State v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 13 April 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. S97G1681.,S97G1681. |
| Citation | 499 S.E.2d 56,269 Ga. 370 |
| Parties | The STATE v. JOHNSON. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stacey K. Hydrick, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for the State.
J. Converse Bright, Valdosta, for Carolene Johnson. HUNSTEIN, Justice.
We granted certiorari in this case to consider the construction the Court of Appeals gave to OCGA § 16-10-20 in State v. Johnson, 226 Ga.App. 836, 487 S.E.2d 677 (1997). For the following reasons we reverse that court.
Carolene Johnson was indicted in Fulton County and charged, in 44 counts, with the offense of false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of a department of the State. OCGA § 16-10-20. That statute sets forth three ways to commit the crime of false statement: (1) when a person knowingly and willfully falsifies a material fact; (2) when a person makes a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) when a person "makes or uses any false writing or document, knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry." Id. This appeal involves the third way of violating OCGA § 16-10-20.
It was alleged that Johnson, while operating a school in Lanier County that provided education and intervention programs for people convicted of driving under the influence, falsified the certificates of completion and the class rosters for 22 persons so as to indicate they attended and completed required programs when they had not done so. However, Johnson was not indicted for making the false documents; rather, the 44 counts of the indictment specifically charged Johnson with "knowingly and willfully us[ing ] a false document, knowing the same to contain a false statement, by causing the document to be submitted" either to the Department of Public Safety (as to the 22 counts regarding the certificates of completion1) or to the Department of Human Resources (as to the 22 counts regarding the class rosters2).
1. We agree with the State that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that a charge of "using" a false document under OCGA § 16-10-20 applies only to a person who uses a false document that was prepared by another. State v. Johnson, supra at 837, 487 S.E.2d 677. While the Court of Appeals correctly noted that the person who makes a false document containing the false statement has already violated the statute, id., nothing in the plain language of OCGA § 16-10-20 restricts the State to prosecuting the maker solely for the falsification itself, when the maker also violates the statute by using the falsified document.3
[S]tatutes should be read according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions, for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation, [cit.], and this principle is particularly compelling when interpreting criminal statutes. [Cit.]
State v. Luster, 204 Ga.App. 156, 158(1)(a)(ii), 419 S.E.2d 32 (1992). Even construing OCGA § 16-10-20 strictly against the State, see generally Jowers v. State, 225 Ga.App. 809(2), 484 S.E.2d 803 (1997), the language therein unambiguously prohibits an individual from making or using any false writing or document, without regard to the identity of the individual who initially made or subsequently used the false document. Because there is no limitation placed on the prohibited conduct of "making or using" false documents in OCGA § 16-10-20, the statutory language does not support the Court of Appeals' holding that prosecution for use of a false document is limited to those situations in which an accused uses false documents prepared by another. State v. Johnson, supra at 837, 487 S.E.2d 677. Where statutory language is plain and unequivocal and leads to no absurd or impracticable consequence, the court has no authority to place a different construction upon it. See generally Holden v. State, 187 Ga.App. 597(2), 370 S.E.2d 847 (1988). It thus follows that under OCGA § 16-10-20, all individuals who use a false writing or document, knowing it to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the State or its political subdivisions, may be charged with violating the statute.
2. We hold that venue for the prosecution of OCGA § 16-10-20 for the use of a false document is proper in the county in which the document was submitted for use, even if the person charged with using the false document made the document in another county. As was noted in State v. Barber, 193 Ga.App. 397, 398, 388 S.E.2d 350 (1989), "(studying) the key verbs which define the criminal offense in the statute is helpful in determining venue in doubtful cases." (Punctuation and citations omitted.) In OCGA § 16-10-20, the key distinction is whether an indictee has been charged with "making" or with "using" the document. Where the criminal act involves the making of a false document, the essence of the crime is the act of falsification itself, which is an act separate and distinct from submitting, sending or using the falsified document. Hence, in State v. Barber, supra, venue for the falsification of medical assistance documents under OCGA § 49-4-146.1(b)(2) was properly found to be in the county where the falsification occurred. See also Spray v. State, 223 Ga.App. 154(2), 476 S.E.2d 878 (1996) , 476 S.E.2d 878. Where the criminal act involves the use of a false document, the essence of the crime is the act of submitting, presenting or otherwise employing the false document in any matter within the jurisdiction of the State or political subdivision, an act which is separate and distinct from the act of falsification. Accord State v. Barber, 260 Ga. 269, 394 S.E.2d 353 (1990),...
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