State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 11 May 1909
• Citation: 53 Wash. 142,101 P. 708
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. JONES.

101 P. 708

53 Wash. 142

STATE v. JONES.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 11, 1909

Appeal from Superior Court, Kittitas County; Ralph Kauffman, Judge.

W. G Jones was convicted of larceny, and appeals. Affirmed.

Pruyn & Felkner, for appellant.

C. R Hovey and H. W. Hale, for the State.

CHADWICK J.

Appellant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny. One Judd Wilson had already been convicted of the same offense and sentenced to the penitentiary. He was brought from the penitentiary and sworn as a witness for the state at the trial. When upon the witness stand, he was asked on cross-examination to give his true name, after he had admitted that 'Judd Wilson' was an assumed name. An objection to this question was sustained. This is assigned as error. No authorities are cited by counsel that in any way aid us in the determination of this question, nor have we been able to find any. It would seem however, that it can be determined by reference to general principles. The conviction of appellant must depend upon the proof of certain physical facts to which the witness Wilson and other witnesses have testified. The name of the witness could not be material to prove or disprove any fact upon which conviction depends. It was at best collateral to the main inquiry, and, if material at all, could only go to the credibility of the witness. Its materiality and importance, though urged by counsel, are not pointed out. In order to reverse the case for this reason, we would have to presume prejudice resulting to appellant from the mere fact that the true name of the witness was not disclosed. This we cannot do. Appellant had the full benefit of cross-examination. He showed that the witness was a convict; that he had been living under an assumed name; that he had by his own admission confessed his perjury when testifying in his own behalf when tried for the same offense. Disclosure of his true name would have been of no benefit to the jury, and it was not an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court to thus limit the cross-examination.

Appellant was charged with the theft of lawful money of the United States, whereas on cross-examination the prosecuting witness admitted that the money stolen might have been Canadian money. It is insisted that this brings this case within the rule of State v. Phillips, 27 Wash. 364, 67 P. 608. In that case it is said: 'The record has been carefully examined, and no further or more specific description of the money contained in the package stolen can be gathered from the testimony.' It is not so here. Both on cross-examination and redirect-examination the witness testified that he was familiar with 'United States money,' and that 'it was United States currency,' and that 'it looked like United States money.' He also described the several denominations of the bills alleged to have been stolen. The weight to be given to this evidence was for the jury, and their finding cannot be disturbed by isolating one question and answer from the whole examination, or because the testimony on the whole was without qualification. State v. Murphy, 15 Wash. 98, 45 P. 729; State v. Hill, 45 Wash. 694, 89 P. 160.

The next error complained of is the refusal of the court to give the following instruction: 'The witness Judd Wilson, who has testified in the case, is an accomplice, and an accomplice is one who is associated with others in the commission of crime; all being principals. Wilson has testified that he was associated with the defendant in stealing the money mentioned in the information, and that in law would make him an accomplice. The court instructs you that...