State v. Johnson, A04-838.

Decision Date05 July 2005
Docket NumberNo. A04-838.,A04-838.
Citation699 N.W.2d 335
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Travis Clayton JOHNSON, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Gregory A. Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Crookston, MN, for respondent.

Steven M. Light, Fargo, ND, for appellant.

Considered and decided by LANSING, Presiding Judge; STONEBURNER, Judge; and MINGE, Judge.

OPINION

LANSING, Judge.

In this appeal from convictions of first-degree burglary and fifth-degree assault, Travis Johnson challenges the district court's jury instructions and its determination that a defendant may be cross-examined about his probationary status and the conditions of his probation. Because we conclude that the district court properly instructed the jury and did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to cross-examine Johnson about his probation, we affirm.

FACTS

In April 2004, a jury found Travis Johnson guilty of first-degree burglary and fifth-degree assault. The evidence at trial showed that on February 3, 2004, while on probation, 29-year-old Travis Johnson went to a bar and consumed alcohol. While standing outside the bar, he saw 67-year-old Donald Johnson walking to his car and asked to talk to him about a disagreement between the two men that occurred several years earlier. Donald Johnson testified that he continued walking. Travis Johnson then walked up to him and hit him. After a bartender interrupted the altercation, Donald Johnson drove home.

When he pulled into his garage, Donald Johnson saw a pickup truck pull up behind him. Initially, he thought that his friend Larry Stortroen had followed him home. After he got out of the car, however, he saw Travis Johnson standing in the garage. The men started arguing and an altercation ensued. Donald Johnson testified that Travis Johnson pushed him to the ground, climbed on top of him, and started punching him.

On direct examination, Travis Johnson testified that he had been at the same bar as Donald Johnson and had an argument with him outside the bar but did not punch him at that time. He then followed Donald Johnson home, entered his garage, and asked for an apology. Donald Johnson grabbed him by the throat and hit him. After about forty-five seconds, Travis Johnson hit Donald Johnson to force him to release his throat hold. When Larry Stortroen arrived, Donald Johnson let go of Travis Johnson and Travis Johnson left.

On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Travis Johnson about his probationary status and the conditions of his probation. Travis Johnson admitted that he was on probation and that, as a condition of probation, he was required to be law-abiding and to refrain from drinking alcohol and going to bars. He also stated that he did not know if he had "time hanging over [his] head" if he violated the conditions of his probation. The court immediately cautioned the jury that evidence of Travis Johnson's probation had been offered for the limited purpose of assisting them in determining whether he had committed the crimes with which he was charged and that he was not on trial for, and could not be convicted of, any offense other than the offense charged in the complaint. The court specifically instructed the jury that it could not convict Travis Johnson on the basis of his probation violation.

The jury found Travis Johnson guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced him to the presumptive sentence. This appeal from the judgment of conviction follows.

ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the state to cross-examine Travis Johnson about his probationary status and the conditions of his probation?
II. Did the district court commit reversible error in instructing the jury on first-degree burglary?
III. Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of fourth-degree burglary?
ANALYSIS
I

Travis Johnson argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the state to cross-examine him about his probationary status and the conditions of his probation to reveal a possible motive to lie. Johnson claims that because he admitted on direct examination that he had been drinking at a bar, the state did not have a legitimate reason on cross-examination to inquire into his probationary status.

Rulings on evidentiary matters rest within the district court's sound discretion. State v. Moua, 678 N.W.2d 29, 37 (Minn.2004). This court will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent evidence that the district court abused its discretion and that the evidentiary ruling substantially influenced the jury's decision. Id.

Whether a defendant who has not raised his probationary status on direct examination may be questioned about it on cross-examination has not been previously addressed by Minnesota appellate courts. Cf. State v. Palmer, 206 Minn. 185, 191-92, 288 N.W. 160, 164 (1939) (holding that district court did not err in allowing state to cross-examine defendant about failure to comply with conditions of probation after defendant testified on direct examination that he had complied). But the Supreme Court has held that a witness may be cross-examined about his probationary status to establish that the witness had an incentive to cooperate and curry favor with the state as a result of his status. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111-12, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (allowing state to cross-examine juvenile witness about probationary status despite juvenile's interest in privacy of his delinquency record). Other courts have held that when defendants take the witness stand in their own behalf, they take on the role of a witness and become subject to cross-examination to the same extent as any other witness. See, e.g., Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 85 (4th Cir.1941)

; United States v. Waldon, 114 F.2d 982, 984 (7th Cir.1940).

