discovered $7,440 in U.S. currency and assorted clothing and personal items within the black bag. The state charged appellant with felony first-degree sale of a controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2014).
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the heroin, arguing that it was the fruit of an unlawful seizure. The district court denied appellant's motion and determined that the officers' seizure of appellant was reasonable in view of the circumstances of the situation and law-enforcement interests, particularly officer safety. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied.
Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to proceed to trial before the district court to preserve appellate review of the pretrial suppression ruling pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court convicted appellant of felony first-degree sale of a controlled substance. This appeal follows.
On a stipulated-evidence trial pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, our review "is limited to the pretrial order that denied the motion to suppress." State v. Sterling, 782 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Minn. App. 2010). "[W]e may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence." State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). When the facts are not in dispute, as here, we review the pretrial decision de novo and "determine whether the police articulated an adequate basis for the search or seizure at issue." State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 247-48 (Minn. 2007).
Here, the parties agree that the officers seized appellant. The only issue in dispute is whether the officers lawfully seized appellant.
The district court analyzed the facts using a Summers analysis. Appellant challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the Michigan v. Summers rule, which authorizes detention incident to the execution of a search warrant, is inapplicable because appellant was a nonoccupant of the apartment subject to the search warrant. See 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595-96 (1981). We agree.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution guarantee the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. As a general rule, a seizure is unreasonable unless it is based on probable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime. Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013). As an exception to this general rule, the United States Supreme Court held in Michigan v. Summers that a search warrant "implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S. Ct. at 2595.
The Supreme Court did not define "occupant" in the Summers decision and has not since expanded on a definition. United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 843, 845 n.3 (8th Cir. 2011). However, the Supreme Court's rationale in Summers suggests that it limited its holding to individuals residing at the place to be searched. 452 U.S. at 704-05, 101 S. Ct. at 2595. The Supreme Court concluded that, on balance, the interests of law enforcement during the execution of a search warrant are substantial compared to the slight increase in the intrusion on individual liberty when a person whose residence is already subject to a search is also detained. Id. at 703, 101 S. Ct. at 2594; Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 125 S. Ct. 1465, 1469 (2005). An "occupant" is "one who occupies a particular place; especially: RESIDENT." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 858 (11th ed. 2014). Neither the State nor the district court cited caselaw where the detention of a nonoccupant was justified based solely on the Summers rule.
Here, no facts show that appellant resided at or occupied the apartment subject to the search warrant and the officers detained him outside of the apartment. Appellant produced an Illinois ID after his arrest, and the officers had not observed him at the apartment before detaining him. Moreover, the district court referred to appellant as a nonoccupant of the apartment. The state also conceded in its brief and at oral argument that appellant was a nonoccupant. We conclude that appellant was neither an occupant of the apartment nor subject to the search warrant and his detention cannot be justified solely on the basis of Summers.1
The state alternatively argues that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain appellant. We may consider an alternative argument when the record contains sufficient facts to support our consideration. State v. Bunce, 669 N.W.2d 394, 400 (Minn. App. 2003) (citing State v. Grunig, 660 N.W.2d 134 (Minn. 2003)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2003). At the hearing on appellant's motion to reconsider, the district court suggested that the police reports did not support the state's argument. However, in its order denying appellant's suppression motion, the district court relied in part on State v. Bitterman, 304 Minn. 481, 232 N.W.2d 91 (1975). In Bitterman, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the detention and frisk of a nonoccupant who had arrived at a residence during the execution of a search warrant. Id. at 484-85, 232 N.W.2d at 94. The supreme court concluded that the detention was justified because the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion in light of the circumstances and facts of the situation. Id.
Here, the district court evaluated both the Summers law-enforcement interests and the circumstances and facts known to the officers at the time of appellant's detention and determined that it was reasonable to detain appellant. We conclude that the reasonable-suspicion argument is properly before this court.
Appellant argues that the officers did not articulate a reasonable basis for detaining him. We disagree.
Under Terry v. Ohio, a police officer may temporarily seize a person if the officer has a reasonable, articulable basis to suspect that...
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