State v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 11 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 53A04-9602-CR-57,53A04-9602-CR-57 |
| Citation | 669 N.E.2d 411 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Glen JOHNSON, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
The State appeals an order granting Glen Johnson's ("Johnson") pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. We reverse and remand for trial.
Although the State presents two issues for our review, we examine only one because it is dispositive: whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.
Bloomington police officer Todd Schmitt ("Schmitt") telephoned Judge Kenneth Todd and requested a warrant to search two particular rooms at the local Comfort Inn. Based upon the information which Schmitt averred, Judge Todd issued the warrant. Following a search, Johnson was charged with Possession of Cocaine, a class D felony, and Obstruction of Justice, also a class D felony. Johnson filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. Following a hearing on the matter, Judge E. Michael Hoff granted Johnson's motion. Thereafter, the State filed a motion to dismiss because the trial court's order granting the motion to suppress precluded further prosecution. The motion was granted and this appeal ensued.
The State contends that it produced sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant. In the alternative, the State claims that even if it did not present sufficient probable cause to support the warrant, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule requires the admission of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. We agree with the latter argument.
We initially observe that Johnson has waived his right to file an appellate brief in this matter. A less stringent standard of review applies and an appellant need only establish prima facie error to win a reversal when the appellee fails to file a brief. Ferrell v. State, 656 N.E.2d 839, 840 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (citing State v. Costas, 552 N.E.2d 459 (Ind.1990)). Prima facie error is error which appears at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of the argument. Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 625 N.E.2d 458, 460 (Ind.Ct.App.1993).
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was modified in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), reh. denied, to permit the use, in the prosecutor's case-in-chief, of evidence seized in good faith reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. Stabenow v. State, 495 N.E.2d 197, 201 (Ind.Ct.App.1986). Today, the good faith exception is outlined in Indiana Code Section 35-37-4-5:
(a) In a prosecution for a crime ..., the court may not grant a motion to exclude evidence on the grounds that the search or seizure by which the evidence was obtained was unlawful if the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer in good faith.
(b) ... evidence is obtained by a law enforcement officer in good faith if:
(1) it is obtained pursuant to:
(A) a search warrant that was properly issued upon a determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate, that is free from obvious defects ..., and that was reasonably believed by the law enforcement officer to be valid; or
(B) ...; and
(2) the law enforcement officer, at the time he obtains the evidence, has satisfied applicable minimum basic training requirements....
The good faith exception does not apply if the warrant was based upon false information knowingly or recklessly supplied by an affiant, or if the affidavit upon which the warrant was based is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Cutter v. State, 646 N.E.2d 704, 714-15 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied.
There is no indication in the record that Judge Todd was not neutral and detached, that the warrant contained obvious defects, or that Schmitt did not satisfy basic training requirements. Thus, we examine the remaining potential impediments to the application of the good faith exception: (a) whether the warrant was based upon false information knowingly or recklessly supplied by an affiant, and (b) whether the affidavit upon which the warrant was based was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.
Notwithstanding Johnson's counsel's assertions to the contrary, no evidence presented shows that Schmitt knowingly or recklessly supplied false information to support his application for a warrant. At the suppression hearing, Johnson's counsel insinuated that since there was no reference to Anderson suppliers in the written reports of the previous investigations of Johnson, then Schmitt must have been lying when he averred to Judge Todd that prior investigations had uncovered an Anderson connection. 1 Yet, when finally allowed to respond to Johnson's counsel's question as to how he learned of the Anderson connection, Schmitt replied, "From previous cases we have intelligence that he had suppliers living in Anderson...." He further stated, When asked the same question on cross-examination, Schmitt elaborated that he knew that Johnson had been getting his cocaine from Anderson Thus, while this "intelligence" was hearsay, there was no showing that it was false information knowingly or recklessly supplied by Schmitt.
We next examine the indicia of probable cause question. The telephonic affidavit was primarily supported by information provided to Schmitt by an informant. That is, the information was hearsay. Indiana Code Section 35-33-5-2(b) provides that an affidavit for probable cause may be based on hearsay if it: "(1) contain[s] reliable information establishing the credibility of the source and of each of the declarants of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished; or (2) contain[s] information that establishes that the totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay." Doss v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (emphasis added).
The informant had provided reliable information to Schmitt on four or five occasions in the past, thus Schmitt found him credible. On the day Schmitt requested the search warrant of Johnson's rooms, the informant stated, "Johnson is currently still active in selling cocaine" and a couple days prior, he had "returned back from Anderson" where he gets his cocaine. The informant also stated that although Johnson and a woman had been living together in an apartment in Bloomington, they recently had moved into the Bloomington Comfort Inn to sell cocaine because they were advised that the "heat [was] on," that is, they were under investigation. The informant also gave Schmitt information regarding numerous phone calls to Johnson's rooms at the inn.
Upon further investigation, Schmitt spoke with the manager of the particular inn. No circumstances were known which would call the inn manager's motives into question. 2 The manager informed Schmitt that Johnson and a woman had indeed checked into the rooms, that they stayed in their rooms quite often, and that they always paid in cash. Additionally, the inn's phone records indicated that they had received over forty phone calls to their rooms within the forty-eight hours prior to the telephonic affidavit for the warrant. Moreover, Schmitt knew of Johnson's previous links with Anderson, and past police experience had taught him that the situation described by the informant and the inn manager was indicative of how drug dealers "set up shop." Thus, the totality of the circumstances corroborated the informant's information.
While we do not pass upon the question of whether sufficient probable cause to support a warrant was presented, we have no difficulty determining that in light of the aforementioned information, Schmitt's belief in the validity of the warrant was reasonable. Sufficient indicia of probable cause was evident. Therefore, using the less stringent standard of review appropriate in this case, we hold that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement applies. As such,...
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