Travis Johnson took on the role of a witness after he took the stand and, like the defendant in Davis, he became subject to cross-examination to the same extent as any other witness. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to cross-examine Travis Johnson about his probationary status to show that he had a motive to lie. See Minn. R. Evid. 616 (stating that evidence of bias, prejudice, or interest for or against any party is admissible to test the credibility of a witness).

Travis Johnson claims that his admissions on direct examination made it unnecessary for the state to cross-examine him about his probationary status. Although Travis Johnson testified that he had been drinking at a bar, he did not mention that he was on probation or that he was required to remain law-abiding as a condition of probation. Subject to the limitations imposed by the rules of evidence, the state was entitled to elicit that evidence to make a record from which the jury could infer that Travis Johnson had a motive to lie about his failure to remain law-abiding—namely, to avoid a substantial jail sentence for violating the conditions of his probation. Because the prosecutor did not exceed the limitations of the rules of evidence, the district court properly allowed the state to cross-examine Travis Johnson about the conditions of his probation. See Minn. R. Evid. 401 (defining "relevant evidence" as evidence tending to make existence of fact, such as bias, more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence); Minn. R. Evid. 403 (allowing exclusion of relevant evidence when probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice); Minn. R. Evid. 608(b) (allowing inquiry into specific instances of misconduct for impeachment purposes if conduct probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness); Minn. R. Evid. 609 (limiting use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes).

II

Travis Johnson next argues that the district court's burglary instruction constituted plain error because it misstated the law. We disagree.

The district court is allowed considerable latitude when selecting language for jury instructions. Alholm v. Wilt, 394 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn.1986). The law requires only that "the charge as a whole convey to the jury a clear and correct understanding of the law of the case." Barnes v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 233 Minn. 410, 421, 47 N.W.2d 180, 187 (1951). This court reviews jury instructions in their entirety to determine if they fairly and accurately reflect the law of the case. State v. Peou, 579 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Minn.1998); State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn.1988). Travis Johnson concedes that he did not object to the district court's burglary instruction at trial. His conviction will therefore be reversed only if the instruction constitutes plain error. State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.2002). To establish plain error, Travis Johnson must prove that there was error, the error was plain, and the error affected substantial rights. State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn.2001). An instruction is erroneous if it materially misstates the law. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d at 917. An error is plain if it is "clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal." Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997).

The statute under which Travis Johnson was charged provides in relevant part: "Whoever enters a building without consent ... and commits a crime while in the building ... commits burglary in the first degree ... if ... the burglar assaults a person within the building or on the building's appurtenant property." Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2002).

The district court instructed the jury that

The statutes of Minnesota provide that whoever enters a building without the consent of the person in lawful possession, and assaults another person within the building or on the building's appurtenant property, is guilty of a crime.
The elements of burglary in the first degree
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
19 cases
  • State v. Khalil, A19-1281
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • July 27, 2020
    ...28, 1990). We have also held that the probationary status of a defendant is admissible to show a motive to lie. State v. Johnson , 699 N.W.2d 335, 338-39 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005). Second, the district court found that the then-recent felony conviction and acco......
  • State v. Williams, No. A04-1586 (MN 11/1/2005)
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • November 1, 2005
    ...622 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 2001). An error is plain if it is "clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal." State v. Johnson, 699 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. App. 2005) (quotation Here, the district court followed the standard instructions of CRIMJIG 15.02, which explain the elements kidna......
  • State v. James
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • June 3, 2013
    ...questions; rather, they were permissible questions about whether P.O. or C.N. were biased against James. Cf. State v. Johnson, 699 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Minn. App. 2005) ("[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to cross-examine[the defendant] about his probationa......
  • State v. Coker, No. A06-1531 (Minn. App. 11/27/2007)
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • November 27, 2007
    ...as an aside" that it also intended to cross-examine Coker about his probationary status, citing our decision in State v. Johnson, 699 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005). The state planned to demonstrate that Coker, like the defendant in Johnson, "had a motive......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT