State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 07 June 1909
• Citation: 120 S.W. 154,91 Ark. 5
• Parties: STATE v. JONES
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

120 S.W. 154

91 Ark. 5

STATE v. JONES

Supreme Court of Arkansas

June 7, 1909

Appeal from Lincoln Circuit Court, Varner District; Antonio B Grace, Judge; reversed.

Reversed and remanded.

Hal L Norwood, Attorney General, C. A. Cunningham, Assistant, for appellant.

The court below misapprehended the meaning of the word "charge," as used in § 1562, Kirby's Digest. The Legislature evidently meant to use the word in its ordinary sense, and not in its legal signification. 1 Bish. Cr. Law, pp. 408-9-10; Clark, Cr. Law, p. 113; Endlich Int. Stat., §§ 258, 264; Lewis' Sutherland on Stat. Int., §§ 389, 390, 392, 394; 129 Cal. 364; 92 Id. 590; 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 176; 34 N.Y.S. 228.

W. B. Sorrells and Bridges, Wooldridge & Gantt for appellees.

The word "charge" has a legal, definite meaning, and the court should so construe. Where a statute has such a meaning at common law, or in the written law, it will be presumed to be used in that sense. Lewis' Suth. Stat. Const., § 398; Id. 399; Black, Int. Stat., p. 131; 5 Ark. 539; 46 Id. 159, 162; 26 A. & E. Enc. Law. (2 Ed.), p. 598; 24 Ark. 494; 59 Id. 244; 38 Id. 521; 90 Mass. 478; 20 F. 298, 308; 150 U.S. 68.

Penal statutes are strictly construed, so that no case is held to be reached except such as are clearly within the spirit and letter of the law. 2 Hawkins, P. C. § 16; 38 Ark. 521; 129 Cal. 364.

Charged evidently means accused of or charged with crime in a regular course of judicial proceeding. Webster; 129 Cal. 364; 20 F. 298, 308; 150 U.S. 68; 1 A. & E. Enc. L., (2 Ed.) 481; 112 Mich. 251; 19 Kans. 417, 426; 102 Ga. 673; 74 S.W. 184; Black on Stat. Const. p. 132.

MCCULLOCH, C. J. Battle, J., dissenting.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

The State appeals from a judgment of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer to an indictment against defendant, J. W. Jones, charging him with having been accessory after the fact to the crime of murder committed by one George Battles. The indictment alleges in substance that the said George Battles did kill and murder one Jarrett Johnson, and that the defendant, after said crime of murder had been committed and with full knowledge that said Battles had committed said crime, "did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously harbor, protect, conceal and aid to escape the said George Battles," etc.

The statute of this State defining the crime of accessory after the fact is as follows: "An accessory after the fact is a person who, after a full knowledge that a crime has been committed, conceals it from the magistrate, or harbors and protects the person charged with or found guilty of the crime." Kirby's Digest, § 1562.

Another section of the statute (1566) provides that "an accessory before or after the fact may be indicted, arraigned, tried and punished, although the principal offender may not have been arrested and tried, or may have been pardoned or otherwise discharged."

The learned circuit judge sustained the demurrer on the ground that the indictment failed to state an offense because it is not alleged therein that a judicial charge or accusation was pending against the principal, George Battles, at the time the defendant is alleged to have committed the acts which constituted the crime of accessory after the fact. In other words, that under the statute it is not a crime to knowingly harbor and protect a felon unless an indictment or other judicial proceedings be then pending against the principal for his apprehension or punishment.

We do not concur in this interpretation of the statute. Under the statutes of this State, either an officer or private person, with or without a warrant, "may make an arrest when he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has committed a felony." Kirby's Digest, §§ 2119, 2120. So, where a felony has been committed, the felon stands charged with the crime, and it is the duty of all persons who know or have reason to believe that he is guilty of a felony to arrest him. One who, with a full knowledge that the crime has been committed, harbors and protects the felon, is guilty as accessory and may be punished as such, whether the principal offender be arrested or not. Any other view of the statute would permit a person to go unpunished who has been guilty of the most flagrant act of harboring and protecting a felon before a warrant of arrest could be procured or an indictment could be returned.

It is, of course, a well-settled rule of interpretation that when the Legislature uses words which have received a judicial interpretation, words which have a fixed and well-known legal signification, they are presumed to have been used in that sense, unless the contrary intention clearly appears. This court has said that "it is dangerous to interpret a statute contrary to its express words where it is not obvious that the makers mean something different from what they have said." Memphis & L. R. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 46 Ark. 159.

But it is equally well-settled that the language of a statute should be fairly and rationally interpreted so as to carry out the manifest intention of its framers. "In general, it may safely be said that when words in a statute are susceptible of two constructions, of which one will lead to an absurdity, the other will not, the latter will be adopted." Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, 258.

Now, the words "charged with," as applied to the perpetration of crime, cannot be said to have a well-known and established legal signification. Chief Justice Andrews, speaking for the Supreme Court of Connecticut, said: "The expression 'charged with,' as applied to a crime, is sometimes used in a limited sense--intending the accusation of a crime which precedes a formal trial. In a fuller and more accurate sense, the expression includes also the responsibility for the crime." Drinkall v. Spiegel, 68 Conn. 441, 36 A. 830.

In the search for the meaning of the lawmakers, it is proper to consider what at common law were the elements of this crime and whether there was any intention to change by statute its elements. Professor Wharton defined the common-law